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Abstract 
This thesis considers the way in which Ludwig Feuerbach, in The Essence of 
Christianity (1841), attempts a reversal of Hegelian ontology. Principally, it 
attempts to define the role of the imagination in this reversal. Chapter 1 isolates 
the forms proper to religious and speculative knowledge in Hegel' s philosophy of 
religion, which supposes the necessity of an ontological concept for thought. 
Chapter 2 isolates three modes of Feuerbachian epistemology - emotion, 
imagination, and reason - and contextualizes each with respect to Hegel. The 
second chapter suggests that The Essence of Christianity is simultaneously a 
critique of speculative ontology, and marks the way in which the Feuerbachian 
species-concept attempts a retrieval of the unity that is lost with the annulment of 
the God-concept of theological-speculative ontology. Chapter 3 considers the 
ambiguous place of the imagination in Feuerbach' s critique, and points to the 
slippery nature of his claim to have retrieved a pre-reflective concept which 
preexists the "necessary'' concept of theological-speculative ontology. This last 
chapter shows the way in which Feuerbach esteems the imagination as an 
essential mode ofhuman self-knowing. 
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Introduction 
'the Young Hegelians: A Preliminary Context 
In Germany, the year 1835 brought with it the publication of the 
contentious work, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined. Its author, 27 year-old 
David Friedrich Strauss, had inadvertently ushered in a new age of Hegelianism, 
an age of philosophical-theological inquiry in which the dogmatic and 
metaphysical dimensions of Christian theology, particularly as they appeared in 
the Hegelian world picture, were called into serious question. 1 Strauss' influence, 
at this early stage, spawned a new series of critical "lives" in the search for the 
historical Jesus. His Life of Jesus was soon present in the currents of French 
intellectual life, as it was in Victorian England, where the young George Eliot 
undertook work on its translation. It was soon r~cognized as a product of "left-
1 Although Strauss' Life of Jesus was the first book to jolt fiery debate within Hegelian, academic, 
and even public circles, it is important to note that Feuerbach himself was author to the first 
recognized work of"ymmg Hegelianism." Thoughts on Death apd Immortality, a work which 
attempted to dispel belief in the illusion of personal immortality and to reorient the spiritual 
yearrungs of hunian beings to the finite conditions of this world, appeared in 1830. With its 
publication, Feuerbach was assured a relative degree of notoriety, though almost entirely negative, 
and as a result of which he was kept from ever acquiring a university post. For the remaining 
years of his life, he would cany out his writing in a place of relative isolation from the academic 
world whose philosophical-spiritual convictions he sought to throw asunder, or bring back to 
earth. 
2 
wing Hegelianism," a phrase formulated by the author himself in his defense of 
the controversial work.2 The most prominent members of this new Hegelianism 
were Strauss himself, and eventually, Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, each 
of whom was concerned, in large part, with the relationship of Hegelian 
philosophy to the Christian religion. In their mature work, Hegelian and Christian 
thought were divested of their transcendent aspect and interpreted as expressions 
of truths immanent in humanity- without the divine, infinite, other. 
In his Life of Jesus, Strauss attempted a systematic critique of the gospels, 
and deemed them unhistorical in terms of both supernatural and natural history. 
He suggested that the gospels of the New Testament were conditioned by a 
mythopoetic, rather than a historical, mode of thought, and that theology had to 
reexamine its content in light of this mythopoetical form. Strauss concluded, in 
other words, that the source of religious truth was fashioned by the mythopoetic 
spirit of pre-scientific humanity, and that the theologians of his day, 
supernaturalists and naturalists alike, were shortsighted in their credo that 
religious truth depended essentially upon the historical referent of an eternal God-
in-Christ. Bauer, though beginning as a staunch opponent of Strauss, would soon 
put forth a more liberal position, eliminating, like Strauss, the transcendent guise 
of the divine being. He, too, endorsed a similarly immanent interpretation of 
religion in general, and of Christianity in particular. "Religion," suggested Bauer, 
"in teaching God separate from man, was denying that unity and thus denying the 
2 David Friedrich Strauss, In Defense of my Life ofJesus against the Hegelians, trans. and ed. 
Marilyn Chapin Massey (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1983). 
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act of knowledge."3 And if God was, as Bauer and Strauss would have it, not 
distinct from the human being, then the object of religious knowledge proper 
could be none other than humanity itself. It is within this discussion of the 
relationship between humanity and the divine that Ludwig Feuerbach takes his 
place in the figuration of nineteenth century, German thought. 
Ludwig F euerbach and The Essence of Christianity, .1841 
Feuerbach is most often remembered as the author of The Essence of 
Christianity, first published in 1841. In The Essence ofChristianity, Feuerbach, 
like Strauss and Bauer, reduces the absolute and infmite nature of the divine to a 
level of human finitude. With Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as his 
springboard, Feuerbach does so explicitly in terms of self-'consciousness; we do 
not find in Feuerbach the kind of historical-critical or textual analysis we find in 
both Bauer and Strauss. 4 Feuerbach, on the contrary, seeks out the essence of 
Christianity strictly in human consciousness, which for him encompasses the 
human capacity for emotion, imagination, and reason. It is thus, moreover, that 
he differs from Hegel, in that the latter fashions his understanding of Christianity 
in terms of consciousness at the level of both finite human and infmite God. For 
Feuerbach, the study of Christianity is not the study of God or of an absolute 
philosophical concept, but of the truths immanent in the human species. 
3William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 191. 
4 Feuerbach himself makes thisclear. See Ludwig Feuerbach, "Preface to the Second Edition," 
The Essence of Christianity, translated by George Eliot (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), 
p. xxii. Moreover, while Strauss effects a "leftist" reinterpretation of Hegelian philosophy, 
4 
''Theology," he says famously, "is Anthropology."5 In The Essence of 
Christianity, Feuerbach's discussion of self-consciousness is carried out from the 
perspective of human self-consciousness alone, rather than the self-consciousness 
of an other, absolute, and divine being (i.e., the God of Christianity). In Hegel's 
dialectical model, the Absolute comes to self-consciousness via reason - as 
mediated by humanity; and humanity, similarly, comes to self-consciousness 
through the Absolute.6 God and humanity, infmite and finite: each finds 
fulfillment in the other; each is an object to the other. Feuerbach, on the other 
hand, suggests that the human subject simply misinterprets or projects itself as a 
divine object, which in turn becomes known to consciousness as an active rational 
subject:7 "consciousness of the objective is the self-consciousness of man .... 
The absolute to man is his own nature.',s The proper object of consciousness, in 
other words, has always been the human being; and thus should the proper object 
of religion, theology and philosophy, be humanity itsel£ 
The Present Investigation 
Despite the seemingly provocative and significant nature of these 
conclusions, Feuerbach has yet to achieve a permanent place in the pantheon of 
Feuer bach attempts the very reversal of Hegelian ontology, and makes no effort to rescue the 
Hegelian world picture (Weltanschauung). 
5 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, translated by George Eliot (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 1989), p. xvii. 
6 Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller with an analysis of 
the text and foreword by J.N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 138. 
7 This "Projection Theory" is central to the discussion in Van A. Harvey, Feuerbach and the 
Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
8 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 5. 
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western thinkers. Whether he deserves an exalted position therein is doubtful; but 
it is a matter of relative misfortune that he has been neglected in the study of both 
philosophy and religion, and has been viewed, often at best, as a transitional 
figure between Hegel and Marx.9 Intellectuals, it is true, have not been reticent in 
their words about Feuerbach. Even the erudite Isaiah Berlin is harsh in his 
judgment of the young Hegelian, dismissing him as a figure of mere derivative or 
transitional status. Feuerbach, he writes, is "one of those authors, not infrequently 
met with in the history of thought, who, mediocrities themselves, nevertheless 
happen to provide men of genius with the sudden spark which sets on fire the 
long-accumulated fuel. His own contribution to philosophy is jejune and 
uninspired,"10 Berlin's vision here is perhaps impaired by the same dark shadow 
which looms over Feuerbach (here, that of Marx, but often that of Hegel). And 
this is the darkness into which this study of The Essence of Christianity hopes to 
cast some kind of light. For, although Marx goes farther in his formulation of a 
materialistic critique of religion, and although history has made an institutional 
relic ofMarxist thought, Feuerbach's significance for the study of religion should 
not be underestimated. Feuerbach, indeed, is through-and-through a philosopher 
of religion. In each ofhis works, he aims to understand the nature of the religious 
impulse as a means of human self-knowing, though never letting go of a position 
that is essentially critical of this impulse, particularly in its rational or "alienated" 
9 Hans-Martin Sass argues quite neatly that Feuerbach should not be viewed simply as a 
transitional figure to Marx. In so doing, Sass attempts to overcome a "stereotype" common to 
many historians of ideas, namely, of viewing developments in thought simply in terms of 
transition (though the principle of transition, one might add, resembles the pulse of the Hegelian 
dialectic itself). See Hans-Martin Sass, "The 'Transition' from Feuerbach to Marx: a Re-
Interpretation," Studies in Soviet Thought 26 (1983) 123-142. I touch upon Feuerbach's 
necessary relation to Marx in the conclusion to this thesis. 
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expressions, theology and speculative philosophy. This tendency is particularly 
true with respect to The Essence of Christianity. 
The present essay attempts to clarify the relationship between The Essence 
of Christianity and traditional theological-speculative ontology. I do not attempt 
to sketch out the relationship of The Essence of Christianity to the works of 
Feuerbach's early or late periods. This has been carried out successfully 
elsewhere.11 Neither do I attempt a comprehensive analysis of Feuerbach's 
appropriation and critique of the western philosophical tradition.12 Here, I focus 
exclusively upon the reversal of Hegelian ontology in The Essence of 
Christianity, so as to shed light upon the complex relationship between 
Feuerbach's critique of the Christian faith and the ontological presuppositions of 
the Hegelian philosophy of religion. My ultimate aim is to show how Feuerbach, 
in the course of this reversal, esteems the imagination in a twofold way: first, as 
the reflective birthplace of the alienated ontology of theology and speculative 
philosophy, and as a pre-reflective or necessary mode of human self-knowing 
10 Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 75. 
11 See Van A. Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). Harvey's book is helpful to anyone encountering Feuerbach . Harvey, 
however, suggests that the intention and design of The Essence of Christianity - in contrast to that 
ofFeuerbach's later works, in which Hegelian influences give way to a "naturalist-existentialist" 
explication of religion - is "convoluted'' precisely because ofits use of a Hegelian design in its 
critique of Christianity. This Hegelian strand, however, serves as the very basis for the present 
essay, in which I suggest that the link between Feuerbach and Hegel, in The Essence of 
Christianity, is exactly that which needs unpacking. 
12 See Marx W. Wartofsky, Feuerbach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
Wartofsky's study is thorough and far-reaching in its attempt to expose the discussion, in the 
collectivity ofFeuerbach 's writings, between Feuerbach and the western philosophical tradition . . 
One writer has suggested that WartofSky' s book, '1or understanding Feuerbach and assessing his 
achievement, has by far surpassed more than one hundred years of scholarship." James A. 
Massey, "Notes to the Introduction," in Ludwig Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, 
ed. and trans. James A. Massey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 253-54n. 
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which preexists the place of genesis of the ontological concept.13 I believe that 
the presence, in The Essence of Christianity, of these opposing perspectives, 
stresses the ultimately complex or slippery nature of the theological-speculative 
ontology that Feuerbach attempts to reverse. It is a level of complexity, as I 
suggest in my conclusion, that is innate to the ontological concept itself, which in 
some sense anticipates any attempt to cut short its essential characteristic of 
ontological necessity. This tension is true of Feuerbach in his attempt to retrieve 
the human essence in the human species. 
In order to bring about this clash of ontological perspectives, in my first 
chapter, I sketch out the ontological position assumed in the Hegelian philosophy 
of religion, and frame my discussion within the Hegelian categories of 
representation and concept (Vorstellung and Begriff). In an introductory fashion, 
I suggest that both Vorstellung and Begriff assume or give expression to the 
principle of ontological necessity which Feuerbach attempts to overturn in The 
Essence of Christianity. The ultimately labyrinthine design of Hegelian 
philosophy impedes, perhaps, any endeavour to chart a straight path through its 
walls. Ultimately, however, I attempt to analyze the representational and 
speculative forms of consciousness in terms of the most basic presUpposition of 
the Hegelian philosophy of religion: the principle of ontological necessity as 
such.14 Vorstel/ungen are the theological expressions of the God-concept, in each 
13 While Feuerbach suggests that theological-speculative ontology is a byproduct of rational 
thought (what I call the "reflective imagination"), Hegel assumes that the ontological concept 
exists "irrespective of our thinking." This, I think, is the fundamental point of distinction between 
Hegel and Feuerbach in their analyses of the Christian religion- a point which I stress throughout 
the chapters of this essay. 
14 Some, beginning with Bauer himself, have attempted immanent or atheistic readings of Hegel. 
In the writings of the 20th century thinker, Alexandre Kojeve, we find what is perhaps the best 
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case bearing out a kernel of rational truth in the representational form of theology. 
The representational fabric of Christianity harbours the ontological horizon of 
speculative thought insofar as theology presents consciousness with a limited but 
direct encounter with the ontological concept, only in representational guise. 
According to Hegel, that is, the Vorstellungen of the Christian faith share the 
essential content of the Begriffe of speculative philosophy. Their content is 
rational and necessary, their form mimetic and contingent. I thus describe the 
way in which the Christian faith is necessarily propelled, according to Hegel, 
towards fulfillment in speculative thought, where its representational form is shed, 
and where its content- importantly, the ontological concept- finds expression in 
pure speculative form. The overarching suggestion of the Hegelian program is 
that Christian theology and speculative philosophy, representational and 
conceptual thought, give expression to the ontological concept, which necessarily 
is the object or centre of consciousness. Due to the perceived necessity of this 
object for thought in Hegelian philosophy of religion, human beings. :occupy a 
neces~ary place at the boundaryline between finite and infmite. My first chapter 
articulation ofsuch an interpretation. Recently, Robert C. Solomon has argued provocatively that 
Hegel's writings disclose a covert atheism. In response to James Stirling, who in 1865 claimed to 
have discovered Hegel's "secret"- namely, that Hegel was a Christian, even "the greatest abstract 
thinker of Christianity" - Solomon writes: "The secret, abruptly stated, is that Hegel was an 
atheist. His 'Christianity' is nothing but nominal, an elaborate subterfuge to protect his 
professional ambitions in the most religiously conservative country in northern Europe." (Robert 
C. Solomon, "The Secret of Hegel [Kierkegaard's Complaint]: A Study in Hegel's PhjJosophy of 
Religion," From Hegel to Existentialism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987], p. 57.) 
Solomon goes on to say that "Hegel used religion and religious vocabulary as his instruments, as if 
the last logical consequence to be drawn from Christian doctrine is humanism, and the final 
meaning to be given to theological terminology is a meaning which refers strictly and exclusively 
to man's conception of himself' (p. 58). Despite the profound nature of the question posed in 
Solomon's paper, I here rest on the side that Hegel's work embodies an ontos that is too pervasive 
· and all-determining to justifY a reailing which proclaims the contrary. That Hegel was false to his 
own "atheistic" convictions, or at best, that he operated under the guise of a philosophical poet -
9 
describes the way in which theology and speculative philosophy, in their 
respective expressions of the ontological concept as Vorstellung and Be griff, are 
forms of consciousness which straddle and work towards the reconciliation of 
fmite and infmite. Throughout, I attempt to articulate the problematical way in 
which Hegel maintains the necessity of theological consciousness, despite his 
ultimate view that the process of human self-knowing requires tlle eventual 
sublation of theological representation into the pure conceptual medium of 
speculative thought.15 
In my second chapter, I attempt to sketch out Feuerbach's view of human 
self-knowing, which, like Hegel's discussion, meets the human being at the level 
of consciousness, at the boundary line of finite and infmite. Yet, I strive to show 
the precise way in which Feuerbach's epistemological claims entail not only a 
critique of theology as such, but also a rejection of the theological-speculative 
ontology essential to the Hegelian philosophy of religion. Whereas Hegel 
assumes that knowledge of the ontological concept can come only when 
theological representation has been sublated or elevated into speculative form, 
Feuerbach rejects the very fabric of speculative philosophy as an abstract 
expression of the same religious dream 16 The ground for Feuerbach's 
simultaneous critique ofHegelian ontology, as we shall see here, rests precisely in 
the fact that speculative philosophy maintains the existence of an ontologically 
never outright saying what he meant, but instead veiling his thoughts in socially palatable 
language- is an argument the consistency of which is difficult to sustain. 
15 Insofar as Hegel claims that the Begriff of speculative philosophy necessarily supercedes the 
God of theology, some suggest that, ultimately, Hegel's philosophy is devoid of a veritable 
''religious" impulse. Whether the coexistence of theology and speculative thought is possible, is 
the matter in question. 
16 As I discuss in my second chapter, Feuerbach himself makes use of this "dream" metaphor. 
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distinct other, only in abstract guise, veiled in rational terms. 17 Feuerbach, in 
essence, disintegrates Hegel's notion of objective cognition, or speculative 
thought, where the ontological concept is comprehended in its pure form. Instead, 
Feuer bach subsumes the Be griff of the Hegelian philosophy of religion under the 
workings of subjective cognition, where the very notion of a speculative concept 
is critiqued as a byproduct of consciousness, rather than its objective and 
necessary centre. 
In order to communicate this shift from .objective to subjective 
consciousness, from the principle of ontological necessity to the "fact" of 
speculative contingency, I frame my discussion within three categories central to 
Feuerbach's conception of human self-knowing: reason, imagination, and feeling. 
In each case, I develop my discussion in relation to Hegel, so as to emphasize the 
precise nature ofFeuerbach's inversion of theological-speculative ontology. Like 
Hegel, Feuerbach considers reason, imagination, and feeling to be modes of 
human self-knowing, though he inverts their hierarchical schematization to give 
primacy to feeling as the originary place of unity with the human essence. In his 
view, feeling preexists the appearance of reason, which effects or abstracts the 
being of the Absolute, first represented as an other by the imagination. It is thus 
that Feuerbach cuts short the principle of ontological necessity: that is, insofar as 
he considers the ontological concept to be an outcome of consciousness, rather 
than its objective beginning point, or the necessarily existent object of which 
17 Whereas D. F. Strauss attempts to rescue speculative philosophy from the briars of theology, 
Feuerbach recognizes speculative thought as an abstract or absorbed form of theological ontology; 
and, for this reason, he attempts to cast the speculative dream "in the simple daylight of reality and 
necessity" (Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xix). 
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consciousness achieves greatening levels of comprehension. 18 I conclude by 
discussing Feuerbach's problematical conception of the human species, which he 
adopts as the object of consciousness proper, first misrepresented as "God" by the 
imagination and only then given distinct or necessary existence by reason. For 
Feuerbach, only species consciousness constitutes objective cognition as such. 
Only species consciousness can reestablish the unity of human consciousness with 
itself, a unity lost when the predicates of the human species are transmogrified 
into attributes of an ontologically distinct other- be it the God (Vorstellung) of 
theology or the Absolute (Begriff) of speculative philosophy. Species 
consciousness, in this sense, constitutes Feuerbach's attempt to awaken human 
beings to the dreamlike nature of theological-speculative ontology. As I argue, 
however, Feuerbach, too, is involved in a discussion of consciousness which 
attempts a straddling of finite and infinite. Ostensibly, he suggests an empirical 
object as the point of departure for self-consciousness. Consciousness perceives 
itself as an other in a fellow-member of the human species. Yet, as I point out in 
my second chapter, this empirical starting point gives way to a phenomenological 
discussion, the concrete nature of which is difficult to sustain. "I am nothing but 
a natural philosopher in the domain of the mind,..I9 he explains. And, insofar as 
this is true, there is some sense in which Feuerbach cannot help but fall back upon 
the "imaginary" apparatus of the theological-speculative ontology he seeks to 
reverse: here, in the form of an infmite human essence. 
18 The wording, "greatening levels of alienation," better reflects Feuerbach 's intention. 
19 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xiv. 
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My third chapter attempts to locate the precise place of the imagination in 
the epistemological framework of The Essence of Christianity. On one level, I 
argue that Feuerbach subsumes reason under the workings of imaginative thought. 
Here, the imagination is seen as the birthplace of theology, where the divine 
image, originally an expression of the unity present to consciousness in feeling, is 
given existence as an ontologically distinct subject.2° Feuerbach responds 
strongly to this rational form of the imagination. It is the imaginative mode of 
which The Essence of Christianity is so critical. Yet, we find that Feuerbach 
simultaneously considers the imagination a necessary mode of human self-
knowing. Rather than suppose that these antagonistic positions render 
Feuerbach's position irredeemable, I suggest that his critique of theological-
speculative ontology reveals what are perhaps two forms of imaginative 
knowledge. The first is what I call the reflective imagination: the imagination of 
theological and speculative consciousness; the imagination which gives rise to the 
Hegelian philosophy of religion, where the representational fabric of Christianity 
is understood as a vesse~ however contingent in fonn, for the rational and 
necessary content of the speculative Begriff. Feuerbach implies that the entire 
ontological dream, including that of speculative philosopher, is contingent upon 
this imaginative framework. Yet, Feuerbach also writes of an imaginative faculty 
which preexists the emergence of the reflective or rational imagination, the 
birthplace proper of Vorstellung and Begriff. I suggest this as the imaginative 
20 In speculative philosophy, the ontologically distinct subject becomes reason itself- still, for 
Feuerbach, a manifest form of imaginative thought. Marx Warto:!Sky notes the tendency of the 
imagination to mistake its images for objects of rational thought. He writes: "The images as 
objects of feeling are given the status of thoughts as objects of reason. This self-deception is the 
13 
mode that Feuerbach considers necessary insofar as it cuts short the process by 
which the imagination becomes reflective, and the formulation of theological-
speculative ontology becomes possible. This is the sense in which the ontological 
position is symptomatic of the reflective imagination: an imagination which steps 
beyond its pre-reflective, emotive sphere, and which misperceives its pre-
reflective object as an existent ontological subject. In order to highlight the 
essentially creative and necessary nature of the pre-reflective imagination as a 
mode of human self-knowing, I strike upon Feuerbach's interpretation of the 
Incarnation. In his brief but crucial reading of the Incarnation, which he views as 
an expression of the limitless capacities of the human imagination, I suggest that 
we are presented with what is, in effect, a mirror argument for the imagination as 
an essential predicate of the human species. The Incarnation, that is, expresses 
the necessity of the imagination for human self-knowing: the imagination as it 
pre-exists rational engagement with a projected other. In my third chapter, I 
suggest that reading The Essence of Christianity through these opposing modes of 
imaginative activity helps to clarify Feuerbach' s critique of theological-
speculative ontology. 
In the pages that follow, I shall suggest that one can argue for two 
interpretations of the human imagination in The Essence of Christianity: frrst, an 
imagination which operates at a pre-reflective level, as the slave of feeling; and 
second, an imagination which misperceives its emotive objects as objects of 
reason, as thoughts, and gives birth to the alienated ontology of theology and 
characteristic error of that power of imagination that mistakes itself for reason proper" (Wartofsky, 
Feuerbach, p. 231). 
14 
speculative philosophy.21 "Pre-reflective imagination and "reflective 
imagination" are, indeed, merely words, or abstractions the existence of which I 
do mean to maintain. Yet, I believe that they are useful in coming to terms with 
Feuerbach's inversion of traditional ontology, which I suggest as the principal 
design of The Essence of Christianity. On one level, Feuerbach attempts to usurp 
the God-concept from its place at the centre of consciousness; on another, he 
cannot escape the slippery or even hermetic nature of the principle of ontological 
necessity, which supposes the existence an infmite concept by virtue of its very 
presence for thought. Feuerbach echoes, at least in sentiment, the general tenor of 
traditional ontology, but chooses to step beyond its hermetic or circular boundary. 
In so doing, he does not render religious consciousness meaningless, but puts 
forward a translation of its images, 22 so as to draw the essence of human existence 
from the religious mode of being. He attempts, as one writer puts it, "the 
transformation of the sacred,"23 while affirming in consciousness an encounter 
with the infinite. In The Essence of Christianity, the infmite horizon of 
consciousness is devoid of an ontological concept, the sun of theological-
speculative ontology. The present essay takes this ontology as its point of 
departure. 
21 In the case of the latter, the imagination is in cahoots with, or is the mother of reason, and 
constitutes the domain proper to the categories of the Hegelian philosophy of religion, Vorstellung 
and Begrijf. Desire, as the German proverb claims, is the mother of thought. And to situate this 
grain of wisdom within the Feuerbachian view ofhwnan self-knowing, one could say thatthe 
imagination rests somewhere between these two worlds, negotiating a balance between pre-
reflective, emotive objects (feelings), and the rational powers which await to give these desires 
conceptual form (thoughts). 
22 Feuerbach; Christianity, p. xiii. 
23 Henri Arvon, La transformation du sacre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957). 
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Chapter 1 
Vorstellung, Begriff and the Necessity of the God-Concept in the 
Hegelian Philosophy of Religion 
In the opening pages of the manuscript for his Berlin lectures on the 
philosophy of religion. Hegel situates philosophical thought in relation to the 
religious desire to know God: 
Consciousness or thought is what distinguishes human beings from 
the animals. All that proceeds · from thought - all the distinctions 
ofthe arts and sciences 'and of the endless interweavings of human 
relationships, habits and customs, activities, skills, and enjoyments 
- find their ultimate center in the one thought of God.... God is 
the one and only object of philosophy.... Thus philosophy is 
theology, and one's occupation with philosophy - or rather in 
philosophy- is of itself the service of God.1 
God, then, for religion and for philosophy, is the proper object of investigation 
and desire; each is connected to the divine by the same golden cord: that of reason 
(Vernunft), in which God becomes the center from which any formulation of 
meaning flows - religious or not. What is ultimately suggested by Hegel is an 
ontology rooted in the divine, or a philosophical perspective which fmds its 
ground in the fundamental ontological assumption that God is - and moreover, 
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 1: Introduction and The 
Concept of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. Peter C. Hodgson et al (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 84. In citations from this and the other editions of the LPB, I have 
removed Hodgson's editorial markings from the text (with the exception ofltalics and bracketed 
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that with his Being as the central object of thought, so too we are. Hegel, 
elsewhere in the Berlin manuscript, casts light on this very matter. With respect 
to the God of Christianity, what Hegel deems the consummate or manifest 
religion, 2 he writes: "Metaphysically it has this form: God is spirit, God has 
reality; he exists [ existiert] in virtue of his concept. Proof of the existence of God 
derives from his concept.... now comes the transition from concept to being. The 
concept is the presupposition."3 Within the concept (Begriff) of God rests the 
ultimate unity of subjective consciousness and the divine being, of finite and 
infinite in the pure medium of thought. This, it can be said, is the ontological 
framework within which Feuerbach situates himself. Feuerbach, however, does 
not answer to the question regarding the ontological necessity of the concept of 
God, and supposes for thought a center of being that is solely human. In this 
sense, one can hardly come to terms with Feuerbach's critique of the Christian 
faith without first attempting some preliminary understanding of Hegel's 
philosophy of religion. For, in the very act of inverting the theistic stance of his 
"master," Feuerbach supposes for Hegelian ontology a moment of dialectical 
priority, carrying out, in effect, the sublation (Azifhebung) of the divine, Absolute 
into the notion of an absolute humanity. 4 
German words). They are useful within the framework of the LPR volumes themselves, in order 
to highlight source material, but are here not needed. 
2 1n both English translations ofThe Phenomenology of Spirit, Christianity is called the ''revealed" 
religion. I follow H.S. Harris in his use of the term "manifest." See H.S. Harris, Hegel's Ladder 
II: The Odyssey ofSpirit (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), p. 649: "The 
Christian Spirit has come out into the open, so that it is now 'manifost. ' The history of its 
'revelation , has already been dealt with in the evolution of finite spirit. .. the offenbare Religion is 
beyond the stages that were 'revealed. "' 
3 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion III: The Consummate Religion, ed. Peter C. 
Hodgson, trans. Peter C. Hodgson et aJ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 65-6. 
4 The theistic nature of Hegel's system, and the corresponding notion of a transcendent, divine 
Absolute, is still a point of fiery dispute in Hegelian circles, and the central concern of many, 
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In what follows, however, I shall consider Hegel's philosophy of religion 
in a sphere of relative isolation from Feuerbach, so as to develop our sense for the 
Hegelian vision to which Feuerbach responds in his 1841 critique of Christianity. 
For in Hegel's terms, religion and philosophy - even Feuerbach's dialectical 
stream of fire - give expression to the same impulse to truth, an impulse which 
fmds its centre in the "one thought of God." It is thus that I shall carry out a 
discussion of religious and speculative truth, religious representation 
(Vorstellung) and speculative concept (Begriff), the two ultimate shapes of 
consciousness manifested by the Absolute Spirit in its ascent towards Absolute 
Knowing, or pure identity in thought. As a brief matter of conclusion, I shall then 
consider the place of the Incarnation in Hegel's system, so as to highlight the 
centrality of Christianity in the epistemological and ontological suppositions of 
Hegelian thought. For it precisely in the realm of Absolute Knowing that we find 
the realization the Hegelian ontological concept that is later rejected by 
Feuerbach, and in the Incarnation that humanity is confronted with the Infinite 
Spirit as an object of consciousness. 5 In The Essence of Christianity, Feuer bach 
reinterprets Hegelian ontology and points to the presence of an infmite human 
essence, a human self-consciousness (species consciousness) which pre-exists the 
ontological concept.6 Indeed, while for Hegel, "philosophy is theology," for 
whose works in some way echo the trumpet sounded, in the years following Hegel' s death in 
1831, by Feuerbach and the young Hegelians of the "left." 
5 In The Essence of Christianity, as I shall show in chapter 3, the Incarnation represents the 
necessity of the imagination in human self-knowing. 
6 This, again, constitutes Feuerbach's assumed rejection of the ontological necessity of the concept 
of God, put forth by Hegel. Whether this rejection is justified - or even, on Hegel' s terms, 
logically possible - is the point in question. 
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Feuerbach, "Theology is Anthropology."7 Yet each assumes an ultimate 
condition in which self-consciousness is characterized by a state of infinitude: be 
it a self-consciousness shared by humanity and by the Absolute (as in Hegel) or 
by members of the human species (as in Feuerbach). In this sense, for this master 
and slave, the horizon of self-consciousness is seemingly without limit. Each 
thinker grounds his ontology in terms of an infmite consciousness. And, what is 
more: each gives representational form to this concept of an infinite, and claims it 
as the object proper of ontology. It is thus that I turn to the nature of religious 
consciousness in Hegel, so as to come to terms with the ontological horizon 
towards which Feuerbach, too, casts his gaze. For, in Hegel's words, it is 
consciousness which marks the essential difference between "the human beings 
and the animals;" and for Feuerbach, too, it is consciousness which distinguishes 
"man and brute,',g and which situates the human being in relation to his or her 
ultimate conception of what it means to be. 
Religious and Speculative Forms of Consciousness: 
Vorstellung and Begri(fin the Hegelian Odyssey of Spirit 
Throughout his writings, Hegel distinguishes between representational and 
conceptual forms of knowledge, shapes of consciousness which mark the 
endpoint of Absolute Spirit's odyssey towards self-consciousness in the pure 
medium of thought. Representation and concept, Vorstellung and Begriff, 
7 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot {Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1989), p. xvii. 
8 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 1. 
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constitute the fundamental modes of knowing characteristic to religious and 
speculative consciousness, respectively. The question regards the essential 
identity and difference of these religious and speculative modes of thought: 
whether, that is, the representational aspect of religious consciousness requires a 
shift to pure philosophical thought, or whether one can stop at the level of 
religious representation posited by Christianity, the "manifest religion," whose 
representational form (Vorstellung) shares in the essential content (Begri.ff) of 
speculative philosophy. The question, however, is perhaps unanswerable insofar 
as either reading can be justified in terms of Hegel's writings. Yet the push of 
Hegel's words, it seems, is to acknowledge the necessity of the move from a 
religious to a speculative form of consciousness, while affirming the necessity of 
representational truth as revealed in the Christian mode of knowing. This 
tendency is marked throughout his writings, particularly in his chapters on 
"Revealed Religion" and "Absolute Knowing" in the Phenomenology of Spirit of 
1807, in sections 451-458 and 564-577 of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences (1830), and in his Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 
delivered four times in an eleven-year period, 1821-1831. The very negativity 
which characterizes the dialectical ascent of the Absolute requires the latter's shift 
from religious to speculative knowing. This principle of negativity, indeed, is 
fundamental both to the representational shell and to the essential content of 
Christianity, the manifest religion, by virtue of the very death of Christ - that 
moment of negativity which rests at the centre of its revelation, and which gives 
rise to the Absolute Spirit as an object of consciousness, as the centre of Hegelian 
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ontology. This essential drive of the Absolute, what Hegel deems "the labour of 
the negative," assumes the necessary status of representation, or form, in the 
Being of the Absolute: "Just because the form is as essential to the essence as the 
essence is to itself, the divine essence is not to be conceived and expressed merely 
as essence, i.e. as immediate substance or pure self-contemplation of the divine, 
but likewise as form."9 It is in this way that the representational fabric of 
Christianity constitutes the revelation of the Absolute; for only through its 
revealed form is the divine essence, reason, "conceived and expressed as an 
actuality," so as to know itself as this truth and to become Spirit. 
Indeed, Spirit resides in the representations (Vorstellungen) of religious 
consciousness in general, which find their centre in ''the one thought of God;" yet 
for Hegel, it is only in the forms of Christian revelation that we find the self-
consciousness of Absolute Spirit itself While religion, "as consciousness of 
absolute Being as such, has indeed made its appearance," it has done so strictly 
"from the standpoint of the consciousness that is conscious of absolute Being; but 
absolute Being in and for itself, the self-consciousness of Spirit, has not appeared 
in those 'shapes' ."10 It is thus only in the representational "shapes" of Christian 
consciousness that we find the consummate expression of the Absolute: that is, 
Vorstellungen in whose form Spirit attains self-consciousness, and whose content 
is identical with the speculative Begriffe of speculative philosophy. It is precisely 
this process of self-examination and self-realization that constitutes The 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The question, in this general context, remains whether 
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), section 19, pp. 10 and 11. 
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Christian consciousness requires a self-surpassing of its forms into the pure 
concepts of speculative philosophy, or whether it can remam content in its 
content: satisfied in its representational husk while embodying a dynamic 
principle of negativity and mediation. 
In terms of ontology proper to Hegel, we must remember, this principle of 
mediation is constitutive of consciousness possessed by the Absolute itself, and 
not an attribute of human consciousness alone, as Feuerbach holds. Yet we are 
still left with the dilemma as to whether or not the representational form of 
Christianity can, in fact, mark the consummation of an infmite self-consciousness. 
Is the infmite not in some way encumbered by the baggage of finite, figurative 
form, despite Hegel's claim that the representational shell of manifest religion 
shares its content with speculative truth? Hegel, in his Berlin lectures, addresses 
the very relationship of the sensuous to religious representation (Vorstellung), the 
latter of which he contrasts with image (Bild): "The image is sensuous, derives 
from what is sensuous; it is myth. Representation is the image elevated into its 
universality: it is thought, full of thought, and is a form for thought too."11 Thus, 
representational forms proper to religion are conditioned by a principle of 
negativity which raises their sensuous aspect to the level of thought, their 
figurative guise to the level of universality. In this sense, Hegel claims that 
religion is essentially polemical since its "content is not grasped immediately in 
10 Hegel, Phenomenology, section 672, p. 310 
11 Hegel, LPR I, p.238. From this arises D.F. Strauss' fimdamental mistake in the "Concluding 
Dissertation" of his Life of Jesus Critically Examined trans. George Eliot, ed. Peter C. Hodgson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1994), pp. 777-81. Though a student in these very lectures, Strauss 
conflates Hegel's conceptions of''myth" and "representation," and fuils to acknowledge the 
principles of negativity and mediation which characterize religious representational form 
according to his teacher. 
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sensuous intuition or figurative [bildlich] fashion but as mediated by the process 
of abstraction, through raising the figurative or sensible into the universal."12 
Religious representation of the infmite, then, is by its nature far more kinetic than 
one might initially assume; it challenges the sensuous aspect of its own form. 
Vorstellung, in effect, stands at a middle point between the finite and 
infinite, and in this sense mirrors the ontology of the human being, who, "by 
virtue of his thinking universality occupies the existential boundaryline between 
fmite and infmite."13 In keeping with this ontological condition, the truth which 
humanity seeks via reason is, for Hegel, relational, and necessarily assumes for its 
dialectical principle of ascent an interplay of finite and infmite. Thus, in contrast 
to Kant, who posits an infmite beyond, a thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) that cannot 
be penetrated by the understanding, Hegel' s Vorstel/ung is a vehicle for thought 
which is at once dependent upon, and independent of: finitude. In that Kant 
supposes an unbridgeable divide between the phenomenal and noumenal realms 
(the finite and the infmite), he deems the latter beyond pure reason and, in effect, 
"limits" or finitizes the infmite. Yet for Hegel, "to recognize a limit is to posit a 
beyond, to reveal and generate an opposition; and that is precisely the movement 
of the dialectic, the implication of which is the immanence of that whole, that end 
and objective, which is the drive ... of the movement."14 Hence his critique of 
Kantian epistemology, where the infmite is exiled to the realm of the noumenal, 
while humans are bound to life in the phenomenal realm of shadows. In the 
12 Hegel, LPR I, p. 239. 
13 James Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 
p. 61 . 
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Hegelian view, ontology supposes no state of exile- either for the human or for 
the Absolute- but supposes their identity in difference, their limitlessness in the 
overcoming of limitation: "I know my boundary because I am unlimited, because 
I have consciousness,"15 says Hegel. It is in this way that Vorstel/ung, a shape of 
this very consciousness, is fundamental to Hegel's dialectical ontology. It 
sustains that immanent middle where the forms of the finite work towards self-
fulfillment through consciousness, the ground for the essentially "polemical" 
nature of religious representation. 
The polemical aspect ofthe religious Vorstellung, it can be said, resides in 
its essential tendency to elevate its figurative form to the level of universality, to 
raise the sensuous to the level of the universal through thought, the ground and 
premise of Hegelian ontology. As Hegel writes: "insofar as religious opinion was 
bound up with the figurative; and the figurative, the beautiful, has precisely the 
signification that the universal, the thought, the concept is not separated from its 
image [Bild]." Thus, any transfiguration of the representational, any elevation of 
religious form, by nature concerned its content.16 This tension between the form 
and content of Vorstellung, between the universality and actuality of the Absolute, 
propels Christian consciousness to greater modes of self-knowing. As noted by 
Paul Ricoeur, "if Christian figurative thought has a unique significance it is 
because the Absolute has equated itself with actuality, with presence," 17 thus 
14 Errol E. Harris, The Spirit ofHegel (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 18. 
Italics added. 
15 Hegel, LPR 1, p. 281. 
16 Hegel, LPR I, p. 239. 
17 Paul Ricoeur, "The Status of Vorstellung in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion," in Meaning, 
Truth, and God, ed. Leroy Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983), p. 
77. 
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bridging the Kantian divide between fmite and infmite. This bridge, what Ricoeur 
calls "presence," establishes the ontological condition of the human being. In 
Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, knowledge of Being -and, for 
that matter, any meaning at all- begins with the one thought of God, or with the 
concept (Begrifj) of God present in thought. 
In the Phenomenology, moreover, Hegel echoes this point. He writes: 
"If ... meaning of the objective is not to be mere imagination, it must possess 
intrinsic being, must originally appear in consciousness as stemming from the 
Notion and must come forth in its necessity."18 Christian Vorstellung simply 
affirms the "intrinsic being" of this ''Notion," the divine Absolute, and is essential 
in Hegel's creed that human ontology finds its ground only in an ontology of the 
Absolute. The representational level, indeed, is essential to the development of 
consciousness, which can only reach self-knowing within its pure speculative 
concept through the sublation of the contingent husk of religious representation. 
With respect to Feuerbach's interpretation of self-consciousness in The Essence 
of Christianity, it is important to note that, according to Hegel, the immediacy or 
presence of the Absolute appears to consciousness in representational form as an 
other; and that this otherness is no mere predicate to be annulled, but a figurative 
18 Hegel, Phenomenology, section 757, p. 458. Miller consistently renders Begriffas ''Notion," 
rather than "concept" -as is carried out by Hodgson et a/ in their translation of the Berlin 
Lectures. With respect to our discussion, however, it is helpful to remember that ''Notion" and 
"concept" are the selfsame principle: the ontological category in which all thought and meaning 
finds its ground. Additionally, from the quoted words arises a fundamental question with respect 
to Hegel's ontological argument: Does Hegel, in his belief that "objective meaning" cannot be 
purely of the "imagination," asswne a credo that is more necessary than his belief in the 
fundamental ontological category itself? Thus the essentially "chicken-or-egg?" nature of any 
ontological "proof." 
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form to be transfigured and elevated into a higher moment of spiritual or 
speculative otherness: 
Consciousness... does not start from its inner life, from thought, 
and unite within itself the thought of God with existence; on the 
contrary, it starts from an existence that is immediately present and 
recognizes God therein. The moment of immediate being is 
present in the content of the Notion in such a way that the religious 
Spirit, in the return of all essentiality into consciousness, has 
become a simple positive Self.... [The Self of existent Spirit] is 
posited neither as something thought or imagined, nor as 
something produced .... On the contrary, this God is sensuously 
and directly beheld as a Self, as an actual individual man; only so 
is this God self-consciousness. 19 
God does not only appear to consciousness as an object, as an other; his concept 
(here "Notion") presupposes the essentiality of his existence, and is that from 
which consciousness itself begins to appear. The existence of the Absolute is not 
merely a predicate that Christian consciousness represents, but is the very ground 
of representational thought.20 The God-concept, in other words, is a necessarily 
existent subject: "that consciousness which primordially belongs to the Christian 
religion . .. is consciousness not simply of predicates attributable to the divine 
being, but more fully of the divine Self of which those predicates are 
determinations."21 The predicates of God constitute Vorstellungen of religious 
consciousness, while the existence of God constitutes the essential nature of 
thought itself, the drive which draws thought out of the finite and into the infmite. 
It is thus in the manifest religion that humanity fmds the basic affrrmation that 
19 Hegel; Phenomenology, section 758, pp. 458-9. 
20 In my second chapter, I show how Feuerbach inverts the subject-predicate relation of 
theological-speculative ontology. . . . . 
21 Martin J. DeNys, "Mediation and Negativity in Hegel," Journal of Religion, 6611 (January 
1986): 51. 
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God is, and through Vorstellung that it achieves self-consciousness and becomes 
inherently mindful of the Absolute. 
Within the framework of ontology proper to Hegel, then, "given the fact 
man is essentially a religious being because a thinking being, he is already 
implicitly aware of the Infmite as the ultimate horizon of all being and meaning 
when he becomes reflectively self-conscious. "22 This, in essence, is a formulation 
of Hegel's ontological supposition that humanity rests at ·the boundary line 
between finite and infmite. It is at this ontological centre that Vorstellung, and so 
the religious consciousness of which it is a shape, fmds its home; there, the 
mediation of infmite and fmite occurs. In this process of mediation, says Hegel, 
the representational fabric of the Vorstellung is dissolved by consciousness: "in its 
departure from the finite, the mediation negates this fmite in the elevation, does 
not allow it to subsist. The finite has a negative determination; the affirmative 
element is the infmite, absolute being."23 The finite horizon of consciousness, 
however, is not entirely transgressed, but is elevated by the process of mediation 
that is required of its content, which embraces the dialectical coexistence and 
resolution of finite and infmite. This mediation, indeed, is the teleological mode 
by which finite human spirit, which receives revelation of the infmite through 
22 Yerkes, Christology, p. 73. Implicit in this ontological formulation, of course, is a critique of 
Feuerbach's understanding of consciousness in The Essence of Christianity. For, although 
Feuerbach echoes Hegel's belief that "consciousness or though is what distinguishes human 
beings from the animals" (LPR I, 84), he does not hold for the existence of an absolute being. In 
this sense, he provides a new rendering of the Hegelian concept, "Being," and reinterprets the 
nature of the position which Vorste/lung, particularly that of the Incarnation, holds in the thought 
system ofhis master and in human consciousness generally. This is the subject of my next 
chapter, which considers Feuerbach 's understanding of self-consciousness in Christianity, and will 
receive preliminarily mention below, with respect to the place of the Incarnation in Hegel 's 
f:hilosophico-religious system. 
~ Hegel, LPR I, p. 422. 
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thought or consciousness, is propelled towards resolution or umon with the 
infmite "Spirit." This process of elevation [Erhebung], this "passing over" 
[Ubergehen] of fmite to infinite,24 is constitutive of the ontological identity of 
humanity and God, of fmite and infmite. It occurs in and through thought: that 
which separates humans from animals; the realm where revelation of the infmite 
fmds finite form, and that which echoes Hegel's point once more: namely, that, at 
the level of being, "[human spirit] is essentially oriented to the infmite, to 
'knowing' God."25 
This essential orientation of the finite spirit to the infinite rests in 
consciousness or thought, which is propelled above and beyond its religious mode 
by the revelation of the infmite spirit to thought. The desire to know God through 
Vorstellung is characteristic of religious consciousness; yet this ontological thirst, 
inherent to the content of Vorstellung, pushes thought beyond its representational 
form, beyond religious consciousness. And insofar as representational truth is 
presented in the form of thought, but not as thought,26 the process of mediation 
continues. Therein, finite spirit is elevated [ erhoben] from religious to 
speculative knowing, to the pure medium of thought where it achieves unity with 
the Absolute, its ontological beginning and end: 
What stems from the mediation shows itself to be the ground and 
truth of that from which it has stemmed. The philosophical 
cognition, the progression is a stream flowing in opposite 
directions, leading forward to the other, but at the same time 
24 Yerkes, Christology, p. 55. 
25 Quentin Lauer, S.J., Hegel's Concept of God (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 
1982), p. 43. 
26 Hegel, LPR I, manuscript note 149, p. 241. 
working backward, so that what appears to be the last, founded on 
what precedes, appears rather to be the first- the foundation. 27 
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Hegel adopts the Heraclitean river-image as a symbol for the process of mediation 
which elevates fmite spirit from religious representation to speculative concept, 
Vorstellung to Be griff God in the form of thought to God as thought. Whereas, 
for Heraclitus, flux is the ground of Being itself, Hegel's process of mediation 
reflects the push towards and from this ground. His, too, is a process of 
becoming, but specifically a process ofreligious thinking becoming speculative 
thinking, representational thought becoming pure thought. With respect to this, 
Hegel notes elsewhere that finite spirit or mind, as religious consciousness, 
"pierces through the seemingly absolute independence of things to the one, 
infinite power of God operative in them and holding them all together; and as 
philosophical thinking, it consummates this idealization of things by discerning 
the specific mode in which the eternal Idea forming their common principle is 
represented in them. "28 
In this sense; speculative thinking shows an awareness of the sensuous 
shapes which are raised to the level of universality in representational thought. 
Ultimately, it exhibits a greater degree of self-consciousness than does its 
predecessor, religious consciousness. Hence the term "speculative," which, as 
Gadamer points out, derives from the Latin word for "mirror," speculum. In 
speculative thinking we find "'the action of the subject matter itself' (das Tun der 
27 Hegel, LPR I, manuscript note 115, p. 227. 
28 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace, Zusiitze trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1971 ), Zusatz to section 381, p. 12. 
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Sache selbst),"29 which, for Hegel, is thought (Gedanke). In speculative thinking, 
therefore, thought finds reflection in itself, free of the forms of pictorial thinking. 
This latter form of consciousness, the pre-philosophical mode of "reflective 
thinking," is that characteristic of religious representation, and "is the universal 
mode for dealing with fmitude, a mode which we have adopted and made the 
universal medium for our ideas." 30 It is thus only in speculative thought that the 
fmite, the domain of Vorstellung, is elevated entirely to the level of the infmite, 
that "abstract reflection begins to regard this [pictorial] mode of thinking as a veil 
behind which the truth is supposed to be hidden and concealed."31 And from the 
ashes of Vorstellung rises the Be griff. 
It is here, then, that we see the transfiguration of religious representation 
into speculative concept. As I emphasize above, however, this "passing over" 
[Obergehen] of the finite to the infmite is required by the very content of the 
Vorstellung, which in the manifest religion is identical to that of the speculative 
concept (Be griff). Yet according to Hegel, the principle of negativity which 
determines the form of religious representation, the restless coexistence of finite 
and infmite at the level of finite spirit, requires a shift to philosophical thinking, 
which alone can capture the existence of the infinite in the pure medium of 
thought. In an attempt to elaborate upon the identity and difference of 
representational and conceptual forms of truth, Hegel says: 
29 Hans Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit tn1d Methode, 2nd ed. (fiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965, pp. 439-
42. Cited in Peter C. Hodgson, "Hegel' s Approach to Religion: The Dialectic of Speculation and 
Phenomenology," Journal ofReligion 64/2 {1984): 160. 
30 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
trans. T.M. Knox and A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 33. 
31 Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 35. 
It is the distinctive task of philosophy to transmute the content that 
is in the representation of religion into the form of thought; the 
content itself cannot be distinguished. Religion is the self-
consciousness of absolute spirit: there are not two kinds of self-
consciousness - not both a conceptualizing self-consciousness and 
a representing self-consciousness, which could be distinguished 
according to their content. There can only be a diversity in form, 
or a distinction between representation and thou~ht, and we can 
presuppose a more detailed acquaintance with that. 2 
30 
In that the content of religious and philosophical concept is identical, each shares 
the same essential object: the infmite or Absolute, figured representationally by 
religious consciousness as "God." It is precisely with respect to this Hegelian 
motif that Kojeve puts forth his interpretation of the relationship between 
philosophy and religion, human being and God, in large part echoing Feuerbach's 
words of more than a century before: "While in fact talking about himself, 
religious Man believes that he is talking about a God. This lack of self-
consciousness, this imaginative projection of the spiritual or human content into 
the beyond (V or-stellung), distinguishes religious (theological) thought from 
philosophical (anthropological) thought."33 For Kojeve, then, religious thought 
signals a lack of self-consciousness on the part of the individual, whereas 
speculative thought involves the fulfillment of human self-knowing: the return of 
God, the infmite other, to "man." To recall Gadamer's etymological remark 
32 Hegel, LPR I, p. 333. Hegel's suggestion here- that the ''form of thought" constitutes the 
highest expression of Absolute content - is discordant with his contention, earlier in the lectures, 
that manifest religion does in fact express this essential content in the form of thought, but not as 
thought (see note 24 above). It is most likely that this discrepancy can be accounted for in terms 
of a variance in sources, or even in terms of a slip on Hegel's part. Ultimately, however, it reveals 
the delicate nature of Hegel's conceptual apparatus. 
33 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. 
Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University press, 1980), p. 71. Similar ''non-supernatural" 
(Kaufinann, p. 275n) interpretations are put forward by other prominent philosophers of the 
twentieth century. See J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Reexamination (New York: Collier Books, 1958), 
and Walter Kaufinann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts. and Commentary (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1965). 
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concemmg speculum, according to Kojeve, man sees himself, the thinking 
subject, mirrored in thought - not some other being, a la Lacan. God, precisely, 
constitutes a belief, an "imaginative projection," of the individual; and the finite 
self achieves a fuller form of self-consciousness when it divests itself of this 
illusory, supernatural other. Ontology for Kojeve, then, consists in a "passing 
over" of infinite to finite, God to human - a reversal of Hegel's view, which 
supposes this Erhebung of the infmite to finite only insofar as the infinite makes a 
parabolic return to itsel£ For Hegel, in other words, religious thinking is 
transmuted into a higher form of self-consciousness, though in the sublation of 
Vorstel/ung into Be griff, the content of the original remains unchanged. Spiritual 
or human content is not drawn back to the fmite from some projected beyond of 
religious consciousness. Instead, the content of speculative concept is identical to 
that of its figurative source, which is neither "something thought or imagined, nor 
something produced. "34 
Indeed, the content of speculative concept is revealed in the content of its 
religious-representational source: Absolute Spirit, or "absolute mind." Truth 
fmds its ground in an infmite other, and does not require the return of fmite 
consciousness to itself, in the sense that Kojeve suggests. Rather, its ascent 
towards the infinite entails a return to itself in the sense that this ontological 
ground is laid bare by and in God. Religious consciousness, this revelation to 
fmite consciousness, ''to know what God as spirit is... includes, in its forefront, 
the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge 
is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God, which 
34 See corresponding citation to note 18 above. 
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proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God."35 Thus, God's self-knowledge is 
dependent upon the human being's consciousness of God, but only insofar as the 
religious consciousness of the latter assumes form in the Being of the Absolute, 
which is necessarily (better: onto logically) other. 36 To reformulate this with 
respect to our current discussion: philosophical thought, which absorbs and 
transmutes the forms of consciousness of the revealed religion, assumes its own 
form in the ontological necessity of the Absolute, an Absolute which is essential 
to the content of the manifest religion itself It is with respect to this common 
ontological ground, to the necessity of the concept (Be griff) of God, that religion 
and philosophy are both carried out in ''the service of God.'.J7 As Lauer remarks, 
"Religion cannot, it is true, institute a critique of philosophy's thinking of God -
religion is not critical thought - but it contains within itself the criterion for the 
adequacy of philosophy as authentically rational."38 Indeed, philosophy 
constitutes a ''rethinking" [Nachdenken] of a content that is presented iri. a form 
inadequate to thought. "It follows upon other, inadequate, forms of thought, not, 
be it noted, to eliminate them but to raise them up to a form adequate to their 
content."39 The content of the manifest religion itself- that is, the content of 
Vorstellung - undergoes no change. According to Hegel, it can be said, the 
speculative Begri.ff does not retrieve this content from some represented beyond, 
as Kojeve claims, but affirms the ontological necessity of the divine through the 
35 Hegel, Philosophy ofMinQ, section 564, p. 297. 
36 Thus nms one possible critique of Kojeve. I do not mean to cheapen his fullness of thought. It 
is simply that the matter requires far more attention than I am able to give here. 
37 See note 1. 
38 Lauer, Hegel' s Concept of God, p. 58. 
39 Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God, p. 62. 
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very process of "rethinking" which pushes thought beyond the representational 
fabric of religious consciousness. 
The Ontological Domain of Begriffand Absolute Knowing; 
and, as a Means of Conclusion: The Ground of Human Ontology 
This last point is what James Yerkes suggests, I think, when he claims that 
"'God' is a content-object of 'pure' thought in the sense that he is the ontological 
ground for the possibility of all thought.'"'0 Yerkes stresses the ambiguous nature 
of the boundaryline between Vorstellung and Begri.ff in Hegelian thought. In 
cognitive or psychological terms, Vorstellung is prior to Begriff, yet Begriff is 
essentially prior to Vorstellung in that the latter is strictly an instantiation of the 
Begriff, but in representational form. 41 This echoes the general tenor of my 
argument: that the fluidity which characterizes the phenomenological divide 
between representation and concept in Hegel's thought is reflective of the 
ontological ground that they share. The ontological priority of the philosophical 
concept, and the phenomenological priority of religious representation, are 
expressions of a unified ontology which supposes for consciousness a God-
thought centre. The possibility of all thought, therefore, resides in the necessity of 
the concept of God, the very "content-object of'pure' thought" itsel£42 
40 Yerkes, Christology, p. 84. 
41 Ibid., p. 92-5. 
42 The question, again, regards whether the concept of God evidences a11)' "labour of the 
negative"; in other words: whether the concept of God requires, but resists, elevation to the level 
of the Absolute Idea, or whether they are the equivalently consummate expressions of ontological 
fulfillment. 
34 
It is in this sense that, in the domain of the concept, in the medium of pure 
thought, the ontological necessity of God is affrrmed. There, Vorstellung passes 
over into Begriff, or returns to its essential mode of Being - or better: the very 
possibility of its being. Yet the nature of Begriffis too dynamic for one to simply 
assume that it achieves a position of unbridled unity in its condition of Absolute 
Knowing. As has been noted, on one level, Vorstellung possesses a negative 
power which belabours finite consciousness in its attempt to rise beyond 
representational thought. The speculative content meets resistance from the 
representational shell. 43 But it is not sufficient to regard the process of sublation 
alone; for, even at the level ofthe Begriff, in the medium of pure thought, we hear 
echoes of the dialectic between ftnite and infmite. These echoes are heard, 
despite the fact that, in the realm of Begriff, the realm of speculative thought or 
absolute knowing, we cannot mark a "distinction between knowledge and its 
truth," what Hegel calls '"the internal opposition of the concept, "'44 in the sense 
proper to phenomenological development heretofore. In the stage of absolute 
knowing - where Absolute Spirit finds, or begins to return to its home - the 
Be griff marks as "pure" a mode of thought as the odyssey of the Phenomenology 
will allow. Yet with the ground of Being laid bare, Spirit is faced by its 
unmediated content, or substance. And so begins the radica~ consummate stage 
of introspection wherein Spirit comes anew into contact with all of its previous 
forms: forms, posited and annulled in the trails of experience, which have led it to 
its point of consummation. Hegel writes: 
43 Paul Ricoeur, "Vorstellung in Hegel," p. 83. 
For experience is just this, that the content- which is Spirit- is in 
itself substance, and therefore an object of consciousness. But this 
substance which is Spirit is the process in which Spirit becomes 
what it is in itself; and it is only as this process of reflecting itself 
into itself that it is in itselftrulySpirit.45 
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Thus, though the dialectical tension of experience has been transmuted, it remains 
present in muted form: in that it remains self-aware of a union of knowledge and 
being, Spirit has sublated, and contemplates its previous forms of knowing, but 
from the perspective of Absolute Knowing. Here, Spirit still knows - in and 
through experience - the content of Spirit. It is simply that the dialectical tension 
of experience - the distinction between knowledge and truth which characterizes 
all forms of knowing, including that of the manifest religion - appears in a 
sublated or dampened form. Even in this consummate stage of speculative or 
"Absolute Knowing," it is only upon contemplation of experience (in this case: 
already mediated experience) that anything is "given [to Spirit] as an inwardly 
revealed eternal verity." 
The entirety of experience thus remains in and for the Absolute, but in a 
sublated or elevated form. The Absolute entails being in its fullest sense; it is the 
very object of the phenomenological dialectic put forward by Hegel. And 
although the echoes of this dialectical experience are essentially heard at its core, 
the Absolute is conceived only in terms of itself Hence the supposed ontological 
"purity" of Begriff, the expression of the Absolute in the "pure" medium of 
thought, and the ground that it puts forth for the very possibility of the dialectic 
which precedes it. With respect to the fluidity which characterizes the 
44 Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology o[Spirit, trans. Samuel 
Chemiak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 576. 
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boundaryline between Vorstel/ung and Begriffin Hegel's "philosophico-religious 
quest,"46 however, argument can be made as to the ontological purity or 
universality of the represented "God" itself- or, reciprocally, as to the essentially 
particular nature of the concept of the Absolute. Herein lies the importance of 
the God-concept, even within the framework of the fulfilled ontology supposed by 
the final section of the Phenomenology.47 
In the Berlin Lectures, which are characterized by a markedly more 
sympathetic reading of the God-concept in its relation to Absolute Knowing, 
Hegel emphasizes that the distinctions which mark the dialectical reconciliation of 
God with himself (his concept) are not "external" in nature, but "are the activity, 
the developed vitality, ofthe absolute spirit itself. It is itself its eternal life, which 
is a development and a return of this development into itsel£"48 Within the 
framework of the consummate religion, then, we find the internal comprehension 
of the concept. How, then, does Hegel's Phenomenology differ with respect ~o 
the Absolute Idea, which achieves a similar, internal comprehension of its concept 
only after having sublated the tension and toil inherent in its forms of experience? 
And if Spirit, in its activity of engaging its internal substance (or experience), 
endures the labour of the negative within itself, as Hegel suggests above, then the 
45 Hegel, Phenomenology, section 802, p. 487. 
46 I take this phrase from RP. Singh, "Spirit, Estrangement and Unification: Hegel's Philosophico-
Religious Quest," Indian Philosophical Quarterly 20/2 (Aprill994): 161-172. 
47 Indeed, Hegel's Science of Logic begins at this level of ontological fu]fillment inferred by the 
Phenomenology's concluding chapter, "Absolute Knowing." It carries out an exposition of this 
ontological ground in terms of itself- i.e., in the supposed medium of''pure" thought - and, 
consequently, remains ambivalent to the terms proper to Hegel's phenomenological ontology 
(where the opposition between knowledge and being, between certainty and truth, is overcome), 
let alone to the relevance of religion therein. See Hyppolite, "Conclusion," Genesis and Structure, 
pp. 571-606. In the Science of Logic, Hegel attempts ' 'the presentation of God as he is in his 
eternal essence, before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit'' (Hegel, Logic, p.3l; cited in 
Hyppolite p. 582). 
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unity of which he speaks would somehow involve a disunity: a disunity of the 
Begriffitself. Yet conversely, in that this "labour ofthe negative" operates within 
the Absolute on a "pure" level of internal comprehension, the very nature of its 
dialectical tension is transmuted, and suggests a view similar to that put forward 
by Hegel in his late lectures. As I suggest above, at the level of the Absolute Idea, 
Spirit experiences the labour of the dialectic (the formal contingency of 
Vorstellung) in the same manner that it hears an echo: as a sound of that which 
has been sublated; ·a trace of that which has been transmuted; a sound not 
contained by its mark of activity, its source. The Absolute "hears" the "echo" of 
the concept of God in the medium of its content, where representational 
figurations have already undergone sublation. In that the Absolute is the ground 
for the very possibility of Being, 49 we are somehow left with the understanding 
that forms of phenomenological experience (including religious consciousness) 
are not simply sublated by the Absolute, but that the possibility of their existence 
finds its determination in the Absolute, the Begriff as it exists in the pure medium 
of thought. 5° There, in the realm of Absolute Knowing, the Absolute entertains 
religious Vorstellungen as part of its content, but only insofar as they have already 
been sublated, insofar as their representational husk has already been shed. 
This is the sense in which I suggest earlier that the speculative Begriff 
does not retrieve its content from some represented beyond, but instead affirms 
the ontological necessity of the concept of God through the very process of 
48 Hegel, LPR III, p. 274. 
49 Find similar discussion of the Absolute as the ground for the very possibility of being in J.N. 
Findlay, "Hegel as Theologian," in Meaning, Truth, and God, ed. Leroy Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: 
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"rethinking" which pushes thought beyond the representational fabric of religious 
consciousness. In the realm of absolute knowing, philosophy is unencumbered by 
the representational surface of religious, pictorial thinking, which it has elevated 
to the level of speculative concept; religion, moreover, is not entirely absent, but 
remains as the essential moment in the ultimate transfiguration of the concept of 
"God," the "Absolute." Indeed, the Absolute in the realm of pure thought is the 
Begriffto which Hegel refers above as ''the activity ... of the absolute spirit itself," 
the very reconciliation of God with himself (his concept). We propose something 
similar when we stress, not only the relatedness, but also the fluidity of 
representational and conceptual forms of knowledge, despite the consummate 
nature of the Begriffwhich characterizes Spirit in the realm of absolute knowing. 
And Findlay does the same thing by suggesting a multifarious collection of 
Begrijfe, all of which are subsumed under, or find consummation in, the Absolute 
Begriff.51 Over and over we find affirmation of the religio-philosophical tenets 
which give momentum to Hegel's dialectic: that "only a knowing which is infinite 
and has as its final object infmite reality is in the final analysis knowing at all," 
and that in God we find the "paradigm ofinfmity."52 
The God-concept, therefore, is constitutive of the Absolute Idea in its 
consummate form, which, in the medium of pure thought, can be conceived only 
in terms of itself. It is thus that the fluidity which characterizes the 
phenomenological divide between religious representation and speculative 
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 177-194. See Yerkes, Christology, p. 84, with respect 
to God: "the ground for the logical the possibility of all thought." 
50 This restates once more the ontological necessity of Hegel's Begriff. 
51 Findlay, "Hegel as Theologian," pp. 185-90. 
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concept reflects the ontological ground shared by God and Absolute in the realm 
of Absolute Knowing. There, "God" is not a contingent representation of the 
divine but is an ontologically necessary concept, elemental to the internal 
comprehension or self-consciousness of the Absolute. To elaborate, "Vorstellung 
is bound to the dualism between the here and the beyond so that the divine is 
never fully present for the believer's experience.... This is why Vorste/lung is 
associated with consciousness in opposition to the self-consciousness of Begriff in 
which, subject and object being identical, no such rift or absence is possible"53 -
hence the centrality ofthe concept of God in the realm of absolute knowing. The 
representational object of religious consciousness is transfigured so as to become 
the subject and object of speculative self-consciousness. In the process of 
elevation from the finite to the infinite, God is divested of his representational 
aspect, and becomes a speculative concept necessary to the internal 
comprehension of the Absolute. The represented "beyond" is overcome. 
It is thus that the God-concept is central to the speculative framework, the 
ontological ground, which marks the beginning and end of Hegel's 
Phenomenology. In the realm of Absolute Knowing, in the medium of pure 
thought, we are reminded of the necessary place that "God" holds therein. The 
God-concept, driven by an essentially speculative thrust, births the state of self-
consciousness fully realized by Spirit. Throughout the voyage of the 
phenomenology, "on the one hand [Spirit] is what is essential, substantial, or has 
being in itself (consciousness); on the other hand, it relates itself to itself, it knows 
52 Lauer, Hegel's Concept ofGod, pp. 168 and 167. 
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itself as subject in relation to an object recognized to be other than itself, it has 
being for itself (self-consciousness)."54 In the stage of speculative knowing, 
however, the distinctions between the in and for itself, consciousness and self-
consciousness, dissolve. Differentiation, a mark of the contingent guise of Spirit, 
is altogether effaced as Spirit makes its consummate move into the realm of 
ontological necessity. There, the God-concept is comprehended as a transfigured 
and necessary speculative concept. 
Indeed, on the plane ofthe internal comprehension ofthe Absolute, God is 
not a Vorstellung contingent upon the sensuous aspect of experience, but an 
ontologically necessary Begri.ff. His concept achieves an identity with the 
Absolute in terms of form and content; or in other words, the Absolute is 
comprehended only in terms of itself. This is the sense in which the God-concept, 
in the stage of absolute knowing, finds affirmation through the very negation of 
the "God" who is revealed in religious representation. The existence or being of 
God is affirmed by his elevation to the level of speculative concept; he becomes, 
moreover, the ontologically necessary ground for human thought. To draw from 
Hegel's words, with which open this essay: "All that proceeds from thought" 
finds its "uhimate center in the one thought of God." And, in that God is the 
content which spirit finds within itself, "consciousness and this content are 
inseparable. "55 
53 Merold Westphal, History and .Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1979), p. 204. 
54 Peter C. Hodgson, ''Introduction: G.W.F. Hegel: Theologian ofthe Spirit," G.W.F. Hegel: 
Theologian ofthe Spirit, edited by Peter C. Hodgson (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), p. 8. 
55 Hegel, LPR I, pp. 84 and 88. 
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The inseparability of God from finite, human consciOusness fmds its 
parallel in the realm of Absolute Knowing, where Spirit overcomes all internal 
dualism and achieves a similar unity with the speculative concept of God; rather, 
it achieves knowledge of its concept in and for itself. The phase in which Spirit 
divests itself of the Vorstellung, "God," and comprehends itself as the speculative 
Begriff, finds parallel design with respect to the central event-turned-concept of 
the manifest religion: the Incarnation. This I put forth as a means of conclusion, 
so as to emphasize the centrality of the manifest religion in the ultimate 
consummation of the Absolute Idea. For it is in the Incarnation that we fmd 
instanced the shift of a historical event or Vorstellung to the level of necessary, 
universal concept or Begriff, much in the manner that in the medium of pure 
thought we find the elevation of a sensuously contingent, representational God to 
the level of necessary speculative concept. We are brought back once again to the 
distinction between representational and speculative forms of truth: 
In addition to these contrasts between absence and presence, 
consciousness and self-consciousness, Vorstellung means viewing 
the incarnation as an event, a contingent happening, while Begriff 
means viewing the incarnation as the expression of necessity. 
What this distinction between event and necessity means is 
indicated by the final contrast, that of individual and universal self-
consciousness. The incarnation means that God is present as 
observable human self-consciousness. But seen in the form of 
Vorstellung this refers uniquely to the historical event and the 
historical individual known as Jesus ofNazareth. To see the unity 
of the human and divine as a necessity, and thus in the form of 
Begriff, is to see the human self-consciousness in which God is 
present and united with man as the universal self-consciousness of 
the congre~ation which, in principle at least, incorporates all of 
humanity.5 
56 Merold Westphal, History and Truth, p. 204. 
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The transmutation of the incarnate Christ from historical figure into universal 
concept "mirrors" the sublation, in the realm of absolute knowing, of a 
representational God into the speculative concept of God. Moreover, while the 
Incarnatio~ as concept, marks the necessary union of finite and infmite, of human 
and divine, the consummate "knowing" of the Absolute in the medium of pure 
thought marks the union or sublation of religious concept into speculative 
concept. Each movement constitutes, by degrees, an elevation or passing over of 
fmite to infmite. 
This being so, it is important to remember that the Incarnation, even as an 
object of consciousness to the Christian community - as Spirit - remains 
belaboured by the toil of the negative. It is not until the stage of Absolute 
Knowing that the universal concept, the content of the Incarnation, is transfigured 
into its purely speculative concept. If we remain mindful of the essentially fluid 
nature of the division between representational and conceptual forms of truth 
before the stage of Absolute Knowing, the transmutation of the Incarnation as a 
historical event into a necessary universal concept does not suppose, for the 
middle point of Christianity, the status Begriff in its consummate sense. Rather, 
we are left with a universal and necessary Begriff that is still to some degree 
encumbered by its own form - a sensuous object universalized in thought: what 
we have elsewhere called Vorstellung.57 One should here remember Hegel's 
distinction between "image" [BildJ and "representation" [Vorstellung], the latter 
57 It is my view that the Incarnation can be tmderstood both as representation and as concept, if we 
keep in mind that this concept is not the selfSame concept that emerges at the end of the 
Phenomenology - a point which emphasizes the ontological fluidity of these two forms of 
religious knowing before Spirit internally comprehends itself in the medium of pure thought. For 
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being an object of pictorial thinking elevated to the level of universality through 
thought.58 This is the sense in which Vorste/lung rests between fmite and infmite, 
between the sensuous world and the speculative Begri.ff. Moreover, like the 
theological claims made for the Incarnation, Vorstellung mediates finite and 
infinite, and makes the one known to the other; the Absolute is present to 
humanity through thought. Or, thought, that which distinguishes human beings 
from animals, finds its centre in the Absolute, in the concept of God. To recall 
Ricoeur's words, "the Absolute equates itself with presence."59 
It is in this sense that the Absolute sets forth the ontological ground for 
human thought, and in the incarnation that we find this ontological ground figured 
historically and then elevated to the level of universality as an object of thought. 
For, "consciousness ... does not start form its inner life, from thought, and unite 
within itself the thought of God with existence; on the contrary, it starts from an 
existence that is immediately present and recognizes God therein."60 Thus reads 
the presupposition of Hegelian ontology in phenomenological terms. 
"Metaphysically it has this form: God is spirit, God has reality; he exists 
[ existiert] in virtue of his concept. Proof of the existence of God derives from his 
concept ... . now comes the transition from concept to being. The concept is the 
presupposition.'.61 It is in this sense that the journey of Spirit in the 
Phenomenology is prefigured by the concept of God. That towards which Spirit 
makes its ascent, the Begriff, preexists all forms of consciousness by virtue of its 
a consonant interpretation of the Incarnation as Vorste/lung, even after its elevation as Spirit, see 
Harris, Hegel's Ladder II, p. 697ft 
58 Hegel, LPR I, p. 239. 
59 Ricoeur, "Vorstellung in Hegel," p. 77. 
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ontological necessity. The existence of the ontological concept is confirmed by 
its presence to finite spirit, in Christian and speculative consciousness. With 
respect to this ontologically necessary beginning and end, it is worthwhile to cite 
from one of the most cryptic sections in the Phenomenology. Here, Hegel speaks 
of Spirit in its final stage of Absolute Knowing, where, in the pure medium of 
thought, time and space are projected outwards and Spirit begins its odyssey 
anew: 
As its fulfilment [sic] consists in perfectly knowing what it is, in 
knowing its substance, this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in 
which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape 
over to recollection. Thus absorbed in itself: it is sunk in the night 
of its self-consciousness; but in that night its vanished outer 
existence is preserved, and this transformed existence - the former 
one, but now reborn of the Spirit's knowledge - is the new 
existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit. In the 
immediacy of this new existence the Spirit has to start afresh to 
bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it 
had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits. But 
recollection, the inwardizing, of that experience, has preserved it 
and is the inner being, and in fact the higher form of the 
substance. 62 
This final stage of Spirit- the Absolute, the concept of God- is the beginning 
and end ofbeing, the alpha and omega of thought. With respect to this ascent of 
the Absolute, J.N. Findlay writes: ''The most perfect being of Anselm seems to be 
slowly constituting itself by stages, though at the end it becomes clear that it was 
always there from the beginning, whole and entire."63 It is here that humanity 
fmds its ontological ground in the concept of God; here, the circle finds 
completion. This point of ontological connection between humanity and God, the 
60 Hegel, Phenomenology, section 758, p. 458. 
61 Hegel, LPR III, pp. 65-6. 
62 Hegel, Phenomenology, section 808, p. 492. 
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historical and the divine, is mirrored in and represented by the doctrine of the 
Incarnation. In the figure of Christ, as in the stage of Absolute Knowing, we fmd 
a condition in which human and divine are bound by a principle of ontological 
necessity. 
In Hegel's tenns, indeed, the Incarnation puts forth, in representational 
form, the ontological necessity of the Absolute for human thought. As Findlay 
reminds us, "for Hegel, God is the truth that knows itself; the self-knowledge that 
man has of God cannot exist outside divine life."64 It is thus that the Incarnation 
marks the very ground of human ontology, and serves as a mirror reading of the 
voyage of Spirit in the pure medium of thought. It is the meeting place of finite 
and infmite modes of thought: at once the domain proper to Vorstellung and the 
place of genesis (for finite spirit) of the speculative Begriff, the principle of inner-
dynamism which spurs consciousness on to greater levels of self-actualization. 
Despite its implicitly dynamic quality, the Incarnation remains limited to the 
representational language of day, to the realm of consciousness. In Hegel's tenns, 
it has not yet "sunk in the night of its self-consciousness." Yet it is precisely 
through the Christ event that the pathway towards this night of absolute self-
consciousness is mapped out, that the infinite is made an object of thought for 
fmite consciousness. In the consciousness of the community of believers, the 
particularities of history are elevated to the level of philosophical thought; 
consciousness gives way to self-consciousness, and (ostensibly) Vorstellung to 
Begriff. Merold Westphal remarks: 
63 Findlay, "Hegel as Theologian," p. 191. 
64 Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, p. 543. 
From its name, Begriff, and from its evident link with Absolute 
Knowing, there is nothing surprising in the discovery that this new 
form of consciousness is the philosophical. The Christian 
congregation can become the bearer of this new mode of 
experience (which cannot strictly be called a form of 
consciousness) and of the Absolute Knowledge it makes possible 
only by radically transcending itself and ceasing to be what it has 
historically been. 65 
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It is in this way that the move from history to ecclesiology, brought about by the 
apprehension of the Incarnate Christ as an object of thought, mirrors the shift 
which takes place in the realm of Absolute Knowing: namely, from externally to 
internally comprehended experience, religious Vorstellung to speculative Begriff, 
the unity of thought and Being. 
The Incarnation initiates the elevation of the Absolute from the level of 
historical and representational form to the level of philosophical thought. But, as 
I have shown in the preceding pages, for Hegel, the pure speculative concept 
cannot be comprehended until the Absolute fulfills its condition of radical self-
transcendence in the medium of pure thought. Until then, the place held by the 
Absolute in the consciousness of the community of believers remains enveloped 
in a representational husk. It remains, strictly speaking, in the domain of 
theology. In some sense, it is to this theological framework that Feuerbach 
responds in his Essence of Christianity of 1841. Yet with respect to Hegel's 
supposition that philosophical thought brings the conceptual core of theological 
inquiry to its necessary fulfillment, Feuerbach' s work casts the end of the 
speculative task itself in a new light. What religion recognizes as "God," what 
theology rationally comprehends as "God," and what speculative thought 
65 Westphal, History and Truth, pp. 205-6. 
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abstracts as the "Absolute" - all are reevaluated by Feuerbach in his examination 
of self-consciousness. In essence, Feuerbach reinterprets religious and 
speculative consciousness proper to Hegel in terms of the human being's self-
relation. The relation of human and God, finite spirit and infmite spirit - indeed, 
the very nature of Hegelian self-consciousness itself - is restated in terms of a 
new understanding of human self-knowledge. For Feuerbach, the Hegelian centre 
cannot hold: the ground of theological-speculative ontology, the one thought of 
God in which all thought "finds its centre," is displaced. It is to this new centre 
that we shall turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
The Theological-Speculative Dream: Feuerbach's Reversal of 
Hegelian Ontology in The Essence of Christianity 
If Hegel's Phenomenology describes the voyage of Spirit to the stage of 
Absolute Knowing, where "it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness,"1 
Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity of 1841 beckons a new dawn. According to 
Feuerbach, in other words, Hegel's speculative philosophy carries out the 
nocturnal vision of religious consciousness and, like religion, "is the dream of the 
human mind." Moreover, Feuerbach stresses that it is a condition peculiar to 
religious persons to be ignorant of the baseless fabric which absorbs them. As 
Feuerbach writes: 
But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in 
heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality; we only see real things 
in the entrancing splendour of the imagination and caprice, instead 
of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity.2 
It is within this dream alone that religion, theology, and their consummate 
speculative form, come into being. For it is through the exercise of imagination 
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), section 808, p. 492. 
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and reason that humanity loses sight of the internal origin of religion, namely, 
feeling. Feuerbach reinterprets the Hegelian conception of religious knowledge, 
outlined in my last chapter. Initially, religious Vorstellung (for Feuerbach) 
appears as a result of the imagination's response to the feeling or intuition of an 
infinite other. Theology makes of this other a unified object of the understanding, 
a "God," while speculative philosophy, to which the God of theology appears in 
the abstract guise of an ''Absolute," effects the synthesis of Christian ontology 
and absorbs the dreamer into his religious dream. For Feuerbach, the journey of 
Spirit towards the stage of Absolute Knowing, by which Hegel assumes an 
overcoming of the contingent form of religious representation, merely restates or 
veils religious ontology in the abstract terms of speculative thought. 3 In this 
sense, the very principle of dialectical development which characterizes the move 
from religious to speculative knowledge in the Hegelian philosophy of religion, 
can be read as the first principle of Feuerbach's own critique of speculative 
philosophy - the presumed place for the pure or emancipated expression of 
religious ontology. Insofar as speculative thought does not divest thought of an 
ontological centre but merely attempts to liberate the ontological principle from 
the contingent forms of religious representation, its pure concepts (Be griffe) 
remain bound, to use Blake's penetrating phrase, by the "mind-forged manacles" 
of religious ontology. 
2 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (Amherst, NY: .Prometheus 
Books, 1989), p. xix. 
3 This theme is most prominent in Feuerbach, "The Prefuce to the Second Edition," Christianity, 
pp. xiii-xxiv. 
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The Essence of Christianity, therefore, suggests an inversion of the 
speculative ontology put forward by Hegel at the end of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1807) and which governs the trajectory of the Science of Logic (1812).4 In 
it, Feuer bach concerns himself not with Being as such, but with the human being. 
In light of the passage quoted above, Feuerbach remains rooted to the "earth," and 
thus challenges the place of the God of theology, the Absolute of speculative 
philosophy, in the dialectic of human self-consciousness. He further explains 
self-consciousness in terms of the individual's self-relation as a sensuous being, 
his relation to an other in the form of his species. Feuerbach eradicates the notion 
of a single infinite being as the ground of thought, and suggests that any 
conception of a singular ontological subject distinct from the world of sense "is 
evolved by his [human's] self-consciousness, by the activity of his thought."5 For 
Feuerbach, therefore, the phenomenological shift of finite spirit from religious to 
speculative consciousness, from Vorstellung to Begriff, does not entail an 
awakening to the core of earthly reality as such, but a deepening of the conceptual 
dream in which the imaginative forms of religion are enforced, first in a 
theological, then in a speculative, guise. Thus, the essence of Feuerbach's 
critique of Hegelian ontology is that the Absolute, the infinite spirit, is not the root 
of all thought, but is a product of thought's self-activity. In Feuerbach's view, 
neither God nor his essential Begriff is a subject unto itself, but rather is a 
4 In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel restateS the centrality of the religious 
ontology in his thought See Merold Westphal, "Hegel's Theory of Religious Knowledge," in 
Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel, ed. Frederick G. Weiss (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijboff, 1974), pp. 30-57. Westphal deals primarily with Hegel's "Lectures on 
the Proofs of the Existence of God," which ne considers to be a "microcosm of his [Hegel's] 
systematic thougllt" (p. 30). 
5 Feuerbach, Christianity. p. 18. 
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"phantasm" of the religious dream. Self-consciousness, according to the Essence 
of Christianity, is not dependent upon some greater ontological principle. Instead, 
any conception of an ontos distinct :from the human being - be it God or the 
Absolute -is exclusively symptomatic of human self-consciousness. 
In what follows, I would like to accentuate the place of the Essence of 
Christianity in relation to Hegel's philosophy of religion, and with respect to 
Feuerbach's problematical formulation of species consciousness. Although it is 
widely accepted that Feuerbach' s work of 1841 works within a Hegelian frame of 
reference, the Essence of Christianity is understood, first and foremost, as an 
exposition of the phenomenon of religious consciousness and as a critique of its 
rational form, theology. Rarely does its implicit critique of Hegelian ontology 
operate as the exegetical ground of its readers. 6 This, of course, can be attributed 
to two possible assumptions: frrst, that Feuerbach's reaction to Hegelian ontology 
comes into fruition only in Principles for a Philosophy of the Future;7 and, 
second, that in Principles Feuerbach puts forth his most mature critique of 
Hegelian ontology as it appears in its fullest form, in the Science of Logic. 8 Yet 
here I shall read Feuerbach's conception of self-consciousness in the Essence of 
Christianity as a response to Hegelian ontology as established on the terms of my 
previous chapter, i.e., with special reference to the forms of religious 
6 Marx Wartotsky is here the exception. The degree to which WartotSky emphasizes the centrality 
of Hegelian philosophy in The Essence of Christianity is notable, and the strength with which he 
carries out his analysis ofFeuerbachian epistemology, lucid and thorough. See Marx WartofSky, 
Feuerbach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 196-292. 
7 Principles appeared in 1843, two years after the first edition of The Essence of Christianity. 
8 SeeGert Hummel's strong overview ofFeuerbach's philosophical project: an exposition of 
Fetierbach and his relation to Hegelian thought, particularly with respect to the furrner's 
Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunfl. Gert Hummel, "Sensibility in the Experience of God: 
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consciousness per se, particularly as they appear in Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Philosophy of Mind (of the Encyclopaedia), and his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion. My general point is that Feuerbach's explicit critique of 
Christianity contains an implicit critique (and not merely a selective 
appropriation) of Hegel's philosophy of religious and speculative consciousness, 
which, as argued in my last chapter, asserts the God-concept (Begrif}) as the 
ontological ground of all thought.9 
Van A. Harvey, who distinguishes between two distinct strands of thought 
m the Essence of Christianity, the "naturalist-existentialist" strand and the 
dominant Hegelian strand, deems the latter an "arcane and speculative theory of 
consciousness," a sphere of "entanglements," the home of a "convoluted 
argument. "10 Indeed, a Hegelian theory of consciousness is the leitmotif which 
appears most frequently throughout the pages of Feuerbach's work of 1841. 
Importantly, the leitmotif also lies at the root of Feuerbach's problematical 
conception of species-ontology. This point, however, need not be attributed to the 
abstract nature of the Hegelian theory of consciousness which Feuerbach 
Ludwig Feuerbach's Philosophy as a Challenge to Today' s Theology," Dialectics and Humanism, 
10/4 (1983): 117-133. 
9 The possibility that The Essence of Christianity constitutes a critique of speculative thought is 
supported by much offeuerbach's writing prior to 1841, which takes a critical view of Hegel's 
position. See most notably, Feuerbach 's Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie of 1839. 
10 Van A. Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 21, 33, 55. Harvey's distinction is most useful for those attempting to 
make sense of the discrepancy between Feuerbach's early (Hegelian) and late (naturalist-
existentialist) works. Harvey's analysis, which makes use of what Richard Rorty calls the method 
of''rationalreconstruction'' (see HiirVey, pp. 16-21X favours the latter over the former. In light of 
Harvey's estimation that Feuerbach's early works are marred by Hegelian motifs, and that the 
naturalist-existentialist language offeuerbach's later writing is more pleasing to the modem ear, 
one must wonder whether Harvey plays audience to the religion ofwhich Feuerbach caJls himself 
the listener, or whether each evidences a distinct Zeitgeist. 
53 
reformulates,11 but perhaps to the problems inherent in the latter's conception of 
the species-being itself: that the essence of human being is located somewhere 
between natural finite life and the infinite horizon of thought. "I am nothing but a 
natural philosopher in the domain of the mind,"12 claims Feuerbach. Hence the 
ultimately problematical nature ofFeuerbach's "science." 
In what follows, and through an examination ofFeuerbach's conception of 
self-consciousness in the Essence of Christianity, I shall argue that Feuerbach 
reformulates ontology proper to the Hegelian philosophy of religion, particularly 
with respect to Vorstellung and Begriff, as discussed in my last chapter. For 
Feuerbach, roughly speaking, representation and concept become epistemological 
rather than ontological categories: i.e., keys to the self-knowledge of human 
beings rather than forms of consciousness attributable to an ontologically distinct 
subject (here: God or the Absolute). They distance humans from what Feuerbach 
puts forth as the original space of the religious impulse: feeling, which is given 
representational form by the imagination. 13 It is precisely through his-placement 
u Recall Josiah Royce' s reminder that the historical and political furces of the early 19th century 
were shaped by the works of their philosophical contemporaries, to an extent that is hard to fathom 
today. See Josiah Royce, "Hegel's Phiinomenologie des Geistes," Lectures on Modem Jdealism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 136-160. 
lZ Feuerbach, Christianity, p . xiv. 
13 Here, some might like to draw the visible link between Feuerbach and Schleiermacher, a point 
of connection upon which Robert Williams has reflected. Williams suggests that Schleiermacher 
goes further than Feuerbach in providing us with a more tenable, existentialist interpretation of 
religious consciousness. He claims, moreover, that Schleiermacher achieves this through a 
reinterpretation of Anselm's ontological principle, which, unlike that put forward by Feuerbach, 
does not reduce Anse.bn 's axiom to a mere "anthropologism," to a level of subjective psychology. 
See Robert Williams, "Schleiermacher and Feuerbacb on the Intentiooality of Religious 
Consciousness," Journal ofReligion 53/4 (October 1973) 424-455. Williams' references to 
Anselm and the ontological proof in some sense anticipate my own contention regarding the 
implied centrality ofthe ontological c.laim in Feuerbach' s critique of religion and speculative 
thought. Insofur as Williams claims that Feuerbach is lacking in a tenable existentialist alternative 
to traditional religious ontology, the author anticipates even Van A. Harvey' s thesis, twenty years 
later, that The Essence of Christianity lacks the coherent "naturalist-existentialisf' interpretation of 
religion, common to Feuerbach' s later writings. 
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of feeling- and not an ontologically necessary God-concept- at the source of 
religious consciousness that Feuerbach reverses Hegelian ontology. In order to 
make my point clear, I shall examine the relationship, implicit in Feuerbach's 
boo~ between feeling, the imagination and the understanding - modes of which 
religious and speculative consciousness engender specific forms. This, of course, 
is to accentuate the peculiar nature of Feuerbach's inversion of Hegelian 
ontology. Feuerbach's inversion denies the existence of an ontologically distinct, 
infinite other, and through its critique of self-consciousness, reverses the subject-
predicate relation of this other - an elemental component of theological reflection 
about God, and its synthetic appropriation by Hegelian speculative philosophy. 
Through his reversal of this subject-predicate relation, and through the concept of 
the species as the proper object of consciousness, Feuerbach attempts to retrieve 
the original unity of feeling which is intuited by human being prior to the 
appearance of the religious imagination, which represents this state of emotive 
disunity and provides the misrepresentational apparatus of reflective thought, 
specifically, theology and speculative philosophy. 14 Feuerbach's species concept 
( Gattungsbegrifj) attempts to reestablish the ·unity of human beings with their 
essence as members of the species, a pre-reflective essence that exists prior to the 
emergence of the infinite other oftraditional theological-speculative ontology. 
Thought as the Ground of Being: Hegel's "God" Reconsidered 
14 I shall consider the place of the imagination in Feuerbachian epistemology below, and in greater 
detail in chapter 3, where I discuss Feuerbach ambivalent position, that the imagination is at once 
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As I mention above, while Hegel stresses the ultimate unity of thought and 
Being, Feuerbach understands belief in the great ontological category (God or 
Begrif.j) as a product of thought's self-activity. "Faith," be it in God or in the 
speculatively transfigured God-concept, "arises out of the structure of self-
consciousness itself."15 Furthermore, if there is an implied unity in the relation 
between Being and thought, it can be attributed to the fact that the intellect 
fashions the consummate ontological category in its own image. Thought does 
not, in other words, find its ground in the pervasive ontological category as such-
in God or the God-concept (the Absolute) - but creates and puts forth (or 
represents [stellet vor]) the very ground ofBeing. Feuerbach, however, remains 
united with Hegel in his estimation that thought or consciousness distinguishes 
"human being" from "brute." To restate a portion of the passage with which' my 
last chapter began: 
Consciousness or thought is what distinguishes human beings from 
the animals. All that proceeds from thought - all the distinctions 
ofthe arts and sciences and ofthe endless interweavings ofhuman 
relationships, habits and customs, activities, skills, and enjoyments 
-find their ultimate center in the one thought ofGod.16 
Although Feuerbach displaces God from the centre of all thought, he still 
considers consciousness that which distinguishes the human being from the 
animal. It is simply that consciousness does not reflect an ontologically distinct 
and infinite subject. "Man thinks - that is, he converses with himself.,,7 If, as 
Hegel claims, all "proceeds from thought," Feuerbach implies that so too does the 
a destructive and a necessary mode of human self-knowing. 
l5 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, p. 3 1. 
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concept of God or the Absolute. On his terms, consciousness grounds the God-
concept, not vice versa. No form of the ontological category, in the theological or 
speculative sense, can be exempt as something other than a manifestation of the 
fundamental structure of self-consciousness. The ontological centre of religious 
and speculative consciousness is simply a notional18 expression of consciousness' 
self-activity. The ontological principle is the mirror image of Feuerbach's 
thinking "human," of Hegel's "finite spirit," and is not the extant reality that acts 
as the necessary centre of self-consciousness. 19 
It is in this manner that Feuerbach casts theological- and also speculative 
- ontology in an altered light. Let us witness the way in which Hegel sets up his 
own discussion of Anselm's axiomatic question: 
The ontological proof has the concept as its starting point .... The 
concept of God is set up, and it is shown that it cannot be grasped 
except as including being within itself; to the extent that being is 
distinguished from the concept, the concept exists only 
subjectively, in our thinking. As thus subjective, it is what is 
imperfect, what fulls only within finite spirit. That it is not just our 
concept but also is, irrespective of our thinking, has to be 
demonstrated.20 
For Hegel, it is not that the concept is "set up" as a ghostly chimera of religious or 
speculative consciousness, but that the very act of "setting up" is dependent upon 
the ontological priority of the concept (Begrijj) itself Thus, the concept cannot 
16 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion l: Introduction and The 
Concept of Religion. ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. Peter C. Hodgson eta/ (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 84. 
17 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 2. 
18 With respect to the term '"'notiooa1," I do not mean to suggest any connection with "Notion," 
employed by some (principally British) scholars, largely until the middle of the twentieth century, 
as an effective renderingofHegel's Begriff. 
19 Feuerbach, interestingly, refers to God as ''the mirror of man" (Christianity, p. 63 ). 
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be set up by finite spirit without the absolute presence of infmite spirit: existence 
of the concept, that is, not simply for "finite spirit" (which would imply a 
subjective or imperfect existence), but in and for itself (an undfiir sich). Indeed, 
the ontological priority of the concept is implied in Hegel's credo regarding the 
essential unity of thought and Being. For Hegel, the ontological proof steps 
beyond the limits of an argument regarding the existence of a divine being; it · 
constitutes the very foundation for the meaningfulness of speculative philosophy, 
of human thought. The ontological proof establishes the existent Be griff in which 
human consciousness fmds its centre. 
For Feuerbach, however, God and "His" correlative Be griff in speculative 
philosophy possess all the reality of a "phantasm."21 In this sense, he cuts short 
Hegel's ontological argument, and calls into question the ontological priority of 
the God-concept, that which, for Hegel, necessarily grounds human 
consciousness. Indeed, Hegel reckons that the God-concept which "exists only 
subjectively, in our thinking," or "falls only within finite spirit," constitutes an 
inadequate expression of its essential content, the absolute perfection of which 
requires Being or existence. Feuerbach, however, remains content with the 
proposal that the God-concept of speculative theology is only an illusion of 
"unrestricted subjectivity," a construct which is not, as Hegel claims above, 
"irrespective of our thinking." God, that is; is a being respective of and exclusive 
to the activity of thought. In his words, "I do not generate the object from the 
20 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ''The Ontological Proof According to The Lectures of 1831," 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion III: The Consummate Religion, ed Peter C. Hodgson, 
trans. Peter C. Hodgson et al (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 352. 
21 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 17. 
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thought, but the thought from the object; and I hold that alone to be an object 
which has existence beyond one's own brain."22 That upon which any 
formulation of the ontological proof rests (namely, perfection), is not an attribute 
of the subject, God, but a predicate transposed "elsewhere," upon an illusory, 
divine other by means of the intellect?3 The categories of theological or 
speculative ontology are objects whose conceptual genesis occurs in the realm of 
thought alone; they do not represent the independent existence of an onto logically 
necessary being. God, the Absolute, the Idea- whatever the term: none possesses 
ontological necessity in and for itsel£ Each is an object derived from thought 
reflecting upon its own infinite nature?4 
It is thus that Feuerbach redefines the theological and speculative 
understandings of ontological necessity. The theologian or speculative 
philosopher, who holds for the necessity of an absolute other- be it in the form of 
the God-concept or the speculative Begriff- spins out of nothing the baseless 
fabric ofhis dream. "But.what is dreaming?" asks Feuerbach. His answer: "The 
reversing of the waking consciousness. In dreaming, the active is the passive, the 
passive the active; in dreaming, I take the spontaneous action of my own mind for 
an action upon me from without. "25 What can be said of "dreaming" can, for 
Feuerbach, be said of the speculative theologian in search of an ontological proof, 
22 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xiv. 
23 This will be expanded below with respect to Feuer bach's claim that the species is the proper 
object of self-consciousness. 
24 For Feuerbach, reason is a necessary mode of self-knowing, while its hypostatization as an 
existent, infinite other is the first-principle of the alienated ontology proper to theology and 
speculative philosophy. As Warto&ky remarks, ~e necessity of reason is represented as the 
necessary existence, the necessary Being of God" (Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 296). 
25 Feuerbach1 Christianity, p. 140. 
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or of the one who assumes the ontological claim as the ground ofthinking.26 For 
it is precisely through the reversal of wakeful thought that the speculative 
theologian first derives "the object from the thought," and then carries out his or 
her thinking under the assumption that this object (the God-concept or Begriff) 
necessarily is. Within the framework of this "dream," Feuerbach asserts, the 
God-concept appears as the necessary existent put forward in the ontological 
proof: when in reality it is but a product of thought reflecting upon the infmite 
nature of its own horizon.27 ''The object of the intellect is the intellect objective to 
itself. "28 
For Feuerbach, who derives "the thought from the object," the only 
onto logically necessary sphere can be that of physical, earthly life, where objects 
confront us prior to rational activity. The speculative theologian, who encounters 
the passive ol'!ject (God-concept) of his thought as an active subject, must be 
shaken from his dogmatic slumbers, and the object ofhis dream laid open in "the 
simple daylight of reality and necessity." 29 For even in dreams we remain 
chained to the earth; it is simply that we misapprehend our dreams as places of 
necessary existence, and their objects as ontologically necessary existents (the 
mistake, according to Feuerbach, ofthe theologian or speculati,1e philosopher).30 
26 With this in mind, and through the substitution of"dreaming" with "thinking about God," 
Feuerbach' s point is all the more direct. 
27 Whether or not thought, due to its essentially hypothetical nature (when beheld in light of the 
God-concept), assumes a level of contingency that cannot be contained in the God:-eoncept is 
fserhaps the fundamental point of support for the ontological proof. 
Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 9. 
29 Feuerbach, Cbristiani!y, p . xix. Italics added. 
3° For a preliminary but interesting analysis of the ''dream" metaphor in The Essence of 
Christianity, see Paul Gallagher, "Feuerhach and Nietzsche on the Significance ofDreaming," 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 67 ( 1993) 87-95. There, 
Gallagher claims that Feuerbach is an heir to the tradition of French Enlightenment philosophy, 
which pitted truth against illusion, but that Feuerbach :finds in the divine illusion "'the most 
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Hegel, interestingly, defines "sleep as the state in which the soul distinguishes 
itself neither inwardly nor from the outer world." He notes, moreover, that ' 'the 
vitality of the waking state requires ... the opposition and the unity of mind with 
its object."31 Other than Hegel's use of "soul" as the operative agent, neither 
point contradicts Feuerbach' s general remarks regarding dreaming as such. 
Feuerbach's discussion of the dream-state, however, is metaphorical in nature, 
and is descriptive of theologians who carry out their rational inquiry while, in 
fact, "awake." It is thus that even the wakeful state of which Hegel speaks is 
subsumed under Feuerbach's metaphorical category, "dream," and that the God-
concept in which speculative thought finds its centre is put forth as the product of 
reflective thought itself. 
So runs one formulation of Feuerbach's inversion of ontology proper to 
Hegel, contingent upon the former's creed that thought and Being do not possess 
essential unity. The God-concept does not possess necessary existence in and for 
itself, but "is evolved by his [human's] self-consciousness, by the activity of his 
thought. ,,n On such terms, and ''to the extent that being is distinguished from the 
concept, the concept exists only subjectively, in our thinking"33 - something 
which Hegel deems both a logical and an ontological impossibility. According to 
Feuerbac~ thought does not find its "ultimate center in the one thought ofGod,"34 
significant content." He writes: "It is precisely here that Feueibach goes beyond the purely 
negative criticism of the French Enlightenment thinkers, for he tells us that lodged within the 
~hantasm of the divine is the essence of man" (p. 88). 
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace, Zustitze trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1971), section 381, Zusatz, pp. 68, 69. 
32 Feuerba~ Christianity, p. 18. 
33 Hegel, "The Ontological Proof," LPR Ill, p. 352. 
34 Hegel, LPR I, p. 84. 
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which, on the terms of Hegelian ontology, includes the attribute of necessary 
existence. Rather, the existent principle of theological or speculative ontology 
proceeds from thought - including the necessity of the concept, the principle 
correlative to the essential unity of thought and Being. Yet, although Feuerbach 
cuts short Hegel's ontological premise, he maintains an infmite horizon for 
thought in its self-activity. The difference, however, rests in the fact that he does 
not deem it necessary to suppose from this infmite horizon the existence of a 
unified and infmite other as a subject. As I shall expand below, Feuerbach's 
reformulation of Hegelian ontology is articulated with reference to the human 
species, a category which keeps the human being rooted to the earth, in the realm 
of sensuous existence, while allowing him to come to terms with his essential 
nature in terms of an infinite self-consciousness. Thus Feuerbach's concept of 
species-ontology remains problematical insofar as it refutes the unified subject at 
the core of speculative theology (the God-concept) but still maintains the 
encounter ofhurnan beings with an infmite other (their essential nature, reflected 
in the consciousness they have ofthemselves as members ofthe human species). 
That upon which Feuerbach's ontological proof rests (namely, perfection), is not 
an attribute of the subject, God, but is a predicate of the species that is 
transfigured into a subject and transposed "beyond one's brain," upon an illusory, 
divine other by means of the intellect. The ontological centre of the Hegelian 
philosophy of religion is given new form, principally through Feuerbach's 
essential tenet that "the divine activity is not distinct from the human. "35 
35 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 30. 
The Epistemology ofReligious Consciousness 
and the Emergence of the Species-Concept 
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Feuerbach's conception of species~consciousness can be understood as the 
epistemological corollary of his species-ontology, in which the other of 
theological or speculative thought is understood as a veiled form of the species. 
As established in the previous chapter, while Hegel's Vorstellung and Begriff 
constitute phenomenological-epistemological categories for finite spirit (the 
human being), they are simultaneously phenomenological-ontological forms of 
infinite spirit (the Absolute). In Feuerbach's estimation, with the centre of 
Hegelian ontology now displaced, the phenomenological-ontological forms of 
Absolute self-consciousness should be understood as phenomenological-
epistemological forms of human self-consciousness alone. The God of religion, 
the perceived ontological other, is in fact a form of the human being's self-
knowing. "[R]eligion is man's earliest and also indirect form of self-
knowledge."36 Similarly, the Hegelian God-concept (the Begrijj) upon which all 
thought is predicated, constitutes the speculative version of the God of religion, 
and again is a mode of human self-knowing. "The absolute to man is his own 
nature."37 The thought-objects of religious and speculative consciousness -
respectively, God and Be griff- constitute forms of human self-knowing insofar as 
both result from the individual's encounter with an infinite object, the species, 
which is misapprehended and then projected "beyond" the mind as a unified, 
infinite subject. Species-consciousness explains the experience of the infinite 
36 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 13. 
37 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 5. 
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other in terms ofhumans alone, and locates the origin of religious and speculative 
misrepresentations of this other in terms of humans' nature as emotional, 
imaginative, and rational beings. This is the sense in which Feuerbach shifts the 
ontological centre of Hegel's philosophy of religion from God to human and, by 
extension, the way in which he explains the forms of religious and speculative 
consciousness (Vorstellung and Begrijj) in terms of a human-centred ontology. 
Feuerbach, indeed, supposes that the nature of theological and speculative 
consciousness is predicated upon a wayward conception of Being, an ontology, 
furthermore, which gives rise to a misguided epistemology: one which points to 
the heavens as the place of human self-knowledge, and to earth as the place of 
God's self-knowledge.38 "God," that is, cannot have self-knowledge, for his 
being is a product of thought's "self-activity." This runs counter, of course, to 
Hegel's understanding of self-consciousness, which presupposes the existence of 
an Absolute that is incarnate as a subject in human beings: "To know what God as 
spirit is ... requires careful and thorough speculation. It includes, in its forefront, 
the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge 
is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God, which 
proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God."39 In some sense, Feuerbach holds to 
Hegel's beliefthat God's self-knowledge is human being's "knowledge of God," 
38 ReligioJJS consciousness, by contrast, arises unintentionally, at a level where feeling and 
imagination are the governing modes ofsel:f..knowing. Theological-speculative ontology, on the 
other hand, is actively governed by reason, and consciously effects the synthesis of the religious 
illusion, while remaining blind to its emotive source. It is thus that Hegelian ontology distances 
hwnan beings from an encounter with their essential nature. Wartotsky puts the matter succinctly: 
"'Religion is the alienated form of man's recognition of his own nature. Theology, on the other 
hand, is the theoretical alienation of man's nature, as l101 yet his own" (Wartofsky, Feuer'bach, p. 
200). 
39 Hegel, Philosophy of Min~ section 564, p. 298. 
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but only insofar as "God" is understood as a self-representation of human being, 
the singular epistemological agent, in relation to his species. He echoes: 
"Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is self-
knowledge."40 And, in this sense, Feuerbach brings the incarnational nature of 
the Hegelian dialectic, in which God is present to humans in and through self-
consciousness, to a particular stage of fulfillment; i.e., he considers human being 
the incarnate place of knowledge by stripping the God-concept of its independent 
existence, and by reconfiguring it in terms of the human species. While religion 
is, for Hegel, an "essential relation which is epistemologically and ontologically 
dependent on God,'>41 for Feuerbach religion is epistemologically and 
ontologically dependent upon the individual's consciousness of himself as a 
member ofthe species. Religious or speculative consciousness, that is, is in fact a 
manifest form of species-consciousness, and is characterized by a tripartite 
relationship between human being and his infmite object (the species): the 
emotional, the imaginative, and the rational. 42 The ultimately problematical 
nature ofFeuerbach's species-ontology comes to light upon consideration of the 
epistemological framework within which he examines religious consciousness. 
While he claims to deal with "concrete man" - that is, the human as an individual, 
4
° Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 12. 
41 James Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1983), 
p.64. 
42 The trinitarian motif of feeling, imagination, and reason, runs like a golden cord throughout The 
Essence of Christianity - a point, which, on some level, enforces the representational weight of the 
theological categories that Feuerbach seeks to overturn. This is a point to which I turn in the 
conclusion to this thesis. For Feuerbach, Wartofsky remarks (importantly), "man's essence 
consists in feeling, willing, and thinking." He states, moreover, that "Feuerbach considers this 
human essence to be man's consciousness; that thinking, feeling, willing are activities of man's 
essence as a conscious being" (WartofSky, Feuerbach, p. 262). WartofSky goes on to say that this 
inconcrete formulation of consciousness (i.e., reeling, willing, thinking) as the essence of human 
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sensuous being - his notion of "species" as the object of human consciousness 
presents us with intimations of an infinite essence of human being. This, indeed, 
is forewarned by my thesis, that Feuerbach's discussion of religious or species 
consciousness is, in essence, an epistemological reformulation of Hegelian 
ontology. 
Feuerbach's fundamental premise is that human beings confront their 
species as the infinite object of consciousness. It constitutes, in effect, the essence 
of humans, who are themselves ''real beings." No divine or speculative being (in 
and for itself) exists for consciousness, but in consciousness. He writes: 
This philosophy has for its principle... no abstract, merely 
conceptional being, but a real being.. . - man; its principle, 
therefore, is in the highest degree positive and real It generates 
thought from the opposite ofthought, from Matter, from existence, 
from the senses; it has relation to its object first through the senses, 
i.e., passively, befure defining it in thought.43 
In that the object of this "'philosophy" exists for thought only through the senses, 
Feuerbach inverts the a priori ontological model put forward by Hegel. No more 
can "God" or the God-concept, in which thought finds its centre, hold. Both the 
Vorstellungen of religious consciousness and the Begriffe of speculative 
consciousness are here deemed ''passive" objects, according to Feuerbach, for 
whom ''the essential attributes or predicates of the divine being are the essential 
attributes or predicates of speculative philosophy.'M This critique, as we have 
seen, rests upon the postulate that thought and Being do not express an essential 
being "has understandably led to much confusion and misunderstanding of The Essence of 
ChristianitY' (ibid., p. 262). 
43 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xv. 
44 Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy ofthe Future, trans. Manfred H Vogel 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), p. 12. Italics added. 
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unity. But it is not simply that "Being" - the representational God or the 
speculative Begriff- springs from thought, but that the content of thought is 
constituted fundamentally by a posteriori knowledge. Thought is the principal 
active agent; and it is through its self-activity that conceptions (on Feuerbach's 
terms: misconceptions) of the God-concept are engendered in the human mind. 
Hence the relevance of the dream image, in which passive objects are 
misapprehended, misrepresented and encountered as active objects. The likening, 
indeed, is not surprising, in light of the inversion of Hegelian ontology put 
forward by Feuerbach, whose interpretation of religious and speculative 
consciousness assumes, at least explicitly, an empirical footing. Yet, despite the 
concrete or "empirical" ground upon which Feuerbach establishes his critique of 
religious-speculative ontology, we find that the terms upon which species-
consciousness operates do not lend to hermetic empirical analysis. For it is 
precisely through the epistemological fabric that Feuerbach supposes for religious 
consciousness (i.e., an obscure interrelationship of thought, imagination and 
feeling) that the nature of the individual as a species being is rendered in its full 
form. 45 
This is the sense in which it is reductive to call Feuerbach an empiricist, 
or, what is more COII11ll()n, a materialist. 46 Indeed, though Feuerbach calls himself 
"a natural philosopher in the domain of the mind," his "science" cannot be called 
"natural" in the sense that we consider the natural sciences today. Feuerbach's 
45 The question regards whether or not Feuerbach argues successfully fur an infinite human 
essence that can be drawn from empirical existence, without recourse to categories that are 
elementa! to traditional ontology. 
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method embraces categories which assume existence only in consciousness, and 
do not constitute empirical objects as such; but in that they subsequently assume 
formfor consciousness, they can be subjected to what we would now understand 
as phenomenological or quasi-scientific analysis. 47 This is the problematical 
milieu of Feuerbach's "science." It is not simply that the forms of religious 
consciousness are hard to subject to scientific analysis, but that religious 
consciousness is not confined to the "domain of the mind," is constituted 
fundamentally by epistemological-emotional experience. For Feuerbach, that is, 
"religion is essentially emotion." In other words, "feeling is the organ of 
religion.'.48 Feeling, moreover, IS the place of genesis of the furms of 
consciousness that are elemental to Hegel's philosophy of religion, namely, 
Vorstellung and Begriff. According to Feuerbach, Hegel, who suggests that all 
thought finds its centre in the one thought of God, fails to acknowledge the 
fundamentally unified quality of the feeling which first gives rise to this thought 
of God. 
Hege~ one might suppose, critiques feeling as the essential mode of 
religious consciousness so as to avoid the implied slip into Kantian subjectivism, 
which denies reason entry into the realm of the infmite and explains the religious 
46 This point finds elaboration in Marx W. Wartofsky, "Homo Homini Deus Est: Feuerbach's 
Religious Materialism," in Meaning, Truth, and God, ed. Leroy Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: 
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983), pp. I 54-173. 
47 This, I think, in part explains Van A. Harvey's dismissal ofFeuerbach's Hegelianism as 
irrelevant to contemporary lire. Feuerbach's "science" (Wissenschqft), largely a reformulation of 
Hegelian "science," is a term of far different scope than that which we use today with respect to 
the natural sciences, and would be better rendered perhaps as "philosophical science." Similarly, 
in his translation of Hegel' s Science of Logic, A.V. Miller renders Wissenschqft either as 
"'science" or as "philosophy." George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science ofLogi~ trans. A.V. 
Miller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998). 
48 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 9. 
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impulse in terms that are exclusive to the practical domain of the finite human 
being. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel associates the 
essentially subjective aspect of emotional content with contingency in the sense 
that, "if God's being is attested in our feeling, it is there in the form of complete 
contingency, as being, in principle, a particular content, one that takes no 
precedence over any other content, for the status of being a feeling can belong to 
the other just as easily as to it. "49 Hegel recognizes that "people speak of 
religious feeling and say that our faith in God is given to us in feeling," and that 
this feeling implies the certainty "that two kinds of being are posited in reflection 
as one form of being."50 Yet he does not consider the heartfelt presence of the 
infinite other as an adequate means of expressing the ontological necessity of the 
God-concept, which can only be fully accounted for in terms of its presence at the 
centre of thought. According to Hegel, the contingent nature of emotive content 
does not do justice to the necessary being or concept upon which his philosophy 
of religion rests. In our hearts, we can be "certain" of many things; but the 
content of this '"certainty" is essentially contingent, and necessary only for the 
heart, while the God-concept is the ontologically necessary centre of thought 
itself 
Feuerbach, who disputes Hegel's ontological principle, articulates a 
diffurent interpretation of human feeling. For him, as I have quoted, '1-eligion is 
the organ of feeling" - a statement which does not, at flfst glance, contradict 
Hegel's words above. Feuerbach's claim, however, is that the genesis of the 
49 Hegel, LPR I. p. 272. 
50 Hegel, LPR I, p. 270. 
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religious impulse occurs in the domain of the heart - not in "the domain of the 
mind." Hence his fundamental point of divergence from Hegel, who establishes 
thought or consciousness as the place where God is affrrmed as an onto logically 
necessary concept. Feuerbach infers that religion is a pre-reflective form of 
encounter for the human being - "pre-reflective" in the sense that the individual 
confronts or feels the other of the 1-Thou encounter strictly in terms of his or her 
own feeling. "Feeling is only acted on by that which conveys feeling, i.e., by 
itself: its own nature.... Feeling is atheistic in the sense of the orthodox belief, 
which attaches religion to an external object; it denies an objective God- it is 
itself God."51 On these terms, he differs from Hegel, who maintains that the unity 
(between finite spirit and infmite spirit) implicit in the content of feeling is 
necessarily contingent, and that it is only in thought that the infinite spirit with 
which fmite spirit feels unity can exist as an ontologically necessary concept. 
Feuerbach, in fact, claims the heart as the only place of a unified encounter 
between human and God (insofar as God is the very essence of feeling itself).52 
In light of Feuerbach's supposition that the heart is the place where the 
individual initially achieves unity with herself (and in this sense only, with 
"God"), the mysteries of religion are "not foreign, but native mysteries, the 
mysteries of human nature." It is in this sense that Feuerbach refigures the place 
of emotion or feeling in the epistemological framework of "human being." The 
unity of the individual and God in feeling is not a contingent relation, as it is for 
51 Feuerbach, Christianity., pp. 6, 11. 
52 This unified encounter is maintained in the images of the imagination, which is the slave of 
feeling. It is only when these images become vessels for rational truth (as in the Vorstellungen of 
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Hegel, but an essential one. Feuerbach elaborates: "I show that religion takes the 
apparent, the superficial in Nature and humanity for the essential, and hence 
conceives their true essence as a separate, special existence ... or makes objective 
the true nature of the human word."53 Indeed, despite the human origin of the 
sense of unity between human and divine, it is a trait peculiar to religious persons 
that they posit an other that is onto logically distinct from them. This disruption of 
the unity of feeling, however, does not arise within the content of feeling itself, 
but intervenes from without. This is the sense in which Feuerbach considers 
religion a "superficial" rather than an essential condition of human being. The 
essential unity of :fueling, insofar as feeling is acted on by its own nature, is upset 
by a counter-feeling, that of fear, which rises in the heart when it faces its 
essential content: "Thou art terrified before the religious atheism of thy heart. By 
this fear thou destroyest the unity of thy feeling with itself, in imagining to thyself 
an objective being distinct from thy feeling . ... "54 It is thus out of the feeling of 
terror that the epistemological framework of human consciousness comes into 
light. With the initially unified content of man's emotion disrupted, the 
imagination comes onto the scene. 55 
In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach fails to outline the precise place 
of the imagination in relation to feeling, sensory experience, and thought. This, . in 
the Hegelian philosophy of religion) that contradiction arises. This point is reinforced in 
Wartofsky, Feuerbach, pp. 232-233. 
53 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xviii. 
54 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. I 1. 
55 This point st:ands in relative contradistinction to Wartofsky' s claim that contradiction does not 
arise until reason has effected the synthesis of the other which is intuited or felt and then 
represented by the imagination. Emotion, indeed, cannot engender or perceive contradiction in the 
sense proper to logic. Yet I believe that there is a real sense, in the opening pages of The Essence 
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fact, is a place of ambiguity common to all of his writings. 56 Yet it is something 
with which one must come to tenus if one is to understand the way in which these 
epistemological forms arise in and for consciousness. For Hegel, Vorste/lung and 
Begriff are both ontological forms of infinite spirit and epistemological forms 
whereby this infinite spirit is apprehended in the consciousness of finite spirit. 
For Feuerbac~ on the other hand, they pertain only to the consciousness of finite 
spirit, concrete human being. While the Hegelian system begins from 
consciousness or thought and attempts a return to itself through a transfiguration 
of its representational forms into pure speculative objects, Feuerbach conceives 
this movement as a distancing from the original emotive source of the religious 
impulse. Thus, implicit in his discussion of the imagination as the form of 
consciousness which bears out the disruption of the unity of feeling by 
representing the nothingness that lies in the heart as an object distinct from human 
being, is a critique of the Hegelian Vorstellung and Begrif/.51 
Both Feuerbach and Hegel carry out their discussions of consciousness 
under the assumption that it is the state of being which distinguishes "man from 
brute," and include the imaginative capacity of human beings as an essential 
of Christianity, in which the pre-reflective terror parallels the ontological rift that is synthesized by 
speculative theology and philosophy. 
56 This ambiguous concep~ the imagination, constitutes the subject of my next chapter. Here, I 
discuss its place in the epistemological .framework suggested in The Essence of Christianity, and 
in so doing, attempt to situate it in r elation to the fonns of theological and speculative 
consciousness, outlined in the previous chapter. 
57 This can be said insofar as the imagination provides the representational ftamework of which 
theology and speculative philosophy effect the dogmatic systematization and synthesis, 
respectively~ Garrett Green notes that Feuerbacb employs the terms Einbildungskrqft, Phantasie, 
and Vorstellung in an indiscriminate but synonymous manner, and that George Eliot renders them 
all accurately as "'imagination." See pp. 57-58 of Garrett Green, "Who's Afraid of Ludwig 
Feuerbach? Suspicion and the Religious Imagination," in Christian Faith Seeking Historical 
Understanding: Essays in Honor of R Jack Forstman, eds. Duke and Dwmavant (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 1997), pp. 45-65. 
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component of what constitutes religious experience as such. According to Hegel, 
the imagination takes hold of: and gives form to the God-image- which, reason 
later ascertains, appears necessarily to·thought or consciousness. For Feuerbach, 
however, the God-concept does not appear as the dawning point of thought, but is 
first encountered in feeling. Subsequently, terror seizes the human subject; the 
initial unity of feeling (i.e., feeling acting upon itself) is disrupted; the emptiness 
of the heart (to which "terror" arises as a response) is represented as an other by 
the imagination, and only then is taken up as an object of thought. Therein lies 
Feuerbach's reversal of Hegelian ontology. A pre-reflective unity engenders 
religious consciousness. Thought appropriates the represented other of the 
imagination and hypostatizes it, in speculative form, as an ontologically necessary 
object. Confronted by Feuerbach through Marx, Isaiah Berlin puts the fust's 
central thesis thus: 
that "the abstract understanding can only give things names" not 
create entities; empirical characteristics are fust transmogrified 
into mysterious metaphysical entities, and then used to account for 
their own original empirical selves, which they are held, in some 
sense, to have generated. 58 
Feeling and the imagination, Berlin neglects to mention, arise prior to the 
operation of thought by which, on Feuerbach's terms, "the object arises from the 
thought',s9 - a point of neglect upon which many critiques of Feuerbach 
(including Marx's) are predicated. Yet Feuerbach's claim that thought and Being 
do not share essential unity can only be understood in light of his presupposition 
58 Isaiah Berlin, "Reply to Orsini," Journal of the History of Ideas 3011 (Jan-March 1969), p. 92. 
This article constitutes Berlin's defense of the short analysis ofFeuerbach, which appears in his 
biography of Karl Marx. See Isaiah Berlin, Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948). 
59 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xiv. 
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that feeling and the religious imagination engender the object which reflective 
thought takes for its ontological centre. The feeling of terror which first seizes the 
human subject, and so, too, the imagination which arises as a representational 
extension this state of seizure, exist prior to reflective thought, where belief in 
ontological necessity of the God-concept takes root.60 
It is thus that thought, according to Feuerbach, protracts the state of 
disunity first aroused by the feeling of terror, and which is then represented by the 
religious imagination as an infinite "God." Hegel, too, maintains that the 
imagination brings alxmt an internal state of disunity in representational form, 
insofar as it represents feeling, whose content is purely subjective. The 
"reproductive imagination," he insists, is the place "where the images issue from 
the inward world belonging to the ego.'.61 And although these images may have 
empirical objects as their referents in terms oftheform they assume in the mind, 
their unity of content is essentially contingent upon the inward, subjective world 
of the ego. As such, a person can imagine the existence of a thing to the point that 
it possesses unity of content in the mind; but this unity remains purely subjective 
in that the object does not possess necessary existence. Such, too, is the nature of 
recollection. (We can be mistaken in the recollection of our past.) The nature of 
imaginative content changes, however, with respect to religious consciousness, 
which has for its object a divine being that has existence in and for itself In 
religious consciousness, the unity of content is not one-sided, but requires the 
60 This is a point that I would like to take up in a future paper on Feuerbach. Whether or not one 
can in fuct retrieve what lies before the formation of the ontological concept - i.e., whether or not 
anything can precede a Begrtffwhich exists necessarily for thought - is the (perhaps circular) 
question, and is the issue towards which !point in the conclusion to this thesis. 
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necessary and objective existence of the God-concept present in thought. Hegel 
writes, "What we are conscious of ... is not only that we have this object as our 
representation but also that it is not merely representation, that it is. This is 
certainty of God, immediate knowledge."62 This necessary existence is assumed 
in the religious Vorstellung, which expresses the God-concept in its own fashion, 
but possesses the same content as the speculative Begriff - and includes, 
therefore, the principle of ontological necessity. 
For Hegel, then, the imagination presents finite spirit with subjective or 
mediate knowledge, save when it operates as a mode of religious consciousness, 
when it engenders representational furms of the God-concept, which has 
necessary existence an und fur sich (i.e., objective existence). Religious 
Vorstellung, in other words, provides finite spirit with immediate knowledge of 
what necessarily is as an object of thought. The representational forms of the 
imagination, therefore, mediate the world of sense for the world of thought, and 
are limited to the subjective or inward nature of fmite spirit - except when they 
embrace, as part of their content, the objectively and ontologically necessary 
concept of God. In the Vorstellungen of Christianity, the manifest religion, 
knowledge of Being is immediate for thought; thought and Being share an 
essential unity. Hence the essential unity, in terms of content, of Vorstellung and 
speculative Begriff, which differ in terms of husk but envelop the same kernel. 
Feuerbach, for whom the original state of unity takes place in feeling rather than 
in an Absolute that is necessary for thought, consequently critiques the Hegelian 
61 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, section 455, p. 206. 
62 Hegel, LPR I, p. 386. 
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conception of the imaginative faculty, not in general, but for religious 
consciousness itself. With respect to the representational God of Christianity, he 
writes, "God is a being conceived under the forms of the sense, but freed from the 
limits of sense, - a being at once unlimited and sensational. But what is the 
imagination? - limitless activity of the senses.'.63 Feuerbach strips the God-
concept of its necessary existence in thought, and restricts it to the realm of 
contingent existence: to the world of sense and imagination, the latter of which 
mediates sensory data for thought. Thus God, the ontologically necessary object 
of religious consciousness, belongs to the subjective world of "man," and can 
only be an object of mediate knowledge. 
Hegel, to recall, suggests that the unity of feeling exists for finite spirit 
only subjectively or contingeptly, and that imagination and·thought must mediate 
its content if the "God" intuited therein is to become an object of immediate 
knowledge, an ontologically necessary concept. Moreover, it is not that the 
process of mediation is required in order to bring about the ontological necessity 
ofthe God-concept, but that the God-concept is already manifest to consciousness 
as its necessary centre. The dialectical mediation of the imagination and thought 
is required by the content of the religious Vorstellung, "God," in which the unity 
or necessity of the Absolute is already confrrmed. In that Hegel's Vorstellung, 
which "is a medium between sense and thought, and correspondingly between a 
mere subjectivity and a true objectivity,"64 shares the content of the speculative 
Begrijf, it is an object of immediate or necessary content. The dialectical push 
63 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 214. 
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(i.e., "the labour of the negative''65) impelled by the immediate content of 
Vorstellung entails a mediation of its subjective form, so that it expresses unity 
with the necessary concept it veils - thus the nature of the represented God for 
Hegel 
Feuerbach, as I have delineated, reverses this ontological framework in 
that he considers fueling the primal space of immediate knowledge. Both the 
religious imagination, which represents the nothingness of the heart as God, and 
speculative thought, which affirms the ontological necessity of the God-concept, 
distance human being from the initial unity of feeling. Whereas Hegel claims that 
the content of fueling is subjective and contingent, that it requires realization in 
thought, Feuerbach believes it objective and necessary: an ontological ground in 
and fur itself. "God is pure, unlimited, free Feeling." "God," here, refers to the 
human subject before it steps beyond feeling to represent the ·immediate unity 
within itself as an other. "Feeling is thy own inward power, but at the same time 
a power distinct from thee, and independent of thee; it is in thee, above thee; it is 
itself that which constitutes the objective in thee - thy own being which impresses 
thee as another being; in short, thy God.',e;6 One must here recall that the 
difference between Hegel and Feuerbach, in their assessment of feeling, 
fundamentally regards the Qntological question. Hegel, indeed, supposes a unity 
for feeling; but, so long as this fueling exists only subjectively, or contingently, so 
long as it remains a one-sided unity, it demands fulfillment in thought, where the 
64 Malcolm Clar~ Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from "Vorstelhmg" to Thought in 
the Philosophy ofHCgel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 26 
65 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), section 19, p.IO. 
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necessary God-concept is apprehended by finite spirit. God "is a content that 
belongs to thought, for thought is the soil in which this content is both 
apprehended and engendered alike.'' With respect to the unity of feeling, "content 
belongs to my actuality ... . and then what we say is that 'I have it in my heart,' for 
this is 'my heart.' In other words, then content is within my own self-
certainty ... . "67 Yet the self-certain intuition of God (in feeling) takes places only 
with reference to the ego; it is mediate knowledge which necessarily undergoes 
transmutation - in that finite spirit becomes conscious of God, who necessarily is, 
in representational form - until the God-concept is apprehended as an object of 
pure thought, of immediate knowledge. I must step beyond the contingent unity 
of feeling (in "my heart'') in order to achieve necessary unity with the God-
concept that is already present to thought. Hence the emergence of the religious 
imagination, and its Vorstellung, which spurs finite spirit from the place of 
emotive, subjective unity onwards, to a proper apprehension of the objective God-
concept. 
In Feuerbach's estimation, however, the God-concept is not a unity 
already present to thought, but is an abstract expression of the human being's 
disunity with himself The heart, for Feuerbach, is the first true place of unified 
or immediate knowledge, thus deflating the Hegelian claim for the necessity of 
the movement from the mediate knowledge of feeling to the immediate 
knowledge of the God-concept in thought. The movement of religious 
consciousness (from feeling, to imagination, to thought) is not propelled by, does 
66 Feuerbach, Christianity, pp. 10-11. 
67 Hegel, LPR I, pp. 394-395. 
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not seek unity with, an ontological concept that necessarily is for thought. 
Instead, it distances the individual from his original place of unity by rendering 
the void of his heart in representational and then in conceptual form. The God of 
religious consciousness, conceived by the imagination, represents the disruption 
of this original state of unity, . in that it does not arise until fear "destroyeth" the 
unity of feeling acting upon itself. Feeling- both in the sense of the original state 
of unity and in the sense of the terror which disrupts it - is essentially prior to the 
ontological principle with which Hegelian thought begins; it does not require 
fulfillment in the God-concept. The imagination, a slave to feeling, paves the 
road of despair that leads to Hegel's necessary Begrijf, i.e., it first steps beyond 
the world of the human subject and represents the fear-inciting nothingness as an 
other. On these terms, God has no objective or necessary existence, but "is the 
manifested inward nature, the expressed self of man. "68 
Feuerbach, then, affirms the . emotional state of disunity as the ground of 
religious consciousness, and "fear'' or ''terror" as a necessary reaction to the 
nothingness present in feeling acting upon itself. But he does not affrrm the 
necessity of religious consciousness itself, which actualizes the original state of 
emotive disunity in forms of the imagination and thought. For Hegel, on the other 
hand, fear is necessarily contained in religious Vorstellung so as to bring about 
the universal Begrijf, the content of representation, as an object of consciousness. 
It is thus that the latter incorporates fear into his discussion of religious 
consciousness: 
68 Feuerbach, Christiamty, pp. 12-13. 
Religious sensibility as such itself contains both the contrast 
between the determinacy of empirical self-consciousness and that 
of universal thought or intuitionand their relation and unity .. •. In 
the determinacy of separation, together with the fact that the 
universal is the substantial against which the self-aware empirical 
consciousness al~o feels its essential nothingness - indeed that of 
its still positive volitional existence - this representatio~ this 
determinacy in general, is the sensation of fear. Being aware of 
one's own inner existence and conviction as of no account, along 
with self-consciousness on the side of the universal condemning 
the former, results in... the higher unity of my self-consciousness 
generally with the universal. 69 
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"Determinacy" here refers to a quality of the object as it is apprehended in 
thought by empirical self-consciousness. As discussed above, the imagination, 
which mediates empirical objects for thought, is restricted to this domain; its 
content is contingent and subjective. "Universal thought," on the other hand, 
entails a level of indeterminacy or immediacy that is free from the limitations of 
"empirical self-con.sciousness." This is the realm of the Begrif!. Religious 
Vorstellung (the object of "religious sensibility'') is unique in that it shares the 
indeterminate content of the universal thought-object while being conditioned by 
determinate form. Faced by the indeterminate or immediate universal thought 
(infinite spirit), finite spirit is seized by fear, which is engendered in Vorstellung. 
The form of Vorstellung, in other words, is ''the sensation of fear. '~70 
69 Hegel, LPR I, p. 220. 
70 The connection between fear and the representational fabric of religious knowledge, in the 
Hegelian interpretation of religion, is an interesting one, and one which deserves further analysis 
elsewhere. (For Feuerbach, I here argJie, fear precedes the formation of the ontologica:t concept 
itself.) Despite the lucidity of his analysis, and his contextualization ofFeuerbach within Hegelian 
philosophy, WartofSky does not comment upon the centrality of fear in the Feuerbach's 
epistemologica1 framework, and so does not attempt to achieve a point of connection, in this 
regard, with Hegel. Hence Wartofsky's place of relative absence in the current discussion. Van 
A. Harvey, for whom the Hegelian-strand of The Essence of Christianity constitutes a great 
impasse to a clear interpretation of religion, here truly remains mute. 
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Feuerbach, for whom Vorstellung is also a manifest form of fear, 
appropriates this aspect of religious sensibility proper to Hegel. He addresses his 
reader: "Thou art terrified before the religious atheism of thy heart. By this fear 
thou destroyest the unity of thy feeling with itself, in imagining to thyself an 
objective being distinct from thy feeling .... ~'71 According to Feuerbach, then, fear 
arises as a direct response to the unity or indeterminacy of feeling, and not when 
faced by what Hegel perceives as a indeterminate or universal thought-object. 
Vorste/lung does not express the essential nothingness of finite spirit, which is 
aware at once of its determinate objects of consciousness and of the universal 
object that necessarily is for thought. Rather, the nothingness which engenders 
fear, and which spurs on the imaginative faculty, is bound strictly to the domain 
of the heart. Thus, implicit in Feuerbach' s examination of consciousness is the 
suggestion that religious sensibility and its Vorstellungen proceed from fear of the 
emotional unity which confronts the individual, and not from an indeterminate 
ontological other, which, according to Hegel, necessarily is for consciousness of 
finite spirit. 72 For Feuerbach, the state of terror engenders God; for Hegel, the 
God-concept engenders the state of terror. In this sense, Feuerbach's claim, that 
feeling comes first, entails an inversion of the ontological question as such. Unity 
of feeling, which for Hegel constitutes a subjective, determinate, and contingent 
unity - i.e., a one-sided unity which requires fulfillment in that the universal 
Begriff necessarily is as an object of consciousness for finite spirit - is for 
Feuerbach an immediate form of knowledge which requires no process of 
71 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 11. 
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speculative synthesis or reconciliation. The unity of thought and Being need not 
be reestablished. 
Yet, as I have remarked, Feuer bach maintains that this state of unity is 
necessarily disrupted by a counter-feeling, terror; but he does not affmn the 
process whereby the religious imagination misapprehends and represents the 
object of fear as an ontologically distinct other, God, of which speculative thought 
effects the synthesis as the Absolute Begriff. How does Feuerbach resurrect from 
this "heap of broken images" a coherent vision of what essentially constitutes the 
human being? The answer (and as I shall expand in the following pages): through 
his problematical notion of the species being, which implies an inversion of the 
subject-predicate relation of Hegelian ontology. For, with respect to religious 
consciousness proper to Feuerbach, we are presented with a seemingly 
fragmented vision. On the one band, Feuerbach claims that feeling expresses the 
essential "unity" of human being, in that through feeling we are presented with 
our own essence as an object. On the other hand, Feuerbach calls feeling "the 
dream of nature;m the very thing which establishes the epistemological horizon 
of religious consciousness, and which puts forth the ground upon which reason 
misapprehends the object of feeling as an ontological other, thus distancing the 
human subject from its original state of unity. Similarly, Feuerbach views the 
imagination as the human fuculty which makes concrete the disruption of the 
unity of feeling, while also regarding it as an essential mode of human 
consciousness. For Feuerbach, "the imagination," as Marx Wartofsky puts it, .. is 
72 According to Hegel, this is something that reason simply confirms (or can know), though the 
ontological concept necessarily is before thought comes onto the scene. 
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not 'imaginary.' It is the real reflex of human existence- of that existence which 
constitutes the distinctly human. lt is the expression of human needs, human 
desire, human feelings. What makes this distinctively human is that it is the 
consciousness of an object of feeling."74 The imagination, inso:fur as it expresses 
needs or feelings that are essentially human, is not an inherently corrupt 
epistemological mode of consciousness, but is a necessary instrument of human 
self-knowing. One will here make greater sense of Feuerbach's claim that '"the 
imagination is the faculty which alone corresponds to personal feeling, because it 
sets aside all limits, all laws which are painful to the feelings, and thus makes 
objective to man the immediate, absolutely unlimited satisfaction of his su~ective 
wishes."75 Yet it is the manner in which the religious person perceives that these 
needs should be fulfilled- at the level of self-consciousness- which distances 
him from his original state of unity: i.e., '"the unreality of the image as it is 
reflectively conceived or thought about."76 So long as we remain conscious of the 
fact that we are in the presence of an . object of feeling, and not some ontological 
other that is fur thought, the imagination does not alienate us from our essence as 
members of the human species. 
This is the sense in which the imagination can be called an "existential'' 
mode of human consciousness, though it becomes the instrument by which 
religious sensibility objectifies feeling as an object that is other for thought. In its 
purest form, the imagination communicates the essence of human being, and is an 
73 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 140. 
74 Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 217. 
75 Feuerbach, Christianity. p. 131. 
u VVrortoffiky,Fe~ch,p.219. 
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instrument of self-knowing which casts into representational form the object of 
feeling. Wartofsky explains, indeed, that the question which regards the nature of 
feeling is one which regards the human essence. Feeling, in the sense that 
Feuerbach suggests, does not involve consciousness of a particular feeling or 
need, but consciousness of the nature of feeling in general. 
This self-conscious feeling has the nature of fueling itself as its 
object, that is, the species nature of fueling. Such a reeling is given 
only to human beings who are at the same time the subjects and the 
objects of the feeling. It is a feeling toward that which is human in 
another, and thus entails, unknowingly, the species concept of 
humanity itself. It is feeling toward another who is like oneself, 
and thus it transcends the particularity of mere sensibility; it has a 
universal as its object - that is, an essence. 77 
Feeling, in other words, has the human essence as its object {viz., the species 
concept), but in pre-reflective form. As discussed in the ftrst section of the present 
chapter, Feue.rbach's belief in a pre-reflective encounter allows him to distinguish 
between religious consciousness on the one hand, and theological or speculative 
modes of consciousness on the other. One should recall Feuerbach's credo, 
"feeling is the organ of religion,"78 or, insofar as the imagination is slave to 
feeling, in that it represents "God" in the face of a disuniting terror, that it, too, is 
"the original organ and essence of religion."79 In each case, religious feeling and 
imagination suppose a pre-reflective oq_iect of consciousness, 80 a level of 
77 Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p . 218. 
78 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 9. 
79 George Eliot neglects to include "and essence" in her English rendering ofFeuerbach's text, and 
writes, .. The imagination is the original organ of religion" (Christianitv, p. 214 ). See Green, 
"Who's Akaid of Ludwig Feuerbach," p. 59. 
S(i The problematical question regards whether this object is in fact another member of the species 
(which constitutes the ground for Feuerbachian ''materialism") or whether this object is the nature 
of feeling in general, whim confronts the individual oo a pre-reflective (and, thus, perhaps pre-
social or pre-material) level. The former reading is the most often held, though here I attempt to 
show that Feuer bach's troublesome treatment ofthe internal genesis of the "God" concept also 
intimates the latter. ln either case, the end result is fear in the face of an other. 
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encounter which exists prior to the formation of the onto logically necessary God-
concept that theological or speculative consciousness adopts as its object of 
inquiry, as the beginning and the end, as the "centre," of all thought. Feuerbach 
supposes a pre-reflective object of feeling and the imagination in that the first 
constitutes the human being's direct encounter with himself, with his "'essence," 
before reflective consciousness can fashion the other of feeling as an onto logically 
distinct other for thought. In that he adopts the species concept as the proper 
object of consciousness, Feuer bach acknowledges the essential role of feeling and 
the imagination, while explaining the other in terms that are solely human. llis 
claim, indeed, is to return to "concrete" human. In this sense, Feuerbach's species 
concept constitutes his attempt to reestablish the unity of feeling, lost in the God-
concept of theological and speculative consciousness, and to invert ontology 
proper to Hegel by positing a human object or essence which preexists the 
ontological category of speculative philosophy and theology. 
The Retrieval ofUnity: Species-Consciousness 
and the Reversal of the Subject-Predicate Relation 
Feuerhacb, as has been discussed, contends that the divine object- be it 
the God of theology or the Absolute of Hegelian philosophy - bas purely 
subjective existence: imaginative existence, that is, is engendered in response to 
consideration of the nature of feeling in general The central place which 
Feuerbach accords feeling entails an inversion of Hegelian ontology, and alters 
the theological-speculative conception of what can be considered ontologically 
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necessary. Hegel assumes that the God-concept possesses necessary existence for 
thought, that the progressive rendering of God in terms of Vorstellung and Begriff 
is the necessary means of achieving unity of Being and thought, and that emotion 
merely provides fmite spirit with a unity that is contingent :in terms of content. In 
this way, it can be said that Feuerbach applies the Hegelian reading of feeling to 
the concept of God that stands at the centre of the Hegelian philosophy of 
religion. A person might hope or reason, that is, for an ontological principle to 
the point that it achieves unity of content, or exists immediately, in his or her 
mind; but this unity is engendered strictly within the world of the ego, and 
possesses no necessary existence in and for itself(an undfiir sich). Its content is 
contingent or one-sided. Here Feuerbach differs from Hegel and the latter's belief 
that thought resolves this disunity through its dialectical engagement with an 
ontological other. Feuerbach, however, does not take rest in the unified space of 
feeling, but contends that this feeling is indeed disrupted by fear, a disruption with 
which the human subject must come to terms as an other. Feuerbach establishes 
an object for the human ·being, which he calls the species. "Man is notlring 
without an object, "81 he says in The Essence of Christianitv; and, in this sense, he 
does not differ from Hegel, who also assumes that the human being requires an 
object for consciousness. But in keeping with the general tenor of this chapter, 
one should hold fast to the axiom that Feuerbach and Hegel differ precisely with 
respect to the nature of this object. Feuerbach's species concept - which, as I 
shall expand below, hovers somewhere vaguely between the world of sense and 
the world of thought - embraces the emotional and imaginative faculties of the 
81 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 4. 
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human being as essential instruments of human self-knowing. Hegel, whose 
philosophical voyage assumes that the subjective nature of emotive and 
imaginative content, requires a dialectical shift towards the universal thought 
object which exists necessarily in and fur thought, suggests that unity can only be 
achieved when the ontologically necessary other of consciousness is apprehended 
in its pure speculative form. Hence the basic but essential comment that Hegel 
differs most fundamentally from Feuerbach- and, moreover, from Kant before 
him- with regard to the ontological assumption as such: fur it is not a mere proof, 
on Hegel's terms, but a position or standpoint required by the structure of 
consciousness itself 
Feuerbach, indeed, supposes that ''faith" (be it in God as an image and as a 
speculatively transfigured concept) ~'arises out of the structure of self-
consciousness itself "82 But in no way does Feuerbach claim that the emergence 
of this ontological other for consciousness, as an object of faith, is in fact 
necessary. 83 Rather, these objects are misconstrued forms ofthe species concept, 
which is first intuited by feeling, then :fulsely represented by the religious 
imagination, and lastly contemplated by theological and speculative 
consciousness as an object of pure thought. This triadic progression (or 
digression) is consistent with Feuerbach's view that thought absorbed in its own 
activity cannot function as the sole basis of reality: 
God, as a metaphysical being, is the intelligence satisfied in itself: 
or rather, conversely, the intelligence, satisfied in itself, thinking 
82 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, p. 31. 
&l One must mark the distinction between the statements: 1) that faith in the ontological cor.cept 
arises out of the structure of self-consciousness (e.g., for Feuerbach); and 2) that the ontologicol 
concept itself arises out of the structure of self-consciousness (e.g., for Hegel). 
itself as the absolute being, is God as a metaphysical being. Hence 
all metaphysical predicates of God are real predicates only when 
they are recognised as belonging to thought, to intelligence, to the 
understanding. 84 
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To elaborate, the predicates that theological and speculative thought attribute to 
God find their basis in human intelligence, .in reason; but, in that we are 
principally concrete or sensuous beings, we conceive of this thought-relation in 
tenns which govem our empirical life: namely, by supposing that the thought of 
God arises from an object which has independent existence. So conditioned are 
we by our relationship with extemal things that we conceive the God-object, 
which arises strictly in consciousness, to share in the objective and necessary 
existence of the physical world. This basic misapprehension, that the relationship 
of empirical consciousness to the world transfers over to the world of thought 
acting upon itself, sews the fabric of the theological or speculative dream, and 
entails what was cited earlier as '"the reversal of waking consciousness." The 
species concept, in effect, constitutes Feuerbach's attempt to bring humans back 
to wakeful consciousness, and to cast their encounter with the other in the light of 
day. 
With respect to the precise nature of the religious dream, Feuerbach 
remarks elsewhere, "In the perceptions of the senses consciousness of the object 
is distinguishable from consciousness ofself; but in religion, consciousness of the 
object and self-consciousness coincide." This is the sense in which "dreaming is 
the key to the mysteries of religion.}'85 Once the religious vision is understood as 
a dream, then interaction with its images and doctrines becomes the measure of a 
84 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 37. 
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person's self-knowing rather than a measure of his knowledge of a necessary 
other that necessarily exists fur consciousness as a unified subject. The more a 
person attempts to understand the dream from within its weave, ,from the 
perspective of religious or speculative consciousness, the deeper he is submerged 
into fantasy, the more he misinterprets the passive object of thought (God or the 
Absolute) as an active object which possesses existence apart from him. This is 
the way in which Feuerbach disrupts the unity of the ontological assumption at 
work in religious and speculative consciousness, a unity which exists strictly 
through the "reversal of waking consciousness." For Feuerbach, indeed, Hegel's 
ontological assumption constitutes a reversal of wakeful thought precisely in that 
it first supposes the thought (or Begrifj), then assumes its ontological necessity as 
an object, and then conditions an entire system of thought upon this illusory other. 
We move from thought, to object, to thought - an ontological circle that 
Feuerbach likens to the act of dreaming. Thus, although the religious and 
speculative modes of knowing assume a necessary ontological principle as their 
ground, and a unified engagement with it through consciousness, Feuerbach 
reinterprets the claim of necessary existence as nocturnal fancy, and puts forward 
his own vision in which the religious and speculative object is grasped "in the 
simple daylight of reality and necessity," 86 as the species - the only concept which 
85 Feuerbacb, Christianity, pp. 12, 141. 
116 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xix. Italics added. 
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grounds consciousness proper to human being, and which clarifies the nature of 
the disrupted state with which the religious dream begins. 87 
The species, indeed, constitutes the object of what Feuerbach calls 
"consciousness in its strict sense."88 In the sense that he requires an object for 
thought, and thatthis object distinguishes ''the man from the brute," Feuerbach 
does not differ from Hegel, for whom the God-concept is the necessary object of 
all thought, and that which grounds human consciousness. And, moreover, 
Feuerbach agrees with the Hegelian supposition that "religion is 'a fact' there to 
be accounted for."89 Yet, as is suggested above, Feuerbach holds that we are 
more than beings whose reality can be explained for strictly in terms of our 
relation to an o~ect of pure thought. The God-concept, or speculative Begriff, 
remains strictly an object of pure thought - with no objective or necessary 
existence independent from us. Hence Feuerbach's explanation (see above) that 
the metaphysical attributes of God are strictly reified predicates of human 
intelligence. There is no rational or speculative subject of which human thought 
necessarily achieves progressive knowledge. For Feuerbach, this is made evident 
through the phenomenon of religion, a relation which is epistemologically and 
ontologically dependent on human being alone, and specifically, on his 
consciousness of himself as a member of the species: his species nature. In this 
sense, and in this sense alone, religion is "identical with self-consciousness" - the 
"self-consciousness" of human being rather than that of an onto logically distinct 
87 Harvey affixes the label, "objectification-alienation-reappropriation," to the dialectical process 
by Which the individual represents and misperceives an infinite ontological subject, only then to 
retrieve or realize his essence through the recognition of his species nature. 
88 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 2. 
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subject that exists necessarily in and for thought. On Feuerbach's terms, no 
longer can ''the philosopher'' be "said to investigate, not the reality of any 
particular state of affairs, but Reality as such, as though this were an independent 
existing Subject. "90 
With the elimination of the other as subject, then, Feuerbach disrupts the 
principle of ontological unity which governs theological and speculative thought. 
Yet, in that he eradicates belief in this ghostly "chimera," he attempts to retrieve 
the unity which initially presents itself to consciousness through feeling - an 
emotive unity, the content of which Hegel deems subjective, mediate, and 
contingent.91 The species, indeed, replaces the ontological God-concept of 
speculative theology, but is not an immediate or indeterminate subject in the sense 
of the Begriff formal to Hegel. It is present to thought, not as a subject that 
expresses essential unity with consciousness, but as an object, the predicates of 
which constitute the unified essence of the human subject. These predicates -
Reason, Will, Affection (or Love) - are perfections of the human species, which 
are simply misapprehended and then reified as attributes of an ontologically 
distinct subject by the religious imagination. 92 There is, in other words, no 
subject - be it the represented God or the Begriff of pure thought - without the 
predicate. As Feuerbach writes: 
89 Yerkes, Christology ofH¢gel, p. 52. 
90 D.Z. Phillips, "Feuerbach: religion's secret?" in Religion and the Hermeneutics of 
Contemplation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 89. 
91 We must mark Wartofsky's claim that consciousness (and. thus, the human essence) is 
constituted by our nature as feeling, willing, and thinking beings (Wartofi>ky, Feuerbacb, p. 262). 
My point is that the rift which occurs between the individual and his essence is largely an emotive 
one, and that the imagination gives representation to the intuited or emoted. other which engenders 
the state of fear. 
92 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 3. 
What the subject is lies only in the predicate; the predicate is the 
truth of the subject - the subject only the personified, existing 
predi~at~, the predicate conceived as existing. Subject and 
predicate are distinguished only as existence and essence. The 
negation of the predi~ates is therefore the negation of the subject.93 
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This entails Feuerbach's inversion of the subject-predicate relation elemental to 
theological and speculative ontology. Nietzsche, of course, would later suggest 
that ·without the subject, God, the whole Weltanschauung must fall; and Sartre 
would put forth his famous dictum, "existence precedes essence." Feuerbach 
does not go as far as these thinkers do; yet, in that he suggests the death of the 
religious-speculative subject, God, his work invokes the end of the Passion story. 
Christ, God, the speculative Begriff- none is the subject of Feuerbach's drama. 
Religion is the "self-consciousness of man," and the absolute, "man's own 
nature." And as such, the predicates of the human species make up the genuine 
objects of religious consciousness. 
Ahhougb the species concept is more earthbound than the God of religious 
consciousness or the Absolute of speculative consciousness - initially, at least, in 
that it constitutes a totality of :flesh-and-blood, empirical beings, and does not seek 
to establish a necessary subject "elsewhere" - it cannot be considered a hermetic 
empirical category in and of itself (despite Feuerbach's claim that he is nothing 
but a "natural philosopher in the domain of the mind"). This, moreover, is due 
precisely to Feuerbach' s understanding of human consciousness, for which he 
supposes an infinite horizon, a quality that one can easily claim to be beyond the 
reach of natural philosophy. Yet he attempts to bring this "beyond" to the level of 
empirical science, in supposing that this infinite horizon of consciousness is in 
93 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 19. 
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fact a genetic marker of what it means to be human. Within the scope of his 
"genetic-critical" metho~ the infmity of consciousness is likened to the infmity 
experienced, though in a relative sense, by all living creatures.94 His most famous 
statement in this respect regards "the leaf on which the caterpillar lives [which is] 
for it a world, an infinite space. "95 Yet what distinguishes species consciousness 
("consciousness in its strict sense") from other modes of animal being is precisely 
that it is not limited strictly to the physical needs of ·•man;" rather, its object, the 
species, presents man with his unlimited essence. For in Feuerbach's terms, a 
limitation involves a reduction of consciousness to the level of "instinct," while 
consciousness in its strict sense is equivalent to consciousness of the infinite, 
insofar as the predicates of the species are necessarily infinite in scope. 
In this sense, Feuerbach does away with the problematical Hegelian 
supposition of an ontologically distinct subject that exists for consciousness, but 
puts forward the equally troublesome notion that the species, the principal object 
of consciousness, presents human being with his objective and infinite essence. 
He writes: 
Consciousness consists in a being becoming objective to itself; 
hence it is nothing apart, nothing distinct from the being which is 
conscious of itself. How could it otherVtise become conscious of 
itself? It is therefore impossible to be conscious of a perfection as 
an imperfectio~ impossible to feel feeling limited, to think thought 
unlimited.96 
94 See WartoiSky, Feuerbach, pp. 91-94, for a discussion of the genetic concept in Feuerbach' s 
works prior to The Essence of Christianity; and Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of 
Religion, pp. 161-229, for a review ofFeuerbacb's .later works, in which the genetic-critical 
method is realized in a manner that is :free :from the trappings of the Hegelian 1heory of 
consciousness. 
95 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. &. 
96 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 6; 
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Species consciousness, therefore, and in contrast to the consciousness of "the 
brute," entails more than being conscious of the limited domain in which one's 
physical needs and instincts take manifest form. It entails the individual's 
consciousness of the unlimited or perfect nature of his species. This is the sense 
in which Feuerbach distinguishes between the individual person and the universal 
species concept: namely, that the latter is present to the former as an object of 
consciousness, insofar as it presents the former with its unrestricted essence in a 
form that is distinctly human. He maintains the infinite horizon implied by the 
ontological framework of theological or speculative consciousness (which situates 
finite spirit in relation to infinite spirit through reason), without supposing the 
need for an ontologically distinct subject. Hence Feuerbach' s controversial 
statement, "Consciousness, in the strict or proper sense, is identical with 
consciousness of the infmite,"97 which supposes that the infinite is indeed an 
object of consciousness but not a necessarily existent subject. Species 
consciousness, as I cite above, necessarily supposes the human essence as the 
proper object of consciousness in that it "[this consciousness] is not distinct from 
the being which is conscious of itself:" The species concept is engendered by the 
structure of self-consciousness itself, and only misapprehended and 
misrepresented by the religious imagination as an ontologically distinct subject. 98 
And in this sense, the object of the religious-speculative dream can be called 
97 Feuerbaeh, Christianity, p. 2. Wartofuky's translatioo of the same sentence is even stronger in 
tone: "Consciousness, in the strict and proper sense, and consciousness of the infinite are 
indivisible." (ln Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 273). 
98 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation ofReligion, p. 31. 
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"active" only insofar as it is a veiled form of the active essence of human being, 
the active presence to consciousness of the predicates of his species.99 
Despite the abstract nature of his own discussion of species consciousness, 
Feuerbach's claim, indeed, is "to unveil existence, to see properly."100 Yet the 
predicates which he claims to be the proper objects of consciousness, implied by 
the species concept, are better viewed, neither as empirical, nor as conceptual -
but as existential categories. This can in part be attributed to the fact that humans 
are by nature physical, empirical beings, though their essence transcends the 
limitations of finitude when it is met on the infmite horizon of consciousness. 
The predicates of the species can be considered existential categories, moreover, 
in that the infinite nature of the horizon on which they emerge is first encountered 
in feeling, and not in a conceptual or speculative vacuum. They entail an 
understanding of the individual which supposes more for him than an ontological 
condition that can be realized fully only in thought - or, what is more, in the 
thought of something which is other than human. Wartofsky remarks: 
Unless feeling and willing are included, man's essence becomes 
abstractly intellectual. Man represents his essence to himself as 
much as an object of feeling and of will, as an object for thought. 
Under each of these modes, because it is a representation of his 
own essence and not of some other, man's consciousness is 
infmite. 101 
In this way, Feuerbach' s vision of human being is not bound by the briars of 
speculative thought, which denies the essentiality (better: fmality) of any mode or 
form of consciousness . that has not yet conceived of the ontological other in the 
99 Subject and predicate are one; or, as I say earlier, the theological-speculative subject has no real 
or necessary existence apart from the predicates which we assign to it when none properly belong. 
100 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xiv. 
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concepts of pure thought. On the other hand, that Feuerbach chooses what are in 
essence positive predicates - and more particularly, that these positive predicates 
must be Reaso~ Will and Affection (or Love) - is a supposition that tends toward 
the arbitrary.102 Yet, in light of the Hegelian ontological category, which renders 
inadequate all forms of knowing that do not capture it in the medium of pure 
thought, Feuerbach's species consciousness better comes to terms with what he 
calls "flesh-and-blood man," particularly in that the objects which confront 
species consciousness are in fact representations of the essence - be it emotive, 
volitiona~ or rational- of fleshly human. In other words, they are representations 
of the inner world of human being, which, in the idealistic tradition, was 
considered the domain of the infmite. 103 
The perfect predicates of the species, indeed, as representations of the 
infinite essence of human being alone, undercut the subject-predicate relation of 
Hegelian ontology, which deems necessary for consciousness the presence of an 
ontologically distinct subject. But, as Harvey notes, in that Feuerbach is 
concerned principally with the inner world of human being, he ''is preoccupied 
only with that aspect of consciousness that is conscious of the unlimited and 
infinite nature of consciousness itself,"104 and not with consciousness in its 
relation to the objects of the external, empirical world. A symptom of this, 
ltti Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 272. 
102 See Essence of Christianity, pp. 21-25. One ofFeuerbach's moce dubious propositions with 
respect to "the species" runs thus: that the infinite perfection of the predicates, though not met in 
any one individual, is realized when the perfections of finite hwnan subjects are totaled. (The sum 
is greater than the parts.) 
103 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, p. 37. ''In the idealistic framework, 
finitude was basically taken to refer to whatever is determined by something external to it, 
whereas infinitude meant self-related or Wldetennined by another ... . Consciousness could then be 
said to be infinite if it were determined by nothing beyond itself" 
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perhaps, is his infrequent slip into language typical of traditional ontology. 
"Reason, love, force of will, are perfections - the perfection of the human being -
nay, more, they are absolute perfections of being,"105 he says. This being so, 
Feuerbach never assumes that Being is a category which implies a unified 
existence of an ontological subject distinct from human being. Even in this last-
quoted sentence, "being" refers strictly to what is essentially human, to the 
predicates ofthe human species that exist prior to the formation of an ontological 
other, which is frrst represented by the religious imagination, and then adopted as 
the governing principle of religious and speculative consciousness. Feuerbach 
confronts being at the level of human consciousness, before the point at which 
'"Being', that most general predicate, is reified by Hegel into an independent 
Subject."106 This is the manner in which Feuerbach, through his conception of 
species consciousness, assumes an inversion of the subject-predicate relation 
central to theological and speculative ontology, and establishes the ground for his 
claim: "I do not generate the object from the thought, but the thought from the 
object." His species concept, that is, stops short the ontological argument implied 
in the Hegelian discussion of religious and speculative consciousness; "it 
recognises as the true thing, not the thing as it is an object of the abstract reason, 
but as it is an object of the real, complete man, and hence as it is itself a real, 
complete thing.''107 
104 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Intemretation of Religion, p. 37. 
105 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 3. 
106 Phillips, "Feuerbach: religion's secret?" p. 90. 
107 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xv. 
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The object of the "real, complete" human being can be said to be real and 
complete insofur as our modem eyes view it as an existential category.108 It is 
clear that species consciousness takes as its objects various representations of the 
hwnan essence - the emotive, rational, and so on - without supposing that these 
representations must undergo transmutation so as to mirror or comprehend the 
speculative Begriff which, according to Hegel, necessarily exists as an other for 
thought. The predicates of the species, in other words, are not limited to the 
abstract realm of the intellect alone (as is the case with Hegel, insinuates 
Feuerbach). Yet it is difficult to determine the extent to which Feuerbach believes 
that his species concept is an object of empirical consciousness, an object that is 
determined in relation to the external world. The species concept, indeed, reflects 
a particular understanding of the human being as an empirical being, insofar as it 
makes empirical human - and not the God-concept - the subject proper of 
religious consciousness; but, more significantly, it implies that the individual is 
confronted with his own essence in a manner which catmot be deemed 
~'empirical." ''Consciousness," as I cite above, "consists in a being becoming 
objective to itself .... " Similarly, elsewhere Feuerbach writes that "the 
consciousness of the infmite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infmity 
of the consciousness; or, in the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject 
has for his object the infinity of his own nature."109 Thus, although Feuerbach 
divests religious consciousness of an ontological other that is distinct from "man," 
he proclaims for the latter an objective essence which cannot be viewed as a 
108 This, as I have shown, is Harvey's supposition. 
109 Feuerbach, Christianity, pp. 2-3. 
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category of empirical knowledge as such. These intimations of infmity mark the 
problematical milieu ofFeuerbach's species concept.110 
It is in this respect that Feuerbach's species concept recalls the 
epistemological framework suggested by my earlier discussion of religious 
consciOusness. For Feuerbach, one will recal4 feeling and the imagination, 
neither of which can be an object of hermetic empirical (only perhaps 
phenomenological) analysis, express the original encounter of the human being 
with its own infmite essence. This runs counter to Hegel's claim that the 
ontological subject, which necessarily exists for thought, requires a passing over 
of the contingent unity, manifest in fueling and the imagination, to the necessary 
unity achieved through the speculative comprehension of the other in its pure 
form. While Hegel suggests that reason is the means through which finite spirit 
can be reconciled with the speculative "centre of thought," Feuerbach supposes 
that it distances the human s1.1bject concentrically from his original, 
anthropocentric state of unity. Reason intrudes so as to effect the hypostatization 
of the other represented by the religious imagination, the original Vorstellung of 
the human essence. In this way, Feuerbach puts forth an anthropocentric 
interpretation of reason: i.e., the reduction of"Reasorr' to "reason," of Reason (or 
Thought) as a subject to reason as a predicate of human being, a Vorstellung of 
no In light of the seemingly metaphysical nature ofFeuerbach's conception of an infinite hmnan 
essence or consciousness, Harvey asks: «\\1ly does he [Feuerbach] identifY the species idea with 
consciousness alone? \Vhy is consciousness taken to be the 'essence' rather tban embodies 
subjectivity?'~ See Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, p. 49. 1 identify with 
Harvey' s questions, insofur as Feuerbach does not provide a clear answer to them in The Essence 
ofChristianitv. I bring to the fore matters ofthe same nature in my next chapter, where f discuss 
Feuerbach ' s ostensibly ambivalent stance toward the imagination as a mode ofhmnan self-
knowing 
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the human essence. He displaces the Hegelian centre, the essential unity of 
Thought and Being, with which all thought seeks progressive reconciliation. 
Feuerbach, as has been suggested, does not suppose an ontological unity 
of human (what Hegel calls finite spirit) and Absolute, infinite subject. Yet, 
implicit in his species concept, through which the essence of human being is 
present to consciousness, is an implied unity of finite and infmite: the ontological 
unity of subjective, empirical human subject with its infinite and objective 
essence. This is implied in Feuerbach's claim that he considers ''universal man .. . 
as the criterion of truth. ,.m Thus, although Feuerbach holds that the unity 
implied in Hegel's understanding of religious and speculative consciousness 
entails a ·~versal of waking consciousness," he supposes for wakeful thought a 
similarly unified ontological ground. Species consciousness, or wakeful 
consciousness, reflects the ontological unity of "man'' with himself, the unity of 
concrete human with his objectified essence- a unity which recalls the original 
state that marks the beginning of human self-knowing: namely, the unity of 
feeling '"rith itself: For it is only in response to this original unified state that :tear 
takes hold of the human subject and initiates the emotive collapse, the state of 
seizure that is first misapprehended and represented by the religious imagination, 
and then hypostatized as a rational subject by theological and speculative 
consciousness. In that he supposes the necessity of fear in the pre-reflective 
stages of human consciousness, and in that he acknowledges that a wayward 
conception of ontology has been engendered as an expression of this rear, 
Feuerbach secures the proper place of · his species concept in his overarching 
lOO 
conception of self-consciousness. The species concept is a necessary reflective 
concept, posited in order to bring about the original state of unity between the 
individual and his infmite essence through a reversal of the subject-predicate 
relation of ontology proper to theological and speculative thought. For 
Feuerbach, the species concept reflects, and is a means of retrieving the essential 
unity of human being. It is a means of achieving self-consciousness: namely, 
through a reversal of the state of disunity which necessarily constitutes the 
represented ontological condition of human being. 
Implicit in Feuerbach's species concept, therefore, is an appropriation of 
the Hegelian assumption that the individual "is already implicitly aware of the 
Infinite as the ultimate horizon of all being ... when he becomes reflectively self-
conscious."1 12 Species consciousness, although it entails a fundamental reversal 
of the ontology proper to religious and speculative consciousness, assumes a 
similar horizon for the human being: namely, the boundary line of finite and 
infinite. As examined in the previous chapter with respect to Hegel, this is the 
boundaryline which distinguishes the human from the animal, and the region 
where the ontological concept arises neces~...rily for thought, first in a 
representational, then in a speculative garb. Feuerbach, however, cuts short the 
ontological assumption of religious and speculative consciousness by supposing 
that thought conceives of this unified subject orJy after the religious imagination 
has misrepresented (as an other) the unified object of feeling. Hence his 
epistemological critique, implicit in The Essence of Christianity, that the 
111 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xxii Italics added. 
112 Yerkes, Christology of Hegel, p. 73. 
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Vorstellungen of Christianity, and their transmuted speculative form (Begriffe), 
distance the human from his original place of emotive unity. Yet Feuerbach's 
position, despite his critique of religious consciousness and the ontology which 
rests at its base, supposes a unified ontology. His discussion of species 
consciousness, which implies an ontological unity of concrete human being with 
his own objective and infmite essence, gives rise to the possibility that the 
"atheism of [the] heart"113 may have other ways of satisfying its yearnings for an 
other: the species concept being one more representation conjured by the 
imagination. For our purposes, it is not a matter of whether the species concept or 
the God-concept (or either) constitutes the proper oQject of consciousness. The 
greater suggestion, or at least the suggestion which lies beneath the surface of 
each ontological formulation, is that the human being requires an object, and that 
this object is infinite. "Man is nothing without an object," 114 says Feuerbach. 
Feuerbach's object, the ''species," like the Vorstellung of religious 
consciousness, rests on the boundaryline of fmite and infmite; and, like the 
imagination that gives rise to the representational forms of religious 
consciousness, ••it solves the contradiction in an existence which is at once 
sensational and not sensational."115 The contradictions inherent in Feuerbach's 
species concept, therefore, reflect the contradictions inherent in human existence, 
"which is at once sensational and not sensational," at once governed by one's 
encounter with the world and by thought. Thus, with respect to Feuerbach's 
u:; F ba-" c•J.....: • • . 11 eue.r '-'u, m lstiamty, p. • . 
ll4 F ba .\.. cl • . • A eue.r cu, rmst:Janrty, p ... 
115 Feuerbach, Olristianitv, p. 203. Feuerbach's words .reflect upon tbe nature of the jmagiootion, 
not that of the species concept. 
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claim, that "only the imagination is the preservative from atheism,"116 the same 
thing can be said of his species-concept, which straddles that intangible wall 
between finite and infmite (perhaps this is what Hegel and Feuerbach call 
"consciousness"). I shall explore this possibility in greater depth in what follows, 
where I consider the place of the imagination on the road toward human self-
knowing, as put forward in The Essence of Christianity. 
116 F ba .t.. r<l.. - ' • • · '>03 
. euer cu, vmtst:Iamty, p.- . 
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Chapter 3 
Feuerbachian Self-Knowing: The Imagination Reconsidered 
In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach's position with respect to the 
imagination can be viewed as ambivalent, at best. Van A. Harvey shows great 
insight in his claim that it is not always clear how, in Feuerbach's view, the 
imagination and feeling are related to species consciousness, the principal concept 
of his work of 1841.1 As outlined in the previous chapter, The Essence of 
Christianity puts forward a critique of reason as the epistemological mode which 
first distances humans from their original emotive mode of self-knowing, by 
abstracting the other (the species concept) as a distinct and unified subject which 
presents itself to human consciousness.2 Yet Feuerbach also claims that the 
imagination is an essential attribute of human being; as Marx Wartofsky points 
out, the imagination is in no way an "imaginary" instrument, 3 but rather a mark of 
that which distinguishes human being and "the brute,'"' namely, species 
consciousness. As was outlined in the previous chapter, Feuerbach reevaluates 
1 Van A. Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 39. 
2 In this chapter; I shall suggest that Feuerbach considers "reason" itself to be a mark of 
imaginative representation. 
3 Marx Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 217. 
4 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 1. 
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theological and speculative knowledge as subjective (or imaginative) 
epistemological forms. Each finds its first root in feeling, the object of which it 
misapprehends and misrepresents reason as an other, and is, in this sense, an 
imaginative form, a Vorstellung. Feuerbach substitutes this subjective intuition 
with an objective essence, the species - for him, the only object of consciousness 
which cannot be subsumed under the rubric of feeling or the imagination, . insofar 
as it is based on the interrelation of concrete human beings. This is the sense in 
which Feuerbach's species concept exists prior to its theological and speculative 
representational forms, and that in them it exists only in a veiled fashion, in a 
form transfigured by the imagination and systematized by reason. In the 
following chapter, I would like to expand upon Feuerbach's ambivalent position 
with respect to the imaginative faculty of human being, as represented in The 
Essence of Christianity. I follow Harvey in his belief that Feuerbach is not 
consistent with respect to his interpretation of imaginative thought, and take this 
as my point of departure for a closer reading of the place of the imagination in 
Feuerbach's view of human nature, circa 1841. Ultimately, I hope to illustrate, 
via Feuerbach's consideration of the Incarnation, the problematical way in which 
the imagination can be considered an infmite predicate of the species and, as such, 
the way in which Feuerbach's species concept is in some sense haunted by the 
unity and grandeur of the ontological concept he hopes to inter. 
The extent to which the imagination fulfills or is detrimental to human 
self-knowing is the matter in question, and a matter which The Essence of 
Christianity leaves open to question. In one of its key passages, Feuerbach writes: 
To the immediately emotional man the imagination is immediately, 
without his willing or knowing it, the highest, the dominant 
activity... To hlm feeling is an immediate truth and reality; he 
cannot abstract himself from his feelings, he cannot get beyond 
them: and equally real is his. imagination. The imagination is not 
to him what it is to us men of active understanding, who 
distinguish it as subjective from objective cognition; it is 
immediately J.dentical with himself, with his feelings; and since it 
is identical with his being, it is his essential, objective, necessary 
view of things. For us, indeed, imagination is an arbitrary 
activity.5 
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The "immediately emotional" human, therefore, is absorbed entirely by the unity 
of feeling whlch exists within him, and responds blindly to its pull. Similarly, the 
objects of the imagination, the slaves of feeling, are experienced with an 
equivalent level of immediacy; the Vorstellungen exist for theological 
consciousness as manifestations of an active subject. The piquancy of 
Feuerbach's critique rests in the fact that speculative thought, too, is subsumed 
under the workings of the immediate imagination -the "dream" of which I spoke 
in the opening of my last chapter. The speculative concept, in Feuerbach's view, 
is not an end in which the contingencies of imaginative content find their essential 
resolution, but is itself a product of the "dominant activity" of the imagination. 
("The absolute to man is his own nature.',()) While it would seem that Hegel's 
fmite spirit does "abstract [itself] from [its] feelings," in that it distinguishes 
between emotive and rational content, Feuerbach suggests that the act of 
speculative abstraction is symptomatic of the imagination's misapprehension of 
5 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 133. 
6 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 5. 
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the initial unity of feeling which presents itself to consciousness -that speculative 
abstraction, too, is a form of subjective cognition.7 
One can surmise that Feuerbach does not consider Hegel's thought to be 
that of an "immediately emotional" person in the sense cited above. For 
Feuerbach suggests that there is in fact a formal distinction between unity of 
feeling and unity ofthe intellect.8 It is simply that speculative thought imagines 
the unity of the intellect with itself as a unity with an ontological other, and so is 
removed from species consciousness, or the objective essence of human being. 
Moreover, in that the workings of the intellect arise only in response to the initial 
emotive unity which confronts human being - and, moreover, in that the intellect 
effects the synthesis of what are first imaginative representations of feeling -
Feuerbach implies that Hegel's speculative enterprise is twice removed from the 
emotive source of the religious impulse. If the speculative God-concept appears 
as the "essential, objective, [and] necessary" reality, it is only because it is itself a 
representational casting of the imagination, which is in turn only a servant of the 
heart, the omnipotent reign of feeling. This is the sense in which Feuerbach 
implies that Hegelian ontology reflects a dependence upon the initial unity of 
7 As l state in my last chapter, however, the imagination is largely a pre-reflective mode of self-
knowing (a slave offeeling). Yet there is a sense in which Feuerbach considers the imagination an 
active mode of reflection, insofar as it misperceives itself as reason and marks the genesis of 
theological and speculative philosophy, which attempt to systematize and overcome the contingent 
forms imposed upon this "rational" kernel by imaginative or representational thought In this 
sense, the "reason" of theological-speculative thought, the Begriff of theological-speculative 
ontology, does not constitute the object of"consciousness in its strict sense" (Feuerbach, 
Christianity. p. 2), but is an object of subjective cognition. 
8 
"The power of the object over him [roan] is therefore the power of his own nature. Thus the 
power of the object of feeling is the power of feeling itself; the power of the object of the intellect 
is the power of the intellect itself; the power of the object of will is the power of the will itself' 
(Christianity, p. 5). In each case, the "object" of which Feuerbach writes is the human essence 
itself. .Here one should recall Marx Wartofsky's insight that consciousness is constituted by 
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feeling, and that the mind of the philosopher finds its first home in the heart, from 
which it flees, with the imagination as its guide. 
This is not to say that Feuerbach, who suggests that human beings are 
subjects to the omnipotence of feeling, puts forward a view of religious 
experience which runs parallel to that suggested by Schleiermacher. German 
Idealism in its broadest sense, in fact, is challenged by Feuerbach's critique of 
religion. In one of his more revealing passages, Eugene Kamenka suggests that 
religion, for Feuerbach, arises as a result of "man's recognition of his 
helplessness." He points out that Schleiermacher, too, supposes that religion finds 
its ground in human "dependence" upon something other: 
The concept of dependence in Feuerbach, however, as he himself 
emphasizes, is "no theological, Schleiermachian, mystical, 
indeterminate, abstract . feeling". . . . It is not Schleiermacher' s 
vague metaphysical '"dependence", as felt by the finite when 
confronted by the shoreless infinite. It is the concrete empirical 
dependence of man on nature and other men. 9 
What separates the human from the animal is precisely that "man is conscious of 
his dependence." In other words, species consciousness, what Feuerbach calls 
"consciousness in its strict sense," can be distinguished from religious 
consciousness insofar as it assumes that humans are aware or conscious of their 
species nature.10 As suggested above, however, Feuerbach does not suppose that 
a person is necessarily conscious of his or her species nature. Religion, indeed, is 
feeling, wiUing, and thinking; and that consciousness, thus understood, constitutes the essence of 
human being (WartofSky, Feuerbach, p. 262). 
9 Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 
p. 41. 
10 
'•Religion is the alienated fonn of man's recognition of his own nature. Theology, on the other 
hand, is the theoretical alienation of man's nature, as not yet his own" (Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 
200). Species consciousness, or objective cognition, constitutes a retrieval of the human essence, 
unimpaired by the lens of religious self-knowing or theological-speculative self-alienation. 
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symptomatic of a lack of human self-knowing: the earliest and also indirect form 
of self-knowledge." For, "when religion- consciousness of God- is designated 
as the self-consciousness of man, this is not be understood as affrrming that the 
religious man is directly aware of this identity; for, on the contrary, ignorance of it 
is fundamental to the peculiar nature of religion."11 For Feuerbach, then, feeling 
and its subahern, the imagination, indirectly reflect the dependence of humans on 
their empirical surroundings. The "real world," so to speak, is the originative 
domain of the species concept, which is for him the proper object of 
"consciousness in its strict sense." Yet it is an attribute unique to the religious 
person that he remain unaware of the precise way in which his consciousness is 
conditioned by the empirical world; and so, too, is he unconscious of the source of 
the omnipotent feeling which reigns over him. 12 The religious person, to whom 
Feuerbach refers above as "immediately emotional man," is seized between the 
world of sense and the world of feeling, a condition which finds its 
epistemological corollary in the imagination, whose "entrancing splendour"13 
absorbs the dreamer into his dream. 
As I have noted earlier, however, Feuerbach critiques speculative theology 
for carrying out the selfsame dream, though in a more involved fashion, in that its 
operative organ of inquiry, reason, furthers the state of disunity implied by the 
cognitive affliction of "immediately emotional" humans. 14 Theological 
11 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 13. 
12 For an expansion of the way in which Feuerbach considers feeling and reason to be subjective 
affirmations of God's presence fur consciousness, see his chapter entitled, "The Contradiction in 
the Revelation of God," Christianity, pp. 204-12. 
13 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xix. 
14 Hence Feuerbach's ultimate distinction between faith and love: the first of which is fashioned 
by reason, and produces an inward as well as an outward disunion in human being; the second of 
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consciousness takes as its object of inquiry something other than the human 
essence; and thus, though it claims to distinguish the imagination "as subjective 
from objective cognition," on Feuerbach's terms it fails to recognize that its 
necessary object (Begriff) is equally an unveiling of imaginative thought. The 
speculative philosopher, although a person of "active understanding," is similarly 
caught up in the overarching dominion of the imagination. In Feuerbach's view, 
the speculative "Absolute" implicitly reveals that "man, as an emotional and 
sensuous being, is governed and made happy only by images, by sensible 
representations. Mind presenting itself as at once type-creating, emotional, and 
sensuous, is the imagination."15 That speculative thought effects the synthesis of 
forms of thought which are "at once type-creating, emotional, and sensuous," 
reinforces the way in which Feuerbach accuses the speculative philosopher of 
doing that which he principally seeks to avoid: namely, operating a level of 
"subjective cognition." This is the sense in which Feuerbach undercuts the very 
process by which speculative philosophy endeavours to reconcile the subjective 
content of feeling and religious representation with the objective and necessary 
content of the universal object of thought. For him, both poles belong essentially 
to the realm of subjective cognition; and, by consequence, the necessary concept 
(Begrijj) of speculative philosophy is reclaimed as a representational truth, is 
subsumed under the workings of the reflective imagination. 16 
which restores the unity of the human essence, becomes a manifest principle of activity between 
members of the species, and "heals the wounds which are made by faith in the heart of man." See 
Christianity, pp. 247-69. 
15 Feuerbach, Christianity. p. 75. 
16 As I remark in a note above, I use "reflective" imagination in contradistinction to '"pre-
reflective" imagination. The latter, a slave to feeling, is the mode of self-knowing of religion, 
while the "reflective". imagination is indicative of that mode of self-knowing (or alienation) which 
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Marx Wartofsky marks the way in which Feuerbach restates the presumed 
relationship, in speculative thought, between subjective and objective modes of 
thought, as well as its related belief in the necessary identity of thought and 
Being. Summarizing Feuerbach, Wartofsky writes that Hegel "falls prey to a 
representation of the Imagination- this 'achieved' Identity- and takes it to be the 
object of philosophy itself, a truth about Being itself, whereas it is, on critical 
examination, only a formal truth." In support of his claim, Wartofsky draws from 
Feuerbach himself: 
This unity of subject and object is a principle which is as unfruitful 
as it is pernicious for philosophy, especially because it overrides 
the distinction between the subjective and the objective, and 
frustrates any attempt to deal with genetic-critical, conditional 
thought, or with the problem of truth. Hegel was led to take 
representations which expressed merely subjective needs, as 
objective truths, because he failed to go back to the origins, to the 
needs which give rise to these representations in the imagination, 
and took them, instead at face value. 17 
Here it becomes evident that the assertions which Feuerbach puts forward in The 
Essence of Christianity with respect to the "immediately emotional" person, can 
be credibly transposed onto the speculative theologian or philosopher, despite 
Feuerbach's independent claim that the speculative thinker abstracts the emotive 
and imaginative condition of human being. This abstraction or synthesis of the 
object of consciousness constitutes the shift from a pre-reflective to a reflective 
mode of the imagination. According to Feuerbach, speculative philosophy is 
blind to the representational nature of its vision precisely because it has lost sight 
misperceives itself as reason, so as to give birth to the ontological concept of theological and 
speculative consciousness. Although these tenns are not found in The Essence of Christianity 
itself, I believe they help clarity much of what is at stake in Feuerbach's work. 
17 WartofSky, Feuerbach, p. 192. 
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of the pre-reflective origin of religious consciousness. Likewise, the Begriff, the 
assumed necessary centre of all thought, is for him a creation of the imagination, 
and a further manifestation of the human representational impulse. It, too, finds 
its origin in the "subjective needs" of human beings, though these needs are 
misapprehended and abstracted by reflective thought: hence Feuerbach's insight 
in The Essence of Christianity that "man, as an emotional and sensuous being, is 
governed and made happy only by images, by sensible representations."18 
Ostensibly, the speculative philosopher explains the essence of human being 
solely in terms of the abstract intellect; in this sense, finite spirit cannot be 
construed as "immediately emotional" being. Yet, as stated above, Feuerbach' s 
accompanying claim is that the abstract concept which orients the consciousness 
of the speculative thinker is similarly a manifestation of the imagination - the 
imagination which has abstracted itself from its emotive source. And, insofar as 
this is the case, "finite spirit" is not destined to realize its rational essence so as to 
mirror (speculum) or comprehend an absolute object of pure thought, but is 
principally ignorant of its original condition as an "emotional and sensuous 
being" guided by subjective yearnings. Speculative philosophers, in their search 
for "happiness," or what we can accurately substitute with "unity," misconstrue 
their subjective needs as objective truths, and are thereby seized by a state of 
disunity - by what is effectively an unhappy consciousness. The speculative 
thinker is propelled by the same "hunger and thirst"19 put forward by Feuerbach 
as the originary impulse of religious consciousness. The speculative thinker is 
18 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 75. 
19 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 277. 
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driven by the same desire to fashion a representational fabric out of which to 
recover a unified image of the human essence. 
Thus we are left with a twofold reflection on speculative thought. In one 
sense, Feuerbach charges speculative philosophy with abstracting humans from 
their essence by way of strictly rational concepts - and for neglecting the emotive 
and volitional (even imaginative) ground ofthe human essence.Z° Conversely, he 
implies that the speculative philosopher is guided blindly by the pull of the 
imagination, and that he follows the siren-call of feeling unwittingly. With 
respect to our analysis of Feuerbach, the latter observations are the more fruitful, 
insofar as they beckon us on to a closer reading of the role played by the 
imagination in Feuerbach's own formulation of species consciousness in The 
Essence of Christianity. For Feuerbach does not claim that the push and pull of 
feeling and imagination is destructive as such. Rather, he embraces feeling and 
the imagination as creative modes of human self-knowing insofar as human 
beings. remain conscious of their dependence upon the emotive and imaginative 
impulse.21 As long as one is not conscious or the pre-reflective origin of one' s 
religious impulse, it is "the work of the self-conscious reason... to destroy an 
illusion- an illusion, however, which is by no means indifferent, but which, on 
the contrary, is profoundly injurious in its effect on mankind."22 The illusion of 
religion and of speculative philosophy is injurious insofar as it assures the 
absorption of human being into a dreamed beyond, where he encounters the 
2() Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 272. 
21 In the religious stage of self-knowing, this comprehension is, in some sense, not possible, i.e., 
insofur as the imagination operates on a pre-reflective level and has not yet effucted the theoretical 
abstraction ofhwnans from their species essence. 
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passive objects of the understanding as active objects of an other,23 thereby 
denying him authentic existence in his proper sphere of reality, the world. Hence 
Feuerbach's implied distinction between ''reason" of speculative philosophy and 
what he calls "self-conscious reason" - the Begriff of the first simply being a 
Vorstellung of the reflective imagination. Insofar as speculative thought 
constitutes a dream-like "reversal of waking consciousness," it constitutes, on 
Feuerbach's terms, a mode of subjective cognition. Its "essential organ" is not 
self-conscious reason, but a rational impulse governed by the reflective 
imagination itself. 
In light of this discussion, one could question the extent to which 
Feuerbach's species concept itself constitutes a position that is fashioned out of 
the depths of imaginative representation. For it, too, like the imagination, "solves 
the contradiction in an existence which is at once sensational and not 
sensational. "24 The Hegelian conception of consciousness also entails that finite 
spirit mediates between the "sensational" (the finite) and the "not sensational" 
(the infmite); and like species consciousness, or "consciousness in the strict 
sense," it aims to solve the contradiction in an existence that takes place at the 
boundaryline of fmite and infinite. But species consciousness differs in one 
important respect: insofar as it is grounded on an encounter with a concrete, 
bodily other25 - viz., a member of the human species - it supposes an empirical 
being as the "absolute" object of consciousness, and the means toward a realized 
22 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 274. 
23 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 140. 
24 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 203. 
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form of "absolute" self-knowledge. 26 On similar grounds, Feuerbach suggests 
that there is an objective and infinite human essence, an essence that we derive 
from our fellow species-members. He acknowledges that there is such a thing as 
a fmite understanding, what he calls "subjective conception, i.e. , one which does 
not arise out of the general constitution of my species." 27 Speculative 
philosophy, which misapprehends the universal object of consciousness (the 
species) as a unified and independent other, rests on the subjective side of 
understanding, on the side of the reflective imaginative rather than of rational 
truth; it ignores the pre-reflective origin of the religious object, and conceives that 
its ontological concept possesses epistemological priority over feeling and the 
pre-reflective imagination. 28 Species consciousness, contrarily, entails an 
awareness of the universal object before it is reflectively enshrouded by the 
imagination and then is adopted as the necessary object of rational inquiry (as in 
theology and speculative philosophy). Species consciousness rests on the side of 
"objective cognition" insofar as it preexists the representational place of genesis 
of the speculative Begriff.29 "If my conception is determined by the constitution 
of my species, the distinction between what an object is in itself, and what it is for 
me [as, for example, in the imagination] ceases; for this conception itself is an 
25 Van A. Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 32. 
26 Not in the Hegelian sense of" Absolute Knowing" as a rational comprehension of the concept, 
but as a stage of self..:knowledge that cuts short the rational journey of the Phenomenology and 
where the speculative object is understood as a created form of the imagination. 
27 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 16. 
28 
"All therefore which, in the point of view of metaphysical, transcendental speculation and 
religion, has the significance only oft:be secondary, the subjective, the medium the organ - has in 
truth the significance of the primary, of the essence, of the object itself' (Christianity, p. 9). 
29 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 76. 
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absolute one."30 Awareness ofthe species concept, therefore, assumes a mode of 
objective cognition which precludes the need to satiate human "hunger and thirst" 
through imaginative representation (or reflection), a genus of which is the 
speculative concept. 
This is the sense m which Feuerbach attempts to get beyond the 
metaphysical relationship of fmite and infmite implied by the rational dogmatism 
of theology and speculative philosophy, without doing away with the belief in an 
infinite as such. Unlike Kant, Feuerbach does not claim that the infmite lies 
permanently beyond the finite. He still conceives of the infmite dialectically, 
insofar as infinity is a mark of the human essence and is constitutive ofthe formal 
structure of human self-consciousness. He embraces the infmite as a mark of 
species consciousness in that species consciousness is a translated form of 
religion, which entails "consciousness of the infmite; thus it is and can be nothing 
else than the consciousness which man has ofhisown- not finite and limited, but 
infinite nature."31 In that it assumes an infinite horizon of existence, Feuerbach's 
theory of species consciousness is - at least ostensibly - troublesome. How can 
he speak of an "infinite" without summoning, from the grave of theology, the 
ghostly forms of metaphysics? In one of his earliest writings, Hegel cautions 
against this very thing, stating that an examination of "the relation between man 
and the Christian religion" cannot proceed "without becoming in the end a 
metaphysical treatment of the relation between the finite and the infmite. "32 
3° Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 16 (bracketed words, my own). 
31 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 2. 
32 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans. T.M Knox (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), p. 176. This passage predates the Phenomenology by 
ll6 
Interestingly, in order to avoid lapsing into a treatment of that nature, Hegel 
himself suggests a starting-point similar in tenor to that of The Essence of 
Christianity. He writes: "I am here assuming from the start that human nature 
itself of necessity needs to recognize a Being who transcends our consciousness 
of human agency, to make the intuition of that Being's perfection the animating 
spirit of human life.'m The young Hegel's words put forward an exceptionally 
Feuerbachian perspective, particularly if one substitutes the term "species" for 
"Being." Moreover, in that his words suppose that human being manifests an 
existential need to "recognize a Being who transcends our consciousness," they 
echo the underlying assumption of Feuerbach's claim that human beings are 
"nothing without an object,"34 and specifically, that human beings are driven by a 
"hunger or thirst"35 for unity through this object. 36 That humans intuit the 
perfection of this object, and that this awareness constitutes the essence or 
"animating spirit" of existence, evidences a further likeness with Feuerbach, who 
contends that '"the divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, 
the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made 
objective- i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being."37 
approximately ten years, and cannot be considered a form of the Hegelian system to which 
Feuerbach responds in The Essence of Christianity or elsewhere. Walter Kaufinann argues that 
Hegel's early writings would be better labelled "anti-theological," insofar as they argue against the 
positivity of Christian doctrine. See Kaufinann, Hegel: Reinta:pretation, Texts. and Commentary 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965). 
33 Hegel, Early Theological Writings, p. 176. 
34 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 4. 
35 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 2n. 
36 This ''hunger and thirst," however, is manifested uninhibitedly by the pre-reflective imagination. 
The reflective imagination, by contrast, in some sense abstracts itself from the object ofhuman 
yearning and gives rise to an alienated ontology. 
37 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 16. 
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Freedom from limitation, from finite individuality, constitutes "infinity" 
proper to Feuerbach only insofar as the individual does not attempt to reflect an 
imagined escape from the natural dictates of finite existence, but rather comes to 
contemplate his or her infinite essence as a member of the species: to retrieve the 
pre-reflective human essence. But Hegel's general question remains: that is, 
whether Feuerbach's analysis of the relationship between human being and 
Christianity becomes "in the end a metaphysical treatment of the relation between 
finite and infinite." The issue is a particularly problematical one, due principally 
to the fact that Feuerbach's idea of species consciousness, which distinguishes 
between subjective human being and objective human essence, assumes a relation 
between finite and infmite, particular and universal, that is inherent in most 
metaphysical positions. Granted, Feuerbach does not assume a traditional 
metaphysical stance, if one takes him on his own terms: that is, insofar as these 
binaries - finite/infinite, particular/universal - are articulated with reference to 
human beings alone, and not to some objective and infmite other. Yet the very 
proposition of a universal human essence entails that there is something "more 
real" than the judgment of individual human beings.38 And thus, with respect to 
our current discussion, the question arises as to whether Feuerbach's species 
consciousness, what he calls "objective cognition," takes as its object something 
that is in fact a represented form of the imagination - whether it, too, is strictly a 
form of subjective cognition. 
311 See Frederick M. Gordon, "The Contradictory Nature ofFeuerbachian Hwnanism," 
Philosophical Forum VIII/2-4 (1977) 44. 
118 
As I have suggested, indeed, Feuerbach puts forth a broadened view of the 
human imaginative impulse, to the extent that speculative or metaphysical 
abstraction is subsumed under the workings of an active imagination, of 
subjective cognition. 39 Yet he maintains that "the species is not an abstraction; it 
exists in feeling, in the moral sentiment, in the energy of love.'.4° Max Stirner, 
whose Ego and Its Own advanced one of the earliest and most thorough critiques 
of The Essence of Christianity, put forward the following charge: "The meaning 
of the law of love is perhaps this, that everyone must have something that stands 
over him (das ihm uber sich geht). That object of holy love is the spook.'.41 
Insofar as this is the case, Feuerbach' s "species" does in fact constitute an 
abstraction; it becomes an "ideal" or, in our terms, a Vorstellung of something 
that is conceived to be superior in essence to finite human, the subject proper of 
Feuerbach's work. Stirner's critique does not charge Feuerbach with giving in to 
imaginative thought as such; his accusation, rather, is that Feuerbach's "species" 
is an abstraction of the intellect. Stirner' s general claim is that Feuerbach, while 
eliminating the infinite subject of theology, introduces an infinite and universal 
object that contradicts its sister-notion that the human being is a finite and 
sensuous being. "Feuerbach," he says, "allows the predicate to persist as an ideal 
- as a definition of the essence of the species, an essence which is 'imperfectly 
realized' in individual man as the 'complete essence of the perfect man."' 
39 See Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 76. 
4° Feuerbach, Christianity, pp. 268-69 (emphasis mine). 
41 Cited in Max Stirner, ' 'Stirner's Critics," trans. Frederick M. Gordon, Philosophical Forum 
VIIII2-4 (1977) 75. This short work of1845 is a rejoinder to an equally short writing of the same 
year by Feuerbach, written in response to Stirner's The Ego and Its Own (1844). The majority 
(approximately two thirds) of Marx's and Engel's work, The German Ideology, is devoted to a 
criticism ofStimer, to whom they refer ironically as "St. Max." 
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Speaking of himself in the customary third person, Stirner elaborates: "'The 
primary illusion,' says Feuer bach, 'is God as subject.' Stirner showed, though, 
that the primary illusion is rather the idea of the 'perfection of human nature' and 
that Feuerbach who champions this basic prejudice with all his might is therefore 
exactly like a true Christ.'.42 Stirner's allegation is that Feuerbach has made an 
idol ofthe human species, and accordingly, that the objective essence of humanity 
is, to use Feuerbach's own phrase, "a ghostly chimera." Moreover, his 
condemnatory reference to Feuerbach as "a true Christ" supposes that 
Feuerbach's "species consciousness" is no more of a revealed truth than that 
which traditional theology supposes for the Incarnation. The species-concept, 
Feuerbach's "basic prejudice," does not mirror an already-existing truth, but 
rather is predicated upon an imagined one: the idea of a perfect and infinite 
human essence. According to Stirner, The Essence of Christianity articulates a 
particular form of reversal of tradition theological and speculative ontology; but, 
in so doing, Feuerbach's book presents traditional theological-speculative 
revelation in a new incarnational garb. This is the sense in which Stirner 
repudiates Feuerbach's claim that species consciousness entails the form proper of 
objective cognition, or the means of achieving knowledge of a "human essence." 
In the terms of our current discussion, Stirner implies that species consciousness, 
too, is a product of the reflective imagination. 
Stirner, indeed, implies that Feuerbach's species-concept constitutes an 
abstraction that is no different from the religious Vorstel/ung, the speculative 
Begriff it usurps, insofar as it too supposes an incarnate, infmite essence for 
42 Stimer, "Stimer's Critics," p. 76. 
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humanity. For him, the attribution of this essence to the predicates of the species, 
rather than to . the individual subject, entails a theoretical rather than an essential 
transformation of ontology. What, indeed, is the particular nature of Feuerbach's 
claim that species consciousness does not rest on the side of "subjective 
cognition," of the reflective imagination? How does his species-concept differ 
from the imagined forms of theological and speculative representation? If, as 
Feuerbach claims, the human being "is governed and made happy only by 
images," does it not stand to reason that his species-concept itself constitutes a 
manifest or imagined Vorstellung, one which also takes root in the "hunger and 
thirst" which guides "immediately emotional man," as well as the theologian and 
speculative philosopher? In light of these questions, Stimer's likening of 
Feuerbach to Christ can be viewed as more than sheer rhetorical flourish. It 
propels us, indeed, to question Feuerbach's own consideration of the Incarnation, 
for him, the Vorstellung which symbolizes the necessity of the imagination for 
human consciousness. Yet, how the representational . value of the Incarnation, a 
manifest form of the human imagination itself, is related to species consciousness 
is something on which Feuerbach offers no elaboration. 
Feuerbach suggests that Christ-incarnate has no metaphysical existence as 
a subject distinct . from human consciousness; instead, the second person is none 
other than "the nature of the imagination made objective." "The Son is the 
satisfaction of the need for mental images, the nature of the imaginative activity in 
man made objective as an absolute, divine activity.'.43 The Incarnation, in other 
words, reflects the human need to represent human predicates as those of an 
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imagined divine other. As Van A. Harvey observes, however, the symbolized 
Son, for Feuerbach, does not simply satiate the human need to think 
representationally. "It is not just that the religious mind needs to transform the 
abstract being of the reason into an object of sense and imagination; it is that this 
image must itself be regarded as divine. "44 In the same way that Feuer bach 
eliminates the distinction between God-as-subject and the predicates that have 
been applied to the divine being, he alters the theological distinction between the 
"Son as a metaphysical reality and the image of the Son. "45 This is the sense in 
which Feuerbach considers "indefensible" (Harvey) the notion of an incarnational 
metaphysic. It constitutes the mirror image of what he considers a dubious 
ontological subject. The Incarnation is neither a historical, mythological nor a 
representational image of an infmite object (including the species), but is a 
representational image of the human imaginative faculty itself. 46 According to 
Feuerbach, that "the definitions of the second Person are principally images or 
symbols," does not suggest that human beings must necessarily conceive of this 
other in representational form; for "these images do not proceed from man's 
43 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 75. 
44 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, p. 81. 
45 Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, p. 81. 
46 In his Das Leben Jesu of 1835, feUow ''young" Hegelian David Friedrich Strauss suggested that 
Christ was in fact a symbol ofthe human species: that for the historical Christ, one must substitute 
the historical species; that "the two [human and God] are not essentially distinct." (See D.F. 
Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. George Eliot, ed. Peter C. Hodgson 
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1994), p. 777].) In this sense, for Strauss the Christ-event remains a 
Vorstellung of the species, in which finite and infinite conjoin. Feuerbach differs particularly in 
his suggestion that the Incarnation is nothing but the human imagination projecting itself in 
symbolic form. As a result, the fucamatioo has no representational value in the general Hegelian 
sense, i.e., as a mode of picture-thinking which reflects an infinite object (be it the God-concept of 
theology or Feuerbacb's "species"). Instead, it is through-and-through an image, which, at most, 
reflects the centrality of the imaginatioo for species consciousness - though this, tmforttmately, is 
a point upon which Feuerbacb remains silent · As shall be suggested later, there is ground for 
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incapability of conceiving the object otherwise than symbolically,- which is an 
altogether false interpretation, - but the thing cannot be conceived otherwise than 
symbolically because the thing itself is a symbol or image."47 For Feuerbach, 
therefore, the Incarnation does not point to an infinite reality beyond its 
representational fabric. It remains on the side of "subjective cognition," of the 
imagination - what he considers "an arbitrary activity'.48 - and appears as a 
symbol for the very reason that it is nothing more than a symbol. Thus, while 
speculative philosophy assumes a similar relativization of pictorial thinking, it 
maintains the necessity of the imagination for religious consciousness insofar as 
the representational husk of religious Vorstellung is shed so as to reveal a 
necessary thought-concept. For Feuerbach, Christ, the Vorstellung is the human 
imagination made objective; and insofar as this is true, theological and speculative 
inquiry, which assume the necessity of an incarnational object for thought, are 
entwined in the web ofthe imagination. 49 
The precise place of the imagination m Feuerbachian epistemology, 
however, is difficult to discern, particularly with respect to the Incarnation, his 
treatment of which gives greatest consideration to the imaginative activity of 
human being. On the one hand, Feuerbach asserts that the represented Christ 
satisfies the human need to think in images - a view which would seem to run 
parallel with his claim that humans are governed and made happy only by 
arguing that Feuerbach's treatment of the Incarnation is itself a mirror form ofhis discussion with 
respect to the species predicates. 
47 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 75. 
48 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 133. 
49 Feuerbach, Christianity, pp. 74-76. 
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images. 50 Under this assumption, the boundaries of imaginative thought - or the 
omnipotence of feeling - extend to the point where they encompass even the 
conceptual framework of theological and speculative inquiry: i.e., insofar as the 
theologian and speculative philosopher remain unaware that their objects of 
inquiry reflect an ontological principle which is encountered first through feeling, 
and only then is given representational form by way of the imagination. 51 It is in 
this sense that theological and speculative thought exhibit the selfsame "hunger 
and thirst" which reigns over .the "immediately emotional" person. On the other 
hand, Feuerbach argues that the imagination is an arbitrary activity, and that it is, 
by those of"active understanding," understood as a subjective mode of cognition. 
He claims, moreover, that humans are not incapable of thinking otherwise than 
symbolically, 52 and by inference, that the incarnational ground of religious and 
speculative consciousness is based upon an imagined principle of ontological 
necessity: "how blinded by prejudice dogmatic speculation is, when, entirely 
overlooking the inward genesis of the Son of God as the Image of God, it 
demonstrates the Son as the metaphysical ens, as an object of thought, whereas 
the Son is a declension, a falling off from the metaphysical idea of the 
Godhead.',s3 Thus, although the Begrijfofspeculative thought is itself subsumed 
5
° Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 75. 
51 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 133. Feuerbacb's discussion here, to reassert, pertains to the 
religious or "immediately emotional" hmnan. Although theology and speculative thought assmne 
reason as their proper instrmnent of inquiry, and deem emotive and imaginative content as 
subjective in nature, each is grounded upon a principle of ontological necessity which Feuerbach 
deems imaginary. fusofur as this is the case, and in keeping with this chapter' s general 
interpretation of The Essence of Christianity, F euerbach suggests that neither theology nor 
speculative philosophy can be said to be a form of"objective cognition," but rather that each 
should be understood as a manifest form of the reflective imagination. This conclusion can be 
read as another means of articulating Feuerbacb' s reversal ofHegelian ontology. 
52 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 75. 
53 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 76. 
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under the imaginative, and hence the emotive activity of the individua4 by no 
means does it reflect a necessary mode of thought or a principle of ontological 
necessity as such. Rather, it fails to recognize its dependence upon pictorial 
thought, its essentially subjective place of genesis, and gives false assent to a 
rational framework, which, presumably, actualizes the "objective" or "necessary" 
content of the central object of consciousness. This lack of cognizance, a lack of 
what Feuerbach refers to as "self-conscious reason," is symptomatic of the 
essentially imaginative nature of both religious and speculative thought. Self-
conscious reason, by contrast, retrieves the pre-reflective essence ofhuman being. 
With respect to our current discussion, this is the sense in which the 
imagination is for Feuerbach an arbitrary activity, despite his simultaneous 
conviction that the imaginative faculty is necessary for human beatitude. The 
Incarnation is not a necessary symbol, but is in essence, like all forms of pictorial 
thought, arbitrary. 54 Feuerbach's treatment of the Incarnation, in other words, has 
this as its significance: that it attempts the reduction of Christ to a symbol, and by 
extension, redefines as imaginative all thought which takes the Incarnation or any 
other symbol as its necessary centre. Simply put, the imagination in general is 
necessary for human happiness; a particular Vorstellung is not. 55 One can suggest 
54 These thoughts are based particularly on p. 75 of The Essence of Christianity. For Feuerbach, 
the incamational principle, or what Marx Wartofsky caJls a "metaphor," is common to all religious 
thought, and is not simply a motif of Christian revelation: " . .. beyond this particular 'Christian' 
sense, Feuerbach takes incarnatiOn as an essentially religious concep~ in general, a characteristic 
element in any religious consciousness whatever'' (WartofSky, Feuerbach, p; 226). This, I 
believe; is one more way in which Feuerbach distances himself from Hegel and his ultimate 
position that Christianity, a:s the "Revealed" or "Manifest" religion, imparts to humans the ground 
of Being, in a way that the other religions do not. 
55 This is perhaps the clearest possible summation of Feuerbach 's estimation of imaginative 
thought in The Essence of Christiani~ though be does not state the matter so simply, but instead 
waftles between an affirination and a condemnation of the imaginative faculty of human beings 
(see Christianity, pp. 74-78). 
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this despite Feuerbach's claim that Christ-incarnate "is in fact no devised, no 
arbitrary image; for it expresses the necessity of the imagination, the necessity of 
affirming the imagination as a divine power."56 The Incarnation is not an 
arbitrary image insofar as it expresses the necessity of the imaginative faculty 
which engenders it, and not because it reflects the necessity of an infmite subject 
that has existence in and for itself. 
Despite this seemingly apologetic interpretation ofFeuerbach's statements 
regarding the imagination, Feuerbach's ultimate position with respect to the 
imaginative facuhy of human being remains ambiguous. His clearest suggestion 
is that theological and speculative consciousness is necessarily conditioned by the 
imagination. 57 Yet, if the imagination is in fact a necessary form of human being, 
as Feuerbach claims, then it remains a fact to be accounted for in his general 
discussion of species consciousness, and not merely something to be understood 
as an illusion or a hindrance to the recognition of one's species nature, one's 
infmite essence. 58 Despite his frequent allusions to this "infmite essence," it 
could well be argued that Feuerbach, both in his discussion of species 
consciousness and in his erratic comments regarding the imagination, manages to 
56 Feuerbach, Christianity, p . 75. 
57 Wartofsky, too, stresses the fluid boundary which divides rational and imaginative thought. 
With respect to speculative philosophy, he writes: "The images as objects of feeling are given the 
status of thoughts as objects of reason. This self-deception is the characteristic error of that power 
of imagination that mistakes itself for reason proper" (Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 231 ). 
s& This, again, points toward the distinction Feuerbach makes between the "immediately 
emotional" person and the person of"active understanding," the one who takes the imagination at 
"fuce value" and the one who understands the "origins" of image formation. (See citation in 
WartoiSky, Feuerbach, p. 192). The issue can be restated in terms of whether the imagination is a 
"creative" or a "destructive" human attribute, a point upon which Feuerbach remains inconclusive. 
I borrow the "constructive/destructive" contrast from James A. Massey' s discussion ofbeliefin 
the "illusion" of personal immortality. See Massey, "Introduction," in Ludwig Feuerbach, 
Thoughts on Death and bnmortality, ed. and trans. James A. Massey (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), p. xli. 
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avoid the metaphysical trap of which Hegel warns in his early writings.59 On one 
level Feuerbach accomplishes this insofar as he argues that his species-concept 
exists prior to the genesis of the imaginative, metaphysical vessels of theological 
and speculative thought (Vorstellung and Begrif./).60 His claim, in other words, is 
that the illusion of a metaphysical essence does not come into being until the 
illusory distinction between subject and predicate has been abstracted by the 
reflective imagination and, hence, by rational thought: 
Only when God is thought abstractly, when his predicates are the 
result of philosophic abstraction, arises the distinction or 
separation between subject and predicate, existence and nature -
arises the fiction that the existence or the subject is something else 
than the predicate, something immediate, indubitable, in distinction 
from the predicate, which is held to be doubtful.61 
Insofar as Feuerbach understands this metaphysical ens or subject as a 
"declension" of what is first an object of the imagination, 62 speculative 
philosophy, which assumes Being or the subject as a first-principle of thought, is 
entwined in the web of the reflective imagination. 63 It takes its abstract concepts 
as manifestations of an "immediate" and infmite reality, and fails to understand 
59 Hegel, Early Theological Writing~ p. 176. 
1!0 On Hegel's tenns, of course, the ontological concept exists prior to the point where it is 
comprehended by thought. The God-concept is, "irrespective of our thinking." See Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "The Ontological Proof According to The Lectures of 1831," Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion ill: The Consummate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. Peter 
C. Hodgson et al (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 352. 
61 Feuerbacb, Christianity, p. 20. 
62 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 76. 
63 WartofSky remarks that, in Feuerbach's view, contradiction does not exist for the imagination as 
such (what I call the pr~reflective imagination), but is unique to rational thought. (See 
Wartofsky, Feuerbach, pp. 232-233). Rational thought is the realm proper of theology and 
speculative theology, is the place where contradiction first arises (an imagined contradiction, 
insofar as it is based on an imagined principle of ontological unity). Wartofsky's point offers an 
interesting counter-interpretation to my suggestion in the last chapter, that Feuerbach's 
introduction to The Essence of Christianity suggests an emotive place of disunity, or something 
similar to what Wartofsky calls "contradiction." These need not be viewed as mutually exclusive 
points; they hinge instead, I believe, on the distinction between rational contradiction and emotive 
disunity - though each signals a state of inner discord. 
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the nature or genesis of concept-formation (here with respect to the 
imagination). 64 
Feuerbac~ indeed, supposes that imaginative representation does not 
become a vehicle for a metaphysical relation between finite and infmite until it 
has been abstracted by reason, which itself is personified or "imagined" by 
speculative thought as an ontologically distinct, infinite subject.65 Religion 
simply accepts these imagined forms as "immediate" attributes of a divine other, 
and does not attempt to argue about the nature of an infinite essence. It is 
theology which first announces the distinction between subject and predicate, 
divine image and anthropomorphism, existent infmite other and imagined idol.66 
And thus it is theology which first announces the break of dawn of metaphysics, 
the metaphysical relation of finite and infmite, appropriated and abstracted by 
speculative thought in its discussion of Vorstellung and Begriff. Feuerbach 
attempts to cut short the process by which finite and infmite find metaphysically 
relation in the imagination, and dissolves the ontological distinction upon which 
speculative thought is predicated: "the antithesis of divine and human is 
altogether illusory," he says, "and is nothing else than the antithesis between the 
64 D.Z. Phillips makes the important observation that Feuerbach's "emphasis on concept-formation 
is not an emphasis on origin instead of truth, but an emphasis on how certain phiiosophical 
concepts can ~-formed in a way which distorts the realities of human existence." D.Z. Phillips, 
«Feuerbach: religion' s secret?" in Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001 ), p. 88. This is a themewhich Feuerbach takes up two years 
after the first appearance of The Essence of Christianity, in Pr.inciples for a Philosophy of the 
Future. 
65 Feuerbach, Christianity, p . 76. 
66 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 25 . . The religious person, in other words, encounters his "God" as a 
sensuous being, much as he encounters the objects of the sensuous world. This immediacy is lost 
in theological and speculative consciousness, which work under the assumption that there is a 
more immediate level of encounter, precisely what Feuerbach suggests is an imagined leap from 
the constraints of sensuous existence (Christianity, p. 214). 
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human nature in general and the human· individual. "67 The distinction between 
the individual and the species, according to Feuerbach, supposes no imagined or 
metaphysical relation insofar as it exists prior to the genesis of concept formatiQn 
which gives birth to metaphysics proper. 
One should here recall that Feuerbach does suppose an infmite essence for 
human being, an essence that can be apprehended in the predicates of the 
species.68 These infmite predicates arise as objects of consciousness only as a 
result of interaction between finite members of the species - a point which serves 
as the ground for Feuerbach's general denial of metaphysical (or essentially 
imaginative) thought, and his specific claim that he is "nothing but a natural 
philosopher in the domain of the mind.'.69 Yet, one must also juggle Stirner' s 
counterclaim that "love," one of Feuerbach's species predicates, constitutes an 
abstraction70: in terms of our discussion, that it is itself a figment of the human 
imagination. How, indeed, does Feuerbach maintain a solid divide between his 
idea of species consciousness and the imagination, when he deems the latter a 
67 Feuerbach, Christianity, pp. 13-14. 
68 This is the fuel for many critiq~es ofFeuerbach, ranging from fiery reproaches of the more left-
leaning "young HegeJians," Max Stitner and Karl Marx (with Engels), to the dampened criticism 
, of more recent academic articles. ·For a firm example of the latter, see Frederick M. Gordon, 'The 
Contradictory Nature ofF euerbachian Humanism," Phllosophical Forum VIII/2-4 ( 1977) 31-47. 
For the general Marxist evaluation, see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, 
ed. C.J. Arthur, trans. Lawrence and Wishart (New York: International Publishers, 1974), pp. 39-
96. (For Marx' s canonical, "Theses on Feuerbach," see pp. 121-123 of the same volume.) Van A. 
Harvey's critique is perhaps the strongest recent monograph of this sort, insofar as it does not 
dismiss all ofFeuerbaCh, but only what the author deems the "convoluted" strand of thought 
which rtms through The Essence of Christianity. Harvey carries out his critique, moreover, not on 
the terms of Hegelian philosophy, but in light of the clear, "natw'alist-existentialisf' project that 
one finds in Feuerbach's later writings and lectures. See Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation 
of Religion; 
69 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xiv. 
70 Stimer, ''Stitner's Critics," p. 76. 
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necessary attribute of human self-knowing?71 How is the "species concept" itself 
not a Vorstellung of imaginative thought, a reaching out for something that rests 
beyond the limits of sensuous existence? 
Herein, one might suggest, lies a fundamental place of ambiguity with 
respect to Feuerbach's conception of species consciousness. While Feuerbach 
affirms the existence of essential and infmite predicates of the human species-
particularly his trinity: intelligence, love, and will - he argues that the 
imagination, too, is an essential and necessary attnoute of human being. And 
although he does not make the selfsame claim, that the imagination is a 
"predicate" of the species that is reified as an attribute of a divine other, he puts 
forward what can be interpreted as a mirror argument in his treatment of the 
Incarnation: that Christ is the manifest form of the imaginative impulse reified as 
an other; and that it is, like the predicates of the species, an "activity in man made 
objective as an absolute, divine activity. "72 The difference, indeed, is that the pre-
reflective imagination is a necessary mode of human self-knowing, but that its 
objects, which are apprehended by theology on a reflective level, are not. The 
imaginative impulse as such is necessary, its objects arbitrary, while species 
predicates find their confirmation in a person's encounter with concrete objects: 
71 Feuerbacb, Christianity, pp. 74-76. 
72 Feuerbach, Christianity, p . 75. This is something that interpreters ofFeuerbach neglect to 
mention. Harvey, however, makes the important point that ' 'the image [of the Second Person] 
itself must be regarded as divine," though he draws no parallel between this necessity and the 
predicates of the species. (See Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation ofReligion, p. 81.) We 
are left, moreover, with the obscure triad: if (1) the imagination signifies a freeing from the limits 
of sense, or itself is the "limitless activity of the senses" (Christianity, p. 214), and (2) the 
Incarnation is "onJy the nature of the imagination made objective" (p. 75), then (3) the Incarnation, 
is nothing but the limitless activity of the senses made objective. The Incarnation, on these terms, 
becomes the birthplace of theological-speculative metaphysical forms (Yorste/lung and Begriff) 
and consequently, the very ground for Feuerbach 's critique of theological and speculative thought. 
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namely, fellow members of the species. 73 Love, along with other the "infmite" 
predicates of the species, is rooted in the senses, inso:fur as it manifests itself 
between concrete, sensuous members of the species. This is the sense in which 
Feuerbach can claim that species consciousness, or "self-conscious reason,"74 
does not contradict sense certainty, though it offers a particular form of reach 
beyond the limits of finitude: "Follow the senses! Where the sense take over, 
religion and philosophy come to an end. And you have as a consequence the 
plain, shining truth."75 
In light of this treatment ofthe imagination in The Essence of Christianity, 
however, the "truth" (here: species consciousness) can be said to be neither 
"plain" nor "shining." The imagination serves as an interesting point of 
discussion insofar as it points the reader toward a consideration of Feuerbach's 
greater claim to have penetrated the truth with his blade, the species concept. 
Above, Feuerbach claims that the species concept is necessary insofar as it is 
predicated upon the apprehension of a concrete and empirical other. The content 
of imaginative thought, by contrast, is arbitrary and signifies the "limitless 
activity of the senses."76 This is the only manner in which the imagination 
"solves the contradiction in an existence which is at once sensational and not 
sensational."77 Yet, what is it that makes the species predicates as necessary to 
human consciousness as the objects of sensuous experience? Do they not signify 
73 This is the main argument ofFeuerhach's defense against Stimer's claim that love is an 
abstraction. See Ludwig Feuerbach, ' 'The Essence of Christianity in Relation to The Ego and its 
Own," trans. Frederick M. Gordon, Philosophical Forum VIII/2-4 (1977) 81-91. A summary of 
this short tract can be fuund in Wartofsky~ Feuerbach, pp. 423-24. 
74 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 274. 
75 Feuerbach, "The Essence of Christianity in Relation to The Ego and its Own," p. 85. 
76 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 214. 
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somethin& "more" than their sensuous referent, viz., one's fellow member of the 
species? The "truth," in this sense, is not so "plain" or "shining."78 
This point is furthered with respect to the necessary status which 
Feuer bach accords the imagination in the framework of human self-knowing, and 
moreover, to his treatment of the Incarnation as a mark of the necessity of the 
imaginative impulse of human being. To make use ofthe terms with which this 
chapter began: .Is it simply that individuals of "active understanding" understand 
the arbitrary nature of imaginative content; that they can distinguish between the 
"necessary'' species concept and the "arbitrary" representations of religious and 
speculative consciousness? Or is the imagination so necessary that even those of 
active understanding are dazed by its "entrancing splendour"79? For, as 
"emotional and sensuous" beings, we are, according to Feuerbach, "governed and 
made happy only by images, by sensible representations."80 And this, indeed, can 
be understood as an indicator of the necessary place which imaginative thought 
holds in Feuerbach's understanding ofhuman self-knowing, and by consequence, 
in his idea of the species concept itself. With respect to the necessity that 
Feuerbach accords the pre-reflective imaginative impulse of human being, one 
must question whether the species-concept, like the representational fabric of 
theological and speculative thought, is in fact a further unveiling of the 
incarnational metaphor, a further Vorstellung of the human imagination. 
Consideration of the imagination in The Essence of Christianity points to the 
77 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 203. 
78 It is in light of this that many (e.g., Stimer and Marx) begin their respective reproaches of 
Feuerbachian philosophy. 
79 F b ch Chri . . . euer · a , stiamty, p. XIX. 
132 
ultimately problematical nature ofFeuerbach' s claim to have retrieved the essence 
of human being, to have penetrated the space which exists prior to the formation 
of the ontological concept. 
8° Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 75. 
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Conclusion 
Insofar as Feuerbach deems imaginative thought a necessary impulse of 
human self-knowing, one is left wondering whether his species-concept, in The 
Essence of Christianity, constitutes an object imagined: a form greater than or 
beyond "the senses" - what Feuerbach considers the realm of "the plain, shining 
truth,"1 where both religion and philosophy meet their necessary end. This, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, was the initial criticism launched against 
Feuerbach's Christianity by Max Stirner, who claimed that all ideals to which the 
individual bowed down in worship, including the secularized "perfections" of 
moral humanism, were godly abstractions.2 Does Feuerbach, in his species-
concept, unearth a ghostly chimera from the graveyard of theological and 
speculative thought? Marx and Engels, indeed, suppose this much, and suggest 
that ''the species" is simply a secularized form of the religious or speculative 
Absolute it usurps from the throne of "self-consciousness," while for them the 
1 Feuerbach, ''The Essence of Christianity in Relation to The Ego and its Own," Philosophical 
Forum VIII/2-4 (1977) 85. 
2 The author's own summary of The Ego and Its Own can be found in Max Stirner, "Stirner's 
Critics," trans. Frederick M. Gordon, Philosophical Forum VIII/2-4 (1977) 66-80. 
134 
entire empire of the human essence must fall. 3 Yet the duo's appreciation of 
Feuerbach's philosophical endeavour is evident: Marx and Engels claim that 
Feuerbach both accepts and resists "existing reality" and that he goes "as far as a 
theorist possibly can, without ceasing to be a theorist or a philosopher.'.4 
Feuerbach achieves philosophical rather than real liberation, a criticism that is 
sharpened in Marx's famous "Theses." There, Marx suggests that Feuerbachian 
materialism, what he calls "contemplative materialism," fails to "comprehend 
sensuousness as practical activity."5 Feuerbachian materialism, indeed, differs 
from the Marxist version, insofar as it hinges on a conception of a human essence. 
Yet it would be uncritical simply to dismiss Feuerbach's position on Marx's 
terms, without recourse to an examination of Feuerbach's work itself.6 The point 
at which Feuerbachian materialism (or the "sensuousness" which predicates his 
conception of species consciousness) intimates a principle of immateriality is 
heightened by consideration of the imagination as a critical device in The Essence 
of Christianity. 
Ultimately, an analysis of the imagination announces the generally 
ambiguous nature of Feuerbachian species consciousness in The Essence of 
Christianity. As has been argued in the preceding pages, for Feuerbach, 
imaginative thought is the birthplace of what he considers to be alienated forms of 
consciousness: the theological and the speculative. The Hegelian articulation of 
3 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur, trans. Lawrence and 
Wishart (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 40. 
4 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 61. 
5 Karl Marx, ''1beses on Feuerbacb," supplementary text to The German Ideology, "Thesis IX," p. 
123. 
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ontology was the subject proper of my first chapter, in which Vorstellung and 
Be griff functioned as the concepts through which the theological and speculative 
articulations of an onto logically necessary other could be brought to greater light. 
Representational and conceptual forms of truth, as was argued, reinforce Hegel's 
ultimate ontological principle, that both religion and philosophy "fmd their 
ultimate centre in the one thought of God"7 - religious Vorstellung as the God-
concept in figurative or imaginative garb, and Be griff as a vessel for rational truth, 
freed from the chains of imaginative representation. According to Hegel, I 
argued, Christian Vorstellung suggests the existence of an ontological concept, or 
Begriff, which exists necessarily prior to its comprehension in thought by finite 
spirit. The Hegelian philosophy of religion puts forward the twofold supposition 
that Christian dogma enshrouds the ontological concept, which exists as an 
ontologically distinct subject, but that the representational husk of Christian 
Vorstellung must undergo transmutation so as to mirror or comprehend the 
ontological concept in its pure speculative form. 
In my second chapter, I attempted to sketch out the epistemological 
framework of The Essence of Christianity, a framework which inverts the 
theological and speculative expressions of traditional ontology. More 
specifically, I attempted to reveal the manner in which Feuerbach's inversion of 
Hegelian ontology hinges upon an interpretation of reason as an essentially 
subjective human instrument of knowledge. For Feuerbach, I suggested, reason 
6 One should here recall Sass' argument that Feuerbach offers an alternative reading of Marxist 
materialism. Hans-Martin Sass, "The 'Transition' from Feuerbach to Marx: a Re-Interpretation," 
Studies in Soviet Thought 26 (1983) 123-142. 
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abstracts . and effects the synthesis of an imagined object, and is not a mirror 
(speculum) or medium in which a necessary other can be known in its essential 
purity, once its representational husk has been shed. In order to communicate this 
reversal of Hegelian ontology, I sought to sketch out the way in which Feuerbach 
differs from Hegel in his estimation of feeling, the imagination, and reason as 
modes of self-knowing. Feuerbach, in essence, dissolves the distinction between 
contingency and necessity by which Hegel argues for the ontological necessity of 
the speculative concept. The very notion of a unified and infmite other is 
reclaimed as an object of an ontological dream, an object of the imagination, and 
is replaced, in Feuerbach's design, by the human species - the concept which 
effects a reversal of the subject-predicate relation proper to Hegelian ontology. 
In my third and last chapter, I attempted to outline the ambiguous nature 
of Feuerbach's treatment of the imagination in The Essence of Christianity. On 
one level, I strove to reinforce the manner in which speculative thought itself can 
be viewed, on Feuerbach's terms, as a genus of imaginative representation. On 
another level, I hoped to show the way in which the imagination for Feuerbach, 
despite his claim regarding the essentially arbitrary nature of imaginative 
content,8 is for him simultaneously an essential attribute of human self-knowing. 
This was complemented by Feuerbach's treatment of the Incarnation, in which 
one finds a mirror argument for the imagination as a predicate of the species, in a 
way which leaves Feuerbach' s understanding of species consciousness open to 
7 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 1: Introduction and The 
Concept ofReligiorr., ed Peter C. Hodgson, trans .. Peter C. Hodgson eta/ (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984 ), p. 84. 
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serious criticism. I suggested this, despite Feuerbach's explicit position that 
species consciousness constitutes "objective cognition" proper,9 a form of 
consciousness which embraces the human imaginative impulse, so long as we 
remain conscious of and mediate the arbitrary or "subjective" nature of 
imaginative objects themselves10 (including and especially the ontological 
absolute, which, for Hegel, is the speculative Begriff). 
In the pages which precede me here, I have attempted to show that the 
most significant shift in The Essence of Christianity is the ontological reversal 
which grounds both his reading of speculative philosophy and his ''translation" of 
the "images" proper to Christianity.11 On his terms, moreover, the species 
concept is the sublated or realized form ofthe ontological concept.12 Yet, insofar 
as Feuerbach offers us a "translation" of religious and speculative ontology 
without rejecting belief in the human essence itself, his species concept remains at 
the problematical boundaryline between finite and infmite, at the horizon upon 
8 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1989), p. 75. 
9 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 133. 
10 This is in contradistinction to the view of Garrett Green, who claims that Feuerbach ' s view of 
the imagination is essentially hostile. See Garrett Green, "Who's Afraid of Ludwig Feuerbach? 
Suspicion and the Religious Imagination," in Christian Faith Seeking Historical Understanding: 
Essays in Honor of H. Jack Forstman, eds. Duke and Dunnavant (Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1997), pp. 45-65. In the few sections of The Essence of Christianity where Feuerbach 
struggles specifically with the nature of imaginative knowledge, I have argued that there lurks an 
implicit affirmation of the imaginative impulse as a creative mode of human self-knowing. 
11 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. xiii. That Feuerbach accepts "religious discourse" as factual, and its 
objects of devotion as literal, is the main point of (Wittgensteinian) criticism in Stephen P. 
Thornton, "Facing Up to Feuetbach," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (April 
1996) 103-120. 
12 An objection, that this supposes a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the ontological 
concept, is suggested by Hegel throughout his Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. 
Walter Jaeschke argues that, so long as one is faithful to the precise nature of dialectical 
development in Hegelian thought, Feuerbach's anthropological interpretation of religion cannot be 
understood as the realized form of the speculative Begriff. Walter Jaeschke, ''Speculative and 
Anthropological Criticism of Religion: A Theological Orientation to Hegel and Feuerbach," trans. 
Dale M. Schlitt, Journal for the American Academy of Religion XL VIII/3 (Sept. 1980) 345-364. 
138 
which one finds religious Vorstellung according to Hegel. 13 Feuerbach, in this 
sense, is no iconoclast, a point which Stirner takes as his ground for his 
interpretation of the species perfections as abstractions.14 This, moreover, is a 
further way in which a reading of the imagination as a central mode in the 
epistemology of The Essence of Christianity gives rise to the general level of 
ambiguity which characterizes the Feuerbachian "translation" of religious 
consciousness. The imagination, according to him, "solves the contradiction in an 
existence which is at once sensational and not sensational," and in this sense is the 
only "preservative from atheism."15 On the terms of a religious iconoclast or a 
more extreme hermeneutist of suspicion, however, Feuerbach' s species concept 
can be read in the selfsame manner. 
This potential interpretation of the species concept in The Essence of 
Christianity arises in spite of the fact that the "infinite" according to Feuerbach 
differs from the conception of his master- in spite ofthe fact that it is what I shall 
call a relative rather than an absolute infinite, a distinction which hinges once 
more upon each thinker's stance with respect to the principle of ontological 
necessity, the theme which gives pulse to much of the discussion in this thesis. 16 
The suspicious interpretation suggested above, moreover, arises because of the 
13 This "boundaryline" frames much of my analysis in chapter one, and marks much of the 
discussion about religious consciousness in James Yerkes, The Christo logy of Hegel (Albany: 
State University ofNew York Press, 1983). · 
14 Stimer's "Ego," however, does not reflect the most extreme of iconoclastic categories, a view 
put forward by Marx and Engels in their German Ideology. Through and through iconoclasm, in 
fact, is perhaps not fully realized until Nietzsche, who leaves almost nothing untouched by his fire, 
and who rejects even the "1" of western philosophy as a prejudice which philosophers ''baptize" as 
truth. See particularly Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Basic Prejudices of Philosophers," Book I of 
Beyend Good and Evil, in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufinann (New 
York: Random House,2000). 
15 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 203. 
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fact that Feuerbach's species concept, though it does not imply an ontological 
reality that exists beyond the limits of finite existence, supposes an "infinite" 
horizon for the human essence, an infinite principle of historical materialism. On 
this front, Feuerbach writes: 
I firmly believe that many things - yes, many things - which with 
the short-sighted, pusillanimous practical men of to-day pass for 
flights of imagination, for ideas never to be realised, for mere 
chimeras, will to-morrow, i.e., in the next century- centuries in the 
individual life are days in the life ofhumanity - exist in full reality. 
Briefly, the 'Idea' is to me only faith in the historical future, in the 
triumph of truth and virtue.17 
In other words, Feuerbach's species concept, the grounding principle of his 
historical materialism, implies a belief in the potential resolution of the 
contradictions in historical existence. And thus, like the imagination, ''which 
solves the contradictions in an existence which is at once sensational and not 
sensational," it functions as a further ''preservative from atheism,"18 insofar as it 
assumes belief in the infinite possibility of the human species, the infinite 
capacity to overcome contradictions, or things which pass in present times for 
"flights of the imagination." 
Feuerbach's belief in the infinite potential of the species, reflects, I 
believe, his unwillingness to relinquish the metaphor of an infmite principle itself 
He adopts, indeed, what can be viewed as a figurative or transfigured form of the 
infinite other which grounds Hegelian ontology, and in so doing, further reflects 
the necessary place of imaginative or representational thought on the inner road of 
16 Despite Feuerbach's rejection of an absolute, infinite ontological concept, he affirms the infinity 
of the human species, relative to the finite nature oftbe individual. 
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human self-knowing. One cannot help but mark Feuerbach's tendency to 
appropriate religious images as vehicles for a veiled form of infmite truth, as the 
Ur-Text of the ''translation" that is The Essence of Christianity. The presence in 
that work of what Marx Wartofsky calls an "incarnational metaphor" has akeady 
been noted.19 And, as I suggest in my last chapter, insofar as the incarnation 
serves as a mirror argument for the necessary place of the imagination in human 
self-knowing, the incarnational metaphor illustrates the way in which Feuerbach 
cannot entirely break away from representational thought, although he attempts to 
do just that. The very terms with which he distinguishes species consciousness 
from reflectively imaginative (theological and speculative) thought are yielded to 
him, in fact, by the ontological framework he attempts to dissolve. To cite again 
from a central passage in this regard: 
To the immediately emotional man the imagination is immediately, 
without his willing or knowing it, the highest, the dominant 
activity... . To him feeling is an immediate truth and reality; he 
cannot abstract himself from his feelings, he cannot get beyond 
them: and equally real is his imagination. The imagination is not 
to him what it is to us men of active understanding, who 
distinguish it as subjective from objective cognition; it is 
immediately identical with himself, with his feelings; and since it 
is identical with his being, it is his essential, objective, necessary 
view of things. For us, indeed, imagination is an arbitrary 
• • 20 
actlvtty .... 
The distinction between subjective and objective cognition, arbitrariness 
(contingency) and necessity, are embedded in the representational fabric of 
traditional ontology. In this sense, although Feuerbach attempts to divorce 
17 Feuerbach; Christianity, p. xiv (emphasis mine). Referring to this passage, Feuerbach writes, "I 
attach myself: in direct opposition to the Hegelian philosophy, only to realism, to materialism in 
the sense above indicated." 
18 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 203. 
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himself from the ontological other of religion and philosophy, he cannot escape 
the metaphorical presence of an infmite other in his own discussion of species 
consciousness- an observation, some might argue, which reflects the principle of 
ontological necessity itself From this perspective, Feuerbach's inconsistencies 
with respect to the imagination reveal that he is in the grip of an idea which he 
does not have categories adequate to convey, and that he must resort to speaking 
in a representational manner about the traditional dualities of speculative ontology 
(subjective/objective, finite/infmite, arbitrary/necessary). Although these terms 
are relativized in light of the fact that Feuerbach denies an absolute ontological 
concept, they illustrate the metaphorical or representational value that such a 
concept necessarily holds for human self-knowing, and reveal the essentially 
iconic purpose of the Feuerbachian species concept itself. 
Feuerbach himself deems imaginative the fabric of the ontological 
"reality" that serves as the object of religious and speculative consciousness.21 
The thought-icons of religion and philosophy are, for him, without dimension or 
base. Yet, insofar as he argues that the imagination is a necessary impulse of self-
knowing, and insofar as he gives voice to the terms of traditional ontology in a 
figurative form, his own representation of reality (species consciousness) becomes 
19 Marx W. WartofSky, Feuerbach (New York: Cambridge Univ~rsity Press, 1977), pp. 226-228. 
2
° Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 133. 
21 The Begr{ffitselfbecomes a metaphor, or a manifest form of what A.V. Miller, in his translation 
of Hegel's Phenomenology, calls "picture-thinking." I would like to point the reader to the first 
paragraph of that book's last chapter, "Absolute Knowing," where Spirit recognizes the nature of 
its representational condition thereto. While a poet often consciously creates figurative form, 
Spirit sheds its pictorial-rational husk and becomes fully self-conscious only when it recognizes 
itself as having been constituted of figurative-rational forms (Vorstellungen). Feuerbach extends 
the domain of imaginative thought, and subsumes the Begr{ff under the rubric of representation, 
thus implying the figurative nature of the Hegelian awakening to self-consciousness. This is of 
particular interest here, but begs for significant analysis elsewhere. 
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a vehicle for a veiled form of the infinite other. It is thus that an examination of 
the imagination in The Essence of Christianity points to the relatively 
problematical nature of Feuerbach's species concept. One fmds that Feuerbach 
puts forward an ontological position which evidences a longing for an infinite 
horizon, the ''hunger and thirst"22 of religion and philosophy. There, one 
encounters the infmite horizon of traditional ontology presented in a veiled or 
metaphorical garb - without the necessary Begriff. What theological or 
speculative ontology lacks in terms of earthly "reality," it makes up for in terms 
of the principle of necessity that grounds it (much as the dimension that a sacred 
icon lacks, in terms of time and space, is made up for by the ontological horizon it 
is believed to represent). That Feuerbach speaks of an infmite horizon of 
existence, that he casts an image of an infmite in figurative terms, reveals that he 
may be in the grip of an idea which he does not have categories adequate to 
convey. Yet, as I suggest in chapter 3, Feuerbach affirms the necessity of a pre-
reflective imagination- before the emergence of reflective imaginative activity, 
which misperceives itself as reason proper and marks the birthplace of the 
ontological concept. Feuerbach' s conviction, that the emotive and imaginative 
impulses precede the formation of an ontological concept, is precisely what 
separates his reading ofthe Christian religion from Hegel's. Insofar as the species 
concept of The Essence of Christianity suggests the necessity of the imaginative 
impulse, or the power of images on the inner road of human self-knowing, it 
points to a pre-reflective horizon that is at once within and beyond religion and 
philosophy - and thus, perhaps, to the possibility of an ontological principle itself 
22 Feuerbach, Christianity, p. 277. 
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